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Ali Sarihan:

"Iran and Turkey are potential long-term partners for the United States since they share strategic goals, and their societies share democratic values." The idea would have been widely accepted as true, if it had been stated fifty years ago. However, Stephen Kinzer puts forth this remarkable claim in June 2010 in his latest book called Reset, after the recent developments between the United States, Iran, and Turkey.

In brief, the most significant recent developments are Iran's insistence on its nuclear program and US support for the passage of UN resolution 1929 on Iran. Turkey's opposition to the sanctions put it at cross purposes with the US. Furthermore, Turkey has the worst possible diplomatic, economic and military relations with America's best ally in the Middle East - Israel - in particular after the June flotilla crisis. Overall, Kinzer defends the importance of America's partnership with Turkey and Iran, despite Israel's and Saudi Arabia's possible dissatisfaction, and despite significant recent developments in the Middle East.

"Reset: Iran, Turkey and America's Future" consists of four parts, and the sections are entitled: For the people in spite of the people, Our name has not been an honored one, Very far away, and finally The door is so wide open.

The book begins with a historical overview of Turkey's and Iran's democratization process. In the first part of the book, the author explains the adventure of Turkish and Iranian society's westernization and the further political, economical and social reforms after the establishment of the Turkish Republic based on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's vision of a modern Turkey. He also addresses Morgan Shuster's and Reza Pahlavi's struggle against Russian and English influence in Iran. And Kinzer says, "President Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah took over wretched and miserably poor countries (p.64)."

On comparing Shah and Ataturk, author says, "Reza Shah and Ataturk saw themselves as partners (p.76)." However, while Ataturk made many economic, social and political reforms, Reza did not. And according to Kinzer the reason for this distinction is, "Reza confronted a great obstacle that Ataturk never had to face: foreign intervention (p.75)." Ataturk's partially successful reforms during this era are best explained by the removal first of the sultanate and soon thereafter of the caliphate, and moreover the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the transliteration of the Turkish language into Roman letters, the closure of all Koran schools and religious academies, the granting of rights to women with respect to inheritance and their entry into the civil service. After Kinzer mentions Ataturk's withdrawal from political life during his last years and his death in 1938, he also refers to Pahlavi's 1944 death in exile in South Africa. Kinzer sums up their controversial legacy as follows: "Both leaders were autocrats and reformist. These are two legacies they left Turkey and Iran (p.83)."

The second part of the book continues discussing the process of democratization in Turkey and Iran from 1945 to the 2000s. The world was dividing into new power blocks and both the United States and Soviet Union were trying to influence small countries after the Cold War. Turkey and Iran became America's partners, and the author refers to this partnership as "the roots of the power triangle (p.90)." The Korean War and Turkey's membership in NATO strengthened Ankara's relations with America. The outbreak of communal violence on Cyprus in 1964 however led to a polarization in the 1970s that resulted in increasing anti-Americanism and alienated Turkey from the West.

Kinzer says the situation in Turkey changed during the era of Turgut Ozal (1983-1993), who served six years as prime minister followed by four years as president. The author says, "When Ozal was elected prime minister in 1983, Turkey was still inward-looking and afraid of the world (p.127)." Ozal made Turkey much more open, liberal, democratic and modern than it ever had been. During Ozal's reign, America and Turkey were on the best possible terms. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) constituted another important element in Turkey's democratization process. Referring to the AK Party, Kinzer says, for the "first time in modern history, a country was led toward democracy by a political party with roots in Islam (p.137)."

Iran was not as fortunate as Turkey since Pahlavi's absolutism and foreign intervention suffocated the natural development of democracy. Even Iran's popular national actor Mossadegh wanted to make democratic improvements. But because his independent economic views annoyed the United States, America interfered with Iran's administration. After Mossadegh was overthrown, Mohammed Reza Shah (1953-1979) rose to power. Kinzer says, "The coup did more than simply bringing down Mossadegh. It ended democratic rule in Iran and set the country off toward dictatorship (p.98)." The Shah's oppressive and anti-democratic leadership ended with Ayatollah Kohomeini's Islamic revolution in 1979. The American hostage crisis was the beginning of the end of the Iran's relations with the United States. Furthermore, America's support for Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) worsened the already bad relationship between the two countries.

Kinzer claims that the September 11 attack offered a chance for reconciliation between Tehran and Washington, as both faced a common enemy - the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, George W. Bush denounced Iran as part of an "axis of evil along with North Korea and Iraq, and as a matter of course a great chance was lost." According to the author, "George W. Bush and his advisors wished to destroy the Iranian regime, not compromise with it (p.126)."

In the third part of the book, Kinzer argues that the US created an alliance with Israel and Saudi Arabia as an alternative to relations with Turkey and Iran. According to author, although Iran initially was a close American ally, that alliance collapsed violently after Mohammad Reza Shah was overthrown in 1979. On why Turkey's relations deteriorated with America, Kinzer says that, despite Turkey being a NATO member and a United States ally, the lack of both oil and salience in security matters made Turkey less important than Saudi Arabia and Israel: "Saudi Arabia and Israel have been Washington's intimate Middle East Partners for the last half century (p.150)". On the other hand, Kinzer maintains that the present instable situation in the Middle East shows that America should rethink its relations with these countries. After all, the policies presently pursued by Israel and Saudi Arabia do not correlate with American interests. Kinzer claims that the twin pillars of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy - supporting the United States on the one hand and Wahhabi Islam on the other - represent mutually exclusive goals, as September 11 clearly showed. The Saudis will need to build a more democratic, more critical and more transparent state for matters to change. In addition, Kinzer states that Israel should accept the two-state solution, and Israel should be more open to negotiations with the Palestinians. Furthermore, United States should tackle the Israeli- Palestinian conflict more aggressively because, "only the United States can be the long term guarantor of peace between Israelis and Palestinians and only the United States can impose it (p.187)." Moreover, "without confronting [the conflict] directly, the United States cannot preserve its own security or that of its allies (p.191)."

In the last part of the book, America's partnership with Turkey and Iran is analyzed as a prerequisite for improved relations. Moreover, the author makes the noteworthy point that both Iran and Turkey are potential long-term partners for the United States since they share strategic goals, and their societies share democratic values (p.212). On the other hand, Kinzer argues that as long as the old thinking and policies prevail, this will lead only to a repetition of failures and mistakes. Thus, both sides should strive to understand each other's concerns and interests a little more each time. Finally, the author finishes the book with a quote by the Persian poet Rumi that could serve as a recommendation addressed to both sides: "Why do you stay in prison when the door is so wide open (p.218)?"

In conclusion, the book is a good resource for scholars who study the relationship between Turkey, Iran, and the United States. The book is also an essential source for those debating why the United States should redesign its relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, I believe that the book also provides a new approach to Middle Eastern studies.

Ali Sarihan has a fellowship from the Turkish Government and studies at the University of Indiana-Bloomington.