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November 3, 2011 |  18 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Felix F. Seidler

Say Goodbye to Prestige Thinking: Quit CSDP and Concentrate on NATO

Felix F. Seidler: The EU has proven it is not a credible player in international security; the CSDP is merely a prestige project that has gone nowhere. Despite lower budgets, NATO still has the means to tackle current threats, and EU defense spending should be concentrated there.

Recently, German soldiers in Afghanistan told President Christian Wulff that they would not have survived combat injuries without US Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters evacuating them from the battlefield. During the Libya campaign, France and the UK ran out of bombs and the US had to help them out. Robert Gates was right in saying many European countries are just unable to contribute to combat missions. So can the EU be a credible actor in international security if it is unable to evacuate the wounded, has no ammo, and includes many incapable states? No, it can’t!

From the beginning, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its predecessors were more prestige projects than necessary efforts. The EU never needed to be an actor in international security, but it wanted be one. Look at the EU´s first “stand alone” mission in the Congo in 2006, EUFOR RD Congo. The EU community was happy that the EU had demonstrated the ability to act on its own; with a look into the details, however, EUFOR RD Congo was more a joke than a stand-alone mission. From 1100 EU soldiers in Kinshasa, a city with more than 8 million inhabitants, only 130 Spanish troops were combat capable. Had there been escalation in Kinshasa, the EU would have been severely outmatched. Additionally, the EU Battlegroups have never been used in a significant way. The groups are more a paper tiger than a credible instrument. According to military officers, the contributing countries would be unable to send the troops counted on paper if called to action. During the Libya crisis, the idea of EUFOR Libya occurred, but quickly disappeared into the archive.

Within this decade, and due to likely demographic consequences beyond, the EU´s financial and material situation will only worsen. So why continue pursuing on an already failed prestige project? The EU has neither been a credible actor in international security nor will it ever become one. Before ever dealing with security policy, Brussels should try to make its common foreign policy work.

Any EU security policy means a second bureaucracy beside NATO. However, in times of austerity, two bureaucracies with more or less the same job are just a waste of taxpayers’ money. If the EU countries spend even less on defense, they would be better off concentrating the remaining money on one organization rather than splitting it on two. Furthermore, the examples of the CSAR helicopters in Afghanistan and the bombs for France and Britain cited above prove Europe’s inability to act alone. Hence, even if US engagement in Europe and NATO may shrink, any kind of US involvement is better than no US involvement, and, by the way, likely cheaper for the Europeans.

Yes, CSDP is anchored in the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, an alteration of the Lisbon treaty is unnecessary; governments can just wipe the CSDP out of the agenda. It is unnecessary and the EU is not able to execute it anyway.

So why concentrate on NATO? In contrast to the EU, NATO’s major value is that it has proven its ability to act, even when member´s views differed and capabilities lacked. With the smart defense initiative, NATO is already on a good track to compensate for austerity. We definitely need more pooling and sharing among countries. However, we do not need pooling and sharing among countries within two bureaucracies, and any formal intensification of NATO-EU cooperation is not about to happen.

The major argument for strengthening NATO is that the alliance, as opposed to the EU, has the capabilities needed to deal with the threats emerging in the current security environment. Prospectively, the means needed are expeditionary navies, a well-equipped air force including space capabilities, special operation forces and, most importantly, cyber capabilities. Without a doubt, the EU has none of these capabilities working.

While NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division is already tackling cyber threats, the EU has no serious cyber security agenda. It is NATO which is running institutions like the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) protecting people against cyber threats. CSDP just does not deal with this drastically emerging threat. So if CSDP does not protect the taxpayers against the most important threat, why should they pay for it?

Moreover, the CSDP has no Special Forces component. As we saw in Libya, NATO would not have been successful without US, UK and French Special Forces engaged. In all of the last decade’s conflicts, Special Forces played an emerging role and this is likely to continue. However, Special Forces capabilities are quite rare, so cooperation with the US is a must; don’t forget that NATO already has established Special Forces coordination facilities. And as we have seen in Kosovo and Libya, Europe is simply unable to conduct stand alone air campaigns, because it relies on US aerial refueling and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities.

