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It has been a long held maxim in naval strategy that "whoever commands the ocean, commands the trade of the world; and whoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world; and whoever is master of that, commands the world itself..." This striking seventeenth century adage may seem out of place in an era where high-speed transfers of capital make their way from city to city through virtual "trade-routes". For many, naval power may also seem to be a secondary issue when compared to the importance of land and air power, not to mention inter-continental force projected on the tips of advanced rocketry.

Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the continued importance of the world's commercial shipping lanes to a state's prosperity. Natural resources such as oil and liquefied gas are not transportable through any virtual space, and are reliant upon tankers over vast areas of ocean and sea. Such journeys are of course fraught with risk. If one considers the importance of energy supplies to an economy, combined with the relative insecurity (e.g. piracy or collisions) of transporting them to their destinations, then one can see why states are so inclined to protect cargoes.

It is not just physical barriers that cause states so much concern, as transporting energy supplies is also a highly political activity. How a state acquires such resources in the first place (e.g. contracts and conditionality), how political circumstances (e.g. nationalism and political instability) in source countries stammer the supply, and how competition over energy increases inter-state tensions are all considerable issues for any state to overcome.

One answer to these dilemmas is to develop the military force required to cushion the political and economic risks associated with energy supplies. Naval power is still the sole way of protecting supplies when they are transported over oceans and seas. China is currently spending much time and effort in developing its naval capacities to be able to protect its energy supplies. This is China's right and, incidentally, a welcome development in the fight against piracy. However, China is  seeking to develop aircraft carriers and more diesel powered submarines, and, if successful, the Eastern giant will have naval power capable of operating beyond its own immediate vicinity.

This is seen as a worrying development in the United States, and this fear has already permeated thinking in some US public institutions. In 2007, for example, the US Congress heard that "official documents and writings by Chinese military strategists suggest Beijing is surveying the landscape beyond Taiwan in the consideration of the application of China's military forces to other regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory." This thinking is grounded in a rather hypocritical notion that chastises the Chinese for activities (e.g. securing African natural resource supplies) that the West has historically excelled in. While it is true that China's involvement in Africa raises issues such as aid conditionality (or the lack thereof), one must remember that the Chinese still emphasize the importance of the Bandung principles (1954) in its relations with Africa - principles that never guided the West's scramble for resources on the continent.

This has been met with commentary by Robert Kaplan who has already made the prediction that China and the US will lock-horns in the Pacific Ocean, where he believes "China will have distinct advantages over the United States, even if it lags behind in technological military prowess." These include China's geographic proximity to the USA, its ability to learn and adapt quickly from mistakes, and its growing influence in Africa and Latin America.

Such fears are only likely to increase in the US with China's demand for more energy resources from abroad. In this sense, it will be difficult for the US and Europe - and possibly even for the Chinese themselves - to differentiate between the development of Chinese naval power for energy security reasons and wider political ambitions. This distinction is quite difficult to prize apart, and one must ask what a state does with the navy it has just built - are navies ever used simply to ensure energy supply security?

Daniel Fiott is the Project Manager at Madariaga College of Europe Foundation.

For an extended version of this article, please see the attached PDF.

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