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First of all, the US rhetoric of escalation, which reminds one particularly of the pre-Iraq War era, does not help and must be stopped. A constant underlying threat of becoming the target of an attack by the United States or Israel - both nuclear-weapon-states - only helps the Iranian leadership in making its own citizens believe that nuclear capabilities are absolutely crucial for deterrence and self-defense. The military option needs to be taken off the table in order to create an atmosphere that allows room for diplomatic movement toward subsequent mutual trust-building.

Secondly, UN Security Council resolutions pressing Iran to suspend its program seem legally questionable. It is essential to realize and accept that Iran has a legal right to develop and use nuclear technology for civil purposes under Art. IV para 1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which is legally binding for both Iran and the US. Any attempt to interpret this passage otherwise is doomed to failure in the light of continuing state-practices which allow Non-Nuclear Weapon states such as Germany and Brazil to operate vast civil nuclear programs.

Nevertheless, the fact that any civil nuclear facility can easily be misused for military purposes (dual-use-technology) cannot be ignored. Therefore the IAEA accesses and monitors all nuclear activities and - in the case of Iran - could not find anything. Already one of the first IAEA reports after the discovery of the Iranian program in 2002 stated that "there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program." (IAEA-Doc. GOV/2003/75) Although this explicit statement was never repeated, it was never revoked either. Up until today, the IAEA merely expresses "concerns" relating to the "possible existence" of a military program (IAEA-Doc. GOV/2010/10 and GOV/2010/28). Under these circumstances, the lack of moral authority in demanding a suspension of Iran's program becomes understandable, as well as the lack of support for the US strategy by many of the region's actors (e.g. Egypt), for they fear their own rights might eventually be diminished, too.

Hence, the suspension of Iran's nuclear program should not be the condition for lifting sanctions on Iran, as the current resolutions suggest. Success in this matter calls for a solution which all main parties - in particular Iran and the US - can sell at home while at the same time keeping face internationally. A negotiation based on the suspension of nuclear enrichment is very unlikely, given the strong support for the nuclear program from all political parties in Iran. At the same time, Iran's principle right to use nuclear technology cannot preclude the international community from assuring that it has entirely civilian purposes.

Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle is the only practical way to combine these goals. A multinational, commercial uranium enrichment facility in, or outside Iran would provide the country with enriched uranium, without providing the sensitive technology. Such a facility should be constructed with the help of the Europeans and the support of Brazil, Turkey and the IAEA; the EU could offer close partnership in the energy sector - detailed proposals are already on the table.

Thirdly, as long as the nuclear powers of this world defend their nuclear arsenals, the possession of atomic bombs will always remain a sign of prestige and international power. The discriminatory nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, allowing some states to possess nuclear weapons and others not, was one of the main reasons for states like India never to join the NPT. Up until today it perpetuates existing power structures and leads to a loss of moral authority when arguing for the nuclear non-proliferation. The obligation to disarm that would serve as compensation for this imbalance is still far from being fulfilled. But in the case of atomic bombs, less is more. Every step towards nuclear disarmament is a step towards a nuclear free Iran. It is not by chance that the beginning of Iran's nuclear ambitions in the early 1980s coincides with Israel's nuclear armament in the late 1970s.

Therefore, in the short term, all political pressure should be put towards creating a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East. That means in particular, that the US has to pressure Israel to give up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for the internationalization of Iran's nuclear program as described above. Israel should further be encouraged to join the NPT. In the mid- and long-term, complete nuclear disarmament finally has to become a real and priority political goal again. Peace-prize-winning declarations of will are not enough, concrete steps are in order. Topping this list would be the final accomplishment of widespread ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as strong support for the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Finally, all parties concerned should bear in mind that a nuclear Iran is in nobody's interest. It would be the first time in the world's history that a theocratic and instable regime acquired nuclear weapon capacity, putting traditional strategies of deterrence to the test when a "call from Allah" potentially replaces rational policy decisions. It would destabilize the whole region, strengthening the Iran-supported Hezbollah movement as well as introducing the potential risk of nuclear proliferation among terrorist groups and other non-state actors. Eventually it would bring the whole NPT-Regime into deep crisis. Making political concessions as described above would be a small price to pay in order to avoid such a scenario.

Alexander Pyka is a student at Bucerius Law School, Hamburg.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Iran's Nuclear Program" here.