Yes, the EU conducts the naval Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa, but that is not an effort making the EU unique. Instead, Atalanta is an argument against CSPD. Two operations doing the same job and undertaken by largely the same countries are unnecessary. Taxpayers’ money could be used more effectively in one single operation, which should be NATO’s job due its better maritime security expertise.  

Obviously, the EU’s CSDP completely lacks the capabilities necessary today. Thus, the prestige paper tiger CSPD failed and should be scrapped. If European countries want to stay relevant in international security, they should not think “what do we want,” but rather “how can we be most useful.” NATO has proven its ability to use the capabilities the EU lacks. Thus, NATO is the organization that Europeans should focus their fewer resources on.

EU prestige thinking was yesterday. Streamlining and efficiency should be the new zeitgeist.

Felix F. Seidler graduated with an M.A. in political science from Würzburg University and blogs about security policy at Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik.

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Oliver James Frost

October 26, 2011

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An interest article Felix, if quite damning regarding the capabilities and future of the CSDP. I think the points made regarding the inability of European military powers being unable to act autonomously successfully without material and logistical support from the US to be a fair one, and obviously one that must be addressed should Europe be serious about remaining a military presence.

The one issue that would act as an argument against ‘wiping the CSDP out of the agenda’ is the fact that the CSDP is a solely European venture, while with NATO the dominant force is undeniably the US. Surely there exists the possibility that at some point down the line a conflict of interest may arise?
 
Adam  Thew

October 26, 2011

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Thanks for the article Felix, and I agree with your point particularly about the superfluity of a EU military force in the current economic climate in terms of carrying out tasks which can be achieved more successfully by the more experienced and better equipped NATO - in Libya for example. However, I do wonder whether it might not be going a bit far too argue for the removal of the CSDP from the security equation altogether.

Instead, could a compromise not be reached in which the precise role of the CSDP was re-defined (something which is perhaps overdue following the confusion arising from its aborted Libya commitment) to mirror the very real success it has achieved (albeit with NATO support initially) on smaller-scale, police and oversight missions, such as its original 'police mission' in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) in 2003.

The CSDP also plays a crucial role, one for which it is arguably uniquely qualified, in situations such as its European Union Monitoring Missions. The Monitoring Mission in South Ossetia, for example, springs to mind as a role which would be far less suitable for a NATO force considering the connotations of U.S. involvement in Russia's direct 'sphere of influence'. Preserving the CSDP for these very roles, and others which focus primarily on border security and combating extremely destructive activities across European borders such as human-trafficking and drug-trafficking, would appear to be a valuable avenue through which to free up NATO forces for greater security challenges.

This would also appear to address the point made by Oliver about potential conflicts of interest - for example it may well be the case that certain security situations in European countries which require a relatively 'minor' policing and oversight operation could be achieved without any NATO - and indeed U.S. - involvement. Indeed there may be times that an EU-mandated and EU-directed response is far more appropriate in cultural, logistical and economic terms) than one which involves a general NATO reaction with the added complication of U.S. involvement. This could act to strengthen the notion of European sovereignty and satisfy those calling for an EU 'prestige project' as you put it, without stretching the CSDP beyond its practical and logistical capabilities.
 
Hanna none Prakofyeva

October 26, 2011

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The statement ‘wiping the CSDP out of the agenda’ is strong but it is overestimation. I need to agree that practical use and work of CSDP is debatable, there is now real force and impact on issues from the work of CSDP. Nevertheless i believe CSDP is a balancing tool between US and EU. as previous comment said NATO could become a dominant force and than we are back to superpowers rule, however CSDP do not have real influence it creates a visibility of EU force, i believe agenda of CSDP should be re-evaluated and perhaps several transformation could be made in work of CSDP for cooperation with NATO
 
Joshua  Clapp

October 26, 2011

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Felix,

Thanks for the contribution. However, I would not describe the CSDP as a purely ‘prestige project', even if at the present moment CSDP capabilities are lacking. I would agree with Hanna that the CSDP acts to a certain extent, or at least started, as a kind of balancing tool between Europe and the United States.

