The debate on whether or not NATO should impose a no-fly zone over Libya brings us back to the more comprehensive question on the expediency and legitimacy of foreign military intervention. It would be certainly hypocritical to pretend that the number of casualties and level of atrocities are the core issue here. If so, we would have difficulty explaining why such intervention was not considered in Darfur, Rwanda or elsewhere.
Hence, before being about an international sense of morality, interventionism is about political considerations, which are generally the result of public opinion, foreign policy, national security, and operational considerations.
In the Libyan case, NATO's considerations in favor of intervention may be found at several levels. First, in terms of national security, NATO's member States unquestionably have an interest in securing the continued provision of oil to the West. Second, in terms of foreign policy, an intervention in Libya supported by the Arab League may bring NATO and the Arab League closer to one another. After NATO's controversial involvement in Afghanistan, it could generally improve NATO's standing in the region, at the condition of course that its intervention in Libya is carried out smoothly and successfully.
On these points, western public opinion is currently divided (France's, Germany's and US' polls show strong opposition, whereas the results are slightly in favor intervention in UK's polls). In order to grant legitimacy to the decision to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, NATO's member States are therefore looking for a decision of the UN Security Council, now that the Arab League also formally called for a UN-imposed fly zone. But Russia's, Syria's and Turkey's (somewhat mutually reinforcing) lack of enthusiasm shows that there are significant players in the UN Security Council, the Arab League and NATO itself that still are to be convinced of the rightfulness and practicality of such intervention. Therefore, while looking for international legitimacy, NATO and its member States should first clearly define what interests and overall strategic objective NATO's military engagement in favor of Libyan rebels would serve. It is neither about defending the Alliance against an external threat nor about preventing mass murdering or genocide. As for the goal of assisting rebellion forces in its struggle against Qaddafi's regime, it is in itself not convincing enough politically nor strategically. So is it about some broader "regime change" ambition and our willingness to see a pro-West regime emerging in Libya?
After defining the objective of a foreign intervention, there are additional difficult questions that should be answered, as none of the players involved is eager to get involved into a new Afghan quagmire.
These questions include:
- What should happen if Libyan civilians continue to be killed by Qaddafi ground forces, despite the no-fly zone? What would be the next step of international engagement?
- What would be the implications for the West of a failure to end Qaddafi's regime?
- Would NATO's intervention in favor of the Libyan rebels make the organization accountable for the future actions of the rebels' government?
- What are the implications of NATO's engagement regarding possible similar scenarios in Algeria, Yemen and even Saudi Arabia?
Finally, as far as NATO is concerned, it should figure out primarily whether such operation is consistent with the organization purpose and if NATO ought to be the police of the world.
Celine Touboul is a research fellow at the NATO Defense College. The opinions expressed in this article are her own and are not to be attributed to NATO.
This article was submitted for the atlantic-community.org's competition: "Empowering Women in International Relations." It coincides with the 10th Anniversary of UN resolution 1325 calling for an increased influence of women in all aspects of peace and security. The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.



March 15, 2011
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