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September 17th marked the 69th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland at the outset of WWII. With Russian tanks rolling across Georgia’s borders just a few weeks ago, this anniversary was particularly unnerving. The troubling parallel is that, concerning dimensions crucial to international security, the Russia of today is not much different from the Soviet Union in 1939.

Unlike Germany, Russia has never made a clear break with its militaristic past so painfully remembered by its neighbors. To the contrary, common nostalgia is well summarized by Mr. Putin’s eulogy on the breakup of the USSR, which he described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

Pundits like Pat Buchanan have demonstrated one rather disturbing reaction to Russia’s resurgence: blaming the West for “the folly of getting into Russia’s space and getting into Russia’s face.” While the point about promising NATO membership to countries the alliance is not willing and/or able to defend is well taken, the broader implications of this line of reasoning remain troubling. Who exactly is to determine what the “Russia’s space” is? And by what principle should countries that chose a path of democratic transformation and integration with Western structures be denied that choice?

The assumption that pursuing some sort of realpolitik balance of power with newly belligerent Russia is in the West’s interest is simply incorrect. Authoritarian Russia will always be a threat, and allowing it to act on the self-proclaimed right to a “sphere of interest” is not going to make anybody any safer.

Russia’s lack of democracy makes it dangerous. This is not to say that Prime Minister Putin or President Medvedev are bloodthirsty despots à la Stalin. But should they turn their ambitions toward a renewed, aggressive international stance – as they seem to be – there aren’t any effective domestic checks and balances to stop them. As Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident, put it, “If the root of the problem is to be addressed strategically, the focus must return not to this or that specific foreign policy action by Russia, but rather to the matter of democracy within Russia itself. Changing that should be the focus of statecraft today – if we want to ensure that the Kremlin poses no threat to peace tomorrow.”

In the absence of these internal safeguards, the fact that international leverage on Russia has also weakened – as demonstrated by the Georgian crisis – is a serious concern. In particular, America’s influence has been eroded by foreign policy blunders the magnitude of Iraq and economic mismanagement the size of a $700 billion bailout. So Russia is not likely to become a liberal democracy any time soon. But on the upside, it is not as strong as it appears, either:

• Militarily, Russia cannot credibly aspire to control its neighbors. Imposing one’s will by brute force is costly, inevitably demoralizing, and in the end not worth it. Let’s not forget that it was the invasion of Afghanistan that dealt the final blow to the Soviet empire.
• Economically, Russian power hinges on high oil and gas prices and on the trust of international markets. Both have lately taken a tumble amidst the global crisis. The meltdown of Russia’s financial sector has been astounding: foreign investors fled and the stock market fell dramatically.
• Politically, Russia is not as influential on the international arena as it would like to be. It’s not the leader of “sovereign democracies.” The meeting of the Shanghai Group, where China and others refused to provide backing for the Kremlin’s action in Georgia, clearly showed that.

How, then, can the West approach Russia in a constructive way? First, it’s time for a realistic assessment of today’s Russia without politically expedient doublespeak. Mr. Putin is not a great democrat, no matter how deeply one looks into his soul. This doesn’t mean that the West should not seek to engage with Russia on a number of issues ranging from energy security to nuclear proliferation. But we should deal with Russia as is, not as we wish it to be. It is precisely the lack of democratic institutions, rule of law, and transparent decision making that makes Russia such an unpredictable and difficult partner.

Anna Nadgrodkiewicz is a member of Washington DC-based American Polish Forum, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing issues of significance to the United States and Poland in the 21st century.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Mark Brzezinski: Shared Interests
• Francisco J. Ruiz: US, EU, Russia: Not a Zero-Sum Game
• Ralf Fuecks: Georgia: The Right Conflict, the Right Time?