The Saint Malo Declaration in 1998 between Britain and France paved the way for the creation of the CSDP. In the background were British fears that the U.S. could revert back to its historical isolationism, and the French believed the Americans would take the European allies more seriously if Europe took its own defense seriously. The CSDP was not created solely as a flight of fancy but rather, in one sense, as a concrete response to European fears over the larger power, the United States, abandoning the smaller powers in the alliance.

And Adam makes a great point that at times a U.S. presence would not be greatly appreciated in certain parts of the world. In such cases, a European-directed response would be the most logical, be it in Russia’s backyard or any other variety of places. CSDP could compliment NATO capabilities.

For example, see the 2002 ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’, wherein both NATO and the EU lay out their goals for the relationship between both organizations. The Declaration reaffirmed NATO’s basic role for collective-defense and recognized the important function of European initiatives, especially where NATO is not engaged. Of course, this does not mean that a clear NATO-EU relationship has emerged. And the Berlin Plus agreements, which form the backbone of the NATO-EU relationship, need reform.

So instead of doing away with CSDP, Europe should work on improving areas of coordination between NATO and the CSDP, in which the CSDP would compliment NATO capabilities and go where NATO – and by extension the U.S. – could not or would not go.

Regards,

Joshua
 
Paul  Smyth

October 27, 2011

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Felix,

I would echo Adam's point about redefining the CSDP. The above comments illustrate that there are circumstances in which a NATO presence/response may not be desirable or appropriate. Personally, I think the EU should lose aspirations to have a Defence apparatus when NATO already provides one (causes an issue for non-NATO members of the EU of course...) and instead focus more on Security. Obviously there can be problems discriminating between Defence & Security issues but let's not overplay that difficulty.

It seems the EU has Defence aspirations it cannot meet, but will exaggerate it's progress toward them (e.g. conduct a simple mission but extrapolate the ability to do complex ones). It should limit ambition to what is possible and beneficial (e.g. policing and monitoring roles). Perhaps that could be achieved through a CSP that would involve less duplication with NATO. A complementary role, not a competitive one.

One other point, on the C2 of an EU operation. Establishing an EU military HQ without UK participation would be like forming a NATO one without US involvement. Daft.

Paul
 
Christopher John McCartin

October 28, 2011

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I definitely agree with the article that to continue the development of the CSDP in tandem with NATO does not make sense, at least so long as Europe remains engulfed in its financial crisis. The EU must first repair its economic foundations if it to even considers advancing any common defence strategies.

The CSDP whatever its weaknesses, exposed during the recent campaign in Libya, as pointed out by Alex, still has its strengths in more civilian orientated missions, assisting with the development of policing and border control among other things. The CSDP has primarily been concerned with the stability of the EU and its neighboring regions and therefore the stability of the economy of the common market. However NATO facing existential dread in a post-cold war world has also taken up such soft power roles, further making the CSDP increasingly defunct.

The Berlin Plus agreement allows the EU to draw upon the resources and capabilities of NATO, if NATO’s first refuses to intervene in a crisis. It could be argued it is time for a revision of this agreement, the inverse, whereby NATO can have accesses to EU resources. This can only strengthen both institutions. However this may prove difficult; EU/NATO membership is of course not uniform. Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Finland, Sweden and Ireland are not NATO members and Ireland in particular guards its neutrality dearly.

With the prospect of the US now turning its attention to strategic interests in the pacific, the question must be asked where Europe’s place in relation to the US now lies? NATO is safe, its new focus towards soft power may be the new lease of life it needed. However EU-NATO states face the choice of future integration with the Atlantic alliance or consider maintaining and developing the CSDP as a ‘European way’ relatively free from US influence.
 
