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The question as to whether Ukraine should be in NATO and/or the European Union should be placed in a larger geostrategic and regional context.

One simply cannot offer Ukraine membership in NATO (or in the European Union) until the Russians and Ukrainians settle their own disputes over their boundaries—and over irredentist claims to Crimea, in particular. Here, Crimea is still claimed by Russian nationalists, despite the fact that it was handed over to Ukraine by Khrushchev, prior to Soviet collapse, on political-legal grounds that Russian nationalists continue to dispute.

Crimea is significant in that it guards the entrance into the Sea of Azov and also protects Russia's critical energy export facilities at Novorossiysk. Moreover, the Russian Black Sea fleet continues to lease the naval base in Sevastopol, side by side the Ukrainian fleet, but that lease is to expire in 2017. This forewarns of a potential political-military crisis if a deal over the Sevastopol base (among other geopolitical and economic questions) cannot be mediated before 2017.

NATO membership for Ukraine would be met by strong Russian support for pro-Russian nationalist and separatist movements, particularly inside Crimea and eastern Ukraine. It appears dubious that the US and EU could offer significant political-economic incentives to persuade pro-Russian factions to turn away from Russia and toward the greater "West"—given Moscow's increasing oil and gas revenues, and rapidly growing economy (despite overall weakness in many other sectors of Russia's economy). The fact that Russia's military industrial complex is still intertwined with Ukrainian industries further aggravates Russian opposition to Ukrainian membership—in either NATO or the EU.

From a global strategic perspective, immediate Russian support is furthermore needed to apply pressure on Iran to dissuade Tehran from developing a ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capability that could threaten Europe and other states. NATO membership for Ukraine could lead Moscow to strengthen its support for Tehran.

Given apparently increasing European dependence on Russian energy supplies, alienating Moscow is definitely not in the European interest. At the same time, Europe does need to seek out and develop alternative sources and supply routes for oil and gas; the EU also needs to develop alternative energy resources as rapidly as possible. What can be done?

Ukraine is already a key energy partner for the EU, and the EU seeks to work with Kiev to strengthen the integration of European and Ukrainian electricity and gas markets, while at the same time, improving safety and environmental standards. The EU and Ukraine also need to strengthen technological cooperation agreements that would help develop alternative energy sources. All of the above should be pursued but without letting Moscow believe that Russia's political economic interests are being excluded, thus raising Russia's historical fears of being isolated by the West.

Greater European development assistance to predominantly ethnic Russian regions in Ukraine could help to mollify pro-Russian anti-Western sentiment.

One possibility would be to help modernize the coal industry in the Donbass region, which has suffered from years of gross mismanagement, accidents and labor strikes. In addition to assisting environmental clean up throughout the entire country (as it has been doing), the European Union could offer to help foster joint ventures in Ukraine in advancing and modernizing coal mining technology and methane production, for example. These joint ventures could include multinational European, Ukrainian, Russian and American firms. This could be done by helping to develop coal and methane as energy sources, for export to Europe and elsewhere, but utilizing advanced non-polluting and ecologically sound technologies.

The EU is already the major donor of development assistance to Ukraine. But such aid should be offered in such a way so as to not strengthen already deep political-ethnic divisions within the country. European aid and assistance for Ukraine should not be used (even inadvertently) in such a way so as to exclude Russia, but to include her, and to actually help build EU-Russian confidence. In other words, the EU needs to balance its development assistance between the essentially p ro-European western regions and the generally pro-Russian eastern regions of Ukraine.

NATO and the EU could also play a major role in seeking ways to mediate between Russia and Ukraine by working to create a Black Sea "security community" under a separate NATO-EU-Russian regional command structure that would include Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania, through the NATO-Russian Council under general OSCE auspices, with strong European participation through the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO.

This Black Sea regional security community would represent an alternative to demands to integrate the region fully into NATO in the traditional sense (as some American analysts have proposed). It is far better to build security structures that can best fight against drug smuggling, illicit activities, human and arms trafficking—and likewise protect the transport of energy supplies for all concerned—from the bottom up in coordination with Russia and Turkey and other non-NATO or non-EU members than from the top down, thus forcing all states to obey US/NATO directives. Such would represent an exercise in cooperative security.

In the short term, Ukraine should remain "neutral" and not a member of either NATO or the European Union. In the longer term, however, just as Greece and Turkey came into NATO together, it is possible that both the Russia and Ukraine could come into both NATO and the EU together, but not as "full" members of either organization—but as very close associate members. This would represent the development of a confederal relationship—or what has been called asymmetrical federalism.

In other words, instead of offering "full" membership and voting rights to Russia and Ukraine in the European Union based on their population, these states could be granted a more limited vote in the European Union on issues that affect them directly. (The same asymmetrical federal principle could be applied to Turkish membership in the European Union.) Russia and Ukraine (and Turkey as well) would then represent associate members of the EU (going beyond the status of "partners").

In terms of NATO membership for Russia and Ukraine, this means pressing the next American leadership (whether Democrat or Republican) to strengthen the NATO-Russia Council (with greater European input as part of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO). Washington needs to realize that a closer US-European-Russian relationship over ballistic missile defenses and Iran—as well as Ukraine—is in both the American and European interest. (Ballistic missile defenses should be jointly overseen by the Americans, Europeans and Russians.)

Both NATO and the EU need to be as flexible as possible in dealing with their "new" neighbors. To be specific, both NATO and the EU will need to re-define their approaches to the new Europe by means of changing membership categories so as to better incorporate the legitimate interests of Russia, as well as of Ukraine and other states (not to overlook regions with "separatist" demands) which will not necessarily become full members of NATO's integrated command structure.

The concern raised here is that Ukrainian "neutrality" will not last forever; the issue of leasing the Russian Black Sea fleet until 2017 will soon put Ukrainian "neutrality" to the test. In the next few years, Germany and the European Union must play an engaged role in mediating between the US, Russia and Ukraine in order to prevent a possible show of force between Russia and NATO over the Ukrainian question—and to prevent a new partition of Europe—if not much worse.

Hall Gardner is Professor in the International and Comparative Politics Department at the American University of Paris. He is the author of Averting Global War (New York: Palgrave, 2007); American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terrorism' (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005; 2007); and Dangerous Crossroads (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), among many other edited books and articles.

Related materials from the Atlantic Co mmunity:

• Jens F. Laurson and George A. Pieler: Expansion Does Not Solve NATO's Dilemma
• David Francis: Ukraine's Conditional Future in the EU
• Heinrich Bonnenberg: Ukraine's Future Lies in the EU, not NATO

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