Jason  Naselli

October 28, 2011

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The interesting thing is, one potential way to divide up responsibility between the CSDP and NATO would be to make the CSDP responsible purely for territorial defence and have NATO be the go-to for all expeditionary operations, which it has shown it is capable of conducting successfully. However, I think a lot of the reason that EU military operations focus on these policing missions and such is that the trust still isn't there to truly go to a common defence pact. This would require specialisation that would deprive countries of having a fully functional military that could operate independently from one another, and that's something too many EU nations just won't go for. So, to paper over this reality, EU military efforts dabble here and there to present the image of unity, but no one really intends to take it any further.
 
Christopher John McCartin

October 28, 2011

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* Sorry I meant to say '...as pointed out by Felix,' not 'Alex.' My apologies to Felix .
 
Felix F. Seidler

October 28, 2011

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First, thanks to all of you your commtents. I truly value such a good discusion.

I am fully aware that the article contains a lot of provocative statements. However, I actually wanted to provoke, because I am convinced that it is time for an intense discussion about NATO, EU, CSDP and Transatlantic Partnership; something we hadn´t had until now. My was to push the discussion. Whether we concentrate on NATO or not at the end, we need the discussion. We need it here on Atlantic Community and beyond throught the US/NATO/EU foreign and security policy community.

Of course, conflicts of interests between US and EU will occur. However, we are allies for more than sixty years now and, therefore, we should be able to find political solutions for such conflicts. If US and EU would be unable to do so, then we would have a serious problem.

My article is obvioulsy only about the military component of the CSDP. I didn´t comment on civilian missions or similar things.

Police and monitoring missions is something the EU is able to do and should, henceforth, be done. However, as we saw in Afghanistan, the EU did not always succeed in police training. Furthermore, I reject the idea, too, that NATO should take on civilian missions like policy training. As I would concentrate the military work on NATO, I favor to concentrate the civilian work on the EU. Coordination between NATO and EU is exaclty what I want, but, according to military issues, I think it should be coordinated that the military work is done by NATO. Furthermore, nobody rejected my argument that the EU is unable to work with SOF or to deal with cyber threats.

Finally, to states have neither the time, currently, rather the ability, due Turkey/Greece/Cyprus, to find any new formal agreement between EU&NATO. So the discussion´s result should be to find some kind of gentlemen´s agreement of work sharing. NATO military, EU civilian.
 
Joshua  Clapp

October 29, 2011

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Felix,

Your focus on sharing the work is in the right place. However, a gentleman’s agreement is obviously not enough to facilitate better cooperation between the two. And not only does the lack of cooperation stem from the Turkey-Cyprus dispute, but goes to the very heart of the matter: clearly defining NATO and EU strategic concepts in a post-Cold War environment.

On one side, NATO could be a strictly military organization and focus solely on military matters, a view traditionally held by France. On the other side, NATO could operate not only as a military organization but also a setting where European and Americans come together to further their overall interests, a perspective customarily held by the United States. I lean towards the latter interpretation.

As such, I see no problem in NATO taking on civilian missions and expanding beyond a pure military focus. But if the EU can better carry out such missions, then so much the better. Nevertheless, it comes down to better cooperation and moving beyond ad hoc arrangements. In essence, there are four different dialogues – within the EU, within NATO, between the EU and the US, and between NATO and the EU. Somehow these discussions should be brought together into a more coherent whole. How exactly that happens is another question however.

Regards,

Joshua
 
Monika  Noniewicz

November 1, 2011

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Felix,

I second the thought that some sort of a burden sharing agreement should be struck between NATO and CSDP. With the US and Eurozone grappling with predicaments of economic nature both sides should welcome any plans that would involve division of labor, streamlining and reducing structural outgrowth. The agreement should also encompass issues such as security arrangements for EU states that are not NATO members, most notably Cyprus.

What I also think is that the underlying problem behind developing CSDP that is independent of NATO on one side and Robert Gates’ exhortations for Europe to beef up its defense capacities is that the consensus on transatlantic partnership that was the cornerstone of NATO seems somewhat outdated to the members themselves. While it is only right that Europe’s progressive demilitarization should be of concern to its NATO partners and that the EU should therefore develop security arrangements of its own, a change of attitudes seems to have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic. The US seems to have lost interest in being the principal actor on the European security arena and is now focusing more on regions like the Middle East and Asia. Similarly, some actors in Europe seem to resent the American dominance, which didn’t use to be that problematic in the past. After all, at its inception stage NATO was more or less an extension of US foreign policy, which given the realities of those times was quite understandable. Now that the Cold War paradigm is out of place, I think partners on both sides of the Atlantic should strive to uphold the alliance that, as you mentioned, brought over 60 years of peace and make sure that the commitment to its effective development is always there.

 
Oliver  Hauss

November 1, 2011

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Felix,

As Clausewitz stated in his often misinterpreted quote: "war is the continuation of politics with other means". To separate military operations from civilians has been a recipe for disaster in Iraq AND in Afghanistan, because it impairs the respect of military leaders for the necessities of civilian operations, including that of larger policy.

You point at the EU not succeeding in educating police in Afghanistan as if it was a failure of the EU. But for that to be the case, you'd have to show that the conditions were such as to allow success to begin with. You admit in your comment that you looked only at the military components - Since you admit you wanted to provoke, let me reciprocate: in my eyes, that's looking at a fantasy scenario in which the military aspects exist in isolation of all others, when in reality, they interact heavily. In my eyes, this view lies at the heart of many of the problems both in Iraq and Afghanistan, as military objectives and how to achieve them were far more clearly defined than anything else.

You call for a separation of duties - I believe the precise opposite is necessary: The strong integration of all efforts into one coherent whole. The formulation of precise political goals that are intended and the formulation of a comprehensive strategy as to how to achieve these political goals with the entirety of the means at disposal -economical, cultural, military etc..

The problem both in Iraq and Afghanistan in my eyes was not the least, that the political goals were more of non-goals: People knew far better what they did NOT want to have than with what to replace it and how. It is not too surprising that the war doesn't really end in such situations - with no clear political goal to achieve, how could it? In a way, it's similar to how the EU is currently stumbling through the financial crisis: With no one really agreeing on where to go, how do you suppose to get anywhere? You're left reacting to and treating symptoms because the larger problem is far too ill-defined (or agreed-on) to allow for forcefully tackling it proactively. Barring having any idea as to how to dissuade the will to fight in the opponent, the only chance you'd have is to completely and utterly break it (well, or the "kill them all, let God sort them out" solution). However, with developing nations, there's a problem: WWII reduced Germany from an industrialized nation with quite some standard of living into a pile of rubble and cinders. That's quite some shock. But in less developed nations, not only is the loss less great but the readiness to endure hardship is far greater. As "breaking the will to fight" in the traditional sense thus is not only difficult in these situations but may indeed merely cause future antagonism but also jeopardizes any moral high ground one might hold, the solution that's left is the often-quoted "winning the hearts and minds" which as a goal is often impossible to achieve because you ruined your chances to do so in the initial assault, believing there'd be time enough for it when fighting abates. Clausewitz already noted "for whilst we are in full occupation of the country the war may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by allies. No doubt this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every war does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement."

The non-goals cited would have been feasible if indeed we said "Our only goal is to remove Saddam Hussein and who cares what happens afterwards" Though of course such an attitude would have been naive because we are very much affected by what happens afterwards. So people tried to exercise some kind of control on the post-removal period without actually having a clear idea as to what direction to work towards. And if indeed they would have had such an idea, it would have had to shape not just the post-removal efforts, but already the initial invasion.

Instead of having NATO focus on military aspects and the EU on civilian aspects, I'd rather like to see a further integration of NATO into the political discourse. The Wikipedia article on the North Atlantic Council ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_Council ) pretty much speaks volumes in its brevity as to the actual traction that institution can generate. And the "management" of NATO institutions by the US during the Kosovo conflict underscores that pretty clearly.

Rather than a devolution of roles, I believe a comprehensive integration is needed in which military goals are aligned with long-term political goals. Serbia is another example in which one was harmed by an overly focus on the other, and not the least this was an incentive for the EU to push an alternative mechanism. While a prolonged bombing campaign might have served Clinton's domestic goals as to keeping the risk for US soldiers low, it clearly didn't serve European goals as to promoting long-term stability as it fueled victimisation feelings which led to prolonged animosity towards NATO and even while making it possible to remove Milosevic, fueled Serbian nationalism at the same time.

When you want to remodel your house, you might need a rotary hammer, a drill, a hammer, a screwdriver and lots of screws and nails, maybe some bricks and mortar and some tools to apply them with and most importantly, an idea as to how all of them fit together and get you there. When you focus on the rotary drill and neglect the others, chances are you are left with a ruin. Likewise, the military is one tool out of many, and unless you consider all of them and how they can interact and work towards the real, actual goal, chances are you're leaving ruined countries behind in the form of failed states.

In that line, I even disagree with the notion that we need a discussion on the CSDP at this point. In terms of urgency, there are more burning issues to address. In terms of relevance, we need to have a discussion as to what the EU stands for, where it wants to go and what it wants to achieve in general. If we could agree on that - and I have some doubts the current generation of leaders can - not only would what to do about the CSDP follow as a derivative conclusion, but also what to do about the financial crisis would be far more tangible. A discussion on the CSDP in isolation right now would be putting the cart before the horse, in my eyes. As policy, it should be deduced from overall EU policy.


 
Felix F. Seidler

November 2, 2011

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To all of you, thanks for the good comments.

As I wanted to start the debate, however, I would now like to develop some concrete policy recommendations. Obviously, we have a wide consensus here that there should be a work sharing between EU and NATO; even if some views on the "how" differ.

Thus, I would like to present you three approaches we may discuss. I hope that we´ll find a consensus on the policy that should be implemented. Of course, I am also fine with you presenting own approaches

No. 1: work sharing separated by core competences.
This means that each organization focuses on its core competences: the EU on civilian missions and NATO on the military business. In this approach, both organization´s strategies and bureaucracies would be adjusted to the specific core competences. However, there would be neither an EU military staff nor a NATO civilian mission component; there would neither be a military part in an EU policy strategy, neither be any civilian policy approaches in NATO strategies. Due the impossibility of formal agreement, this would base on political consensus throughout the NATO/EU member states.

No. 2: Coordinated work sharing by formal agreement.
Beside the core competences, the EU keeps its military wing. However, NATO and EU try to find a new formal agreement on how and when to share work, to share burdens and to share capabilities.

No. 3: Case by case work sharing.
This would mean neither separated working sharing nor a formal agreement, but rather cooperation on an ad hoc basis whenever it is necessary. Both organizations would have more autonomy and would only cooperate in specific cases/operations, after member states decided to do so.


 
Joshua  Clapp

November 2, 2011

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Hey Felix,

Thanks for the concrete recommendations. Obviously, there are positives and negatives for each approach.

Work sharing separated by core competences appears attractive at first glance. There would exist a fairly clear line for both organizations. However, it also seems shortsighted in letting certain attributes of the organizations atrophy: the military side of the EU and the civilian side of NATO. If in some case the other organization would not be involved in a mission, then NATO or the EU would be lacking a critical component for operations.

Case by case work sharing would mean that no truly hard negotiations would need to take place. If both sides agree on the necessity of the mission, then ad hoc missions might be easier to get off the ground. Nevertheless, case by case work sharing does not leave the two partners with a clear idea as how exactly to coordinate actions on the ground. And a case by case basis does not even guarantee that the EU and NATO actually coordinate on the ground, even if both entities support the same mission. I have read how the EU and NATO at times plan and carry out operations in the same theater as if the other did not exist.

A coordinated work sharing by formal agreement might get bogged down in bureaucratic delay. But a formal agreement would appear to be better considering the weaknesses of the other two approaches. Certain capabilities of NATO and the EU would not atrophy, and an agreement would facilitate actual cooperation on the ground. I see this, the formal agreement, as the best option. I suppose the Berlin Plus agreements technically represent such an agreement. However, at the moment, the Berlin Plus agreements seem to be more of a burden than help. A new and more streamlined agreement(s) should be considered in order to make the most of the EU and NATO relationship.

Regards,

Joshua
 
Jason  Naselli

November 3, 2011

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I really think the onus is on the EU here to decide what they want their unified force to be. Things like Berlin Plus are by design compromises to attempt to accommodate what is a changing and evolving EU military presence. But solid agreements on work sharing and clear delineation of powers needs stable actors; for the EU, whether that is in a more centralised defence force or as a looser affiliation may not matter as much as making it clear WHAT, exactly, it is trying to do
 
Kazimierz  Wiesak

November 6, 2011

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Author wrote:
"If European countries want to stay relevant in international security, they should not think “what do we want,” but rather “how can we be most useful.”
--------------
Questions:
1. most useful for whom and for what?
2. Does "international security" include security for Iraq, Iran, etc.?
 
Unregistered User

November 9, 2011

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Dear Mr. Seidler,

Thank you very much for instigating such as rousing discussion. I agree with most of your assertions—namely that the Western world should consolidate its military efforts under NATO. I find this quite practical, given NATO’s relative success and the fact that both the ideologies and agendas of NATO and the EU closely coincide. The suggestion is also extremely relevant given the current economic state of the globe. Taxpayer dollars funneled into one, effective institution eliminates redundancy, increases efficiency, and bolsters the player with the greatest chance of success.

In my opinion, the most salient element of the discourse is the reference to taxpayer dollars. When we are discussing defense institutions and defense spending, I think we should take a step back and challenge the amount of resources, specifically, the funding allotted to defense institutions as a whole. Defense is heralded a public, good—as it very well should be—but the funding allotted to this cause is increasingly disproportionate to that allotted to the rest of public goods. The US specifically, at 700 billion in 2010, spends more money on defense than the next 14 top global spenders combined. Since 9/11, the US has increased spending on homeland security by over 1 trillion. This consistently amounts to approximately 50% of federal discretionary spending—which leaves 50% for the remainder of public services. That list is long and unbelievably costly. Consider the teachers who push for the hundreds of billions needed to improve public schools and the millions who await federal housing assistance, which carries a multi-billion dollar price tag of its own. The Federal response? It simply cannot afford it. What it should say: try soliciting the Pentagon.

The mission of NATO is vital, especially with regard to protecting populations who do not enjoy protection from their own government in the way that the West does. In no way, do I advocate the elimination of defense structures. Given the growing disparity, both globally and locally, I merely suggest that provision of resources for such structures be scrutinized carefully. Careless, thoughtless and excessive spending is no longer sustainable. Should the Western world and beyond proportionally focus its resources into one, effective unit (such as NATO), the savings would be great. These funds could bolster the rest of public goods—health care, infrastructure, retirement plans, education—that have been so neglected. This reallocation of funds would be a step in the right direction for a world that has left so many behind.

Very best regards,

Lexi Hensley
MS Global Affairs, Candidate, NYU
 
Johannes  Steger

November 12, 2011

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Good morning,
economic efficiency before security concerns, that seems to be quite a common denominator of the above comments. Throughout financial hardship and in absence of any serious threat to security the capability gap between European and U.S. forces does not arose great concern. Why strive for a proper European defence, as long as the U.S. security umbrella is put up?
The answer is quite straightforward: Europe is as independent as are its defence capabilities.
If you assume that European interests will never differ from U.S. interests, than you can safely avoid spending on the CSDP framework (a low-level tentative to achieve a common stand on foreign policy matters, far away from prestigious goals like „acting alone“).
However, remember the fate of some members of the Delian League who bitterly realized that an independent foreign policy (e.g. changing alliances) was no longer an option. And following Thucydides, they had to blame entirely themselves: paying tributes instead of fighting they permitted Athens grip to hegemony inside the league. If once they fought the Persians side on side with the Athenians as equals, now, “without preparation and without experience”, there was no more chance left to revolt against the Athenian Empire (see Thuc. I, 99).
Best regards,
Johannes
Tags: | alliances | foreign policy | thucydides |
 

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