Is authoritarianism persistent due to the lack of pressure to liberalize? Or is it the other way around? Is it the jockey or the horse? Despite a diversity of explanations, there is at least one general lesson: that the creation of regime types does not follow a simple trajectory.
During periods of change and societal recompostion, international and domestic factors interact such that the political sphere opens up for some and closes for others. Regime types results from a challenge-and-response sort of movement. Structural factors provide the context for action, while humans provide the agency, strategic choices that lead to either democratic or non-democratic transformations. How elites choose to respond to this particular historical moment is critical in understanding when regimes become authoritarian or otherwise.
Modernization theories question why the economic growth in MENA countries stalled and incommensurate to their economic potential. Authoritarianism becomes the main explanatory variable to the demise of economic vitality in the region. There is an underlying teleology, a linear trajectory that assumes that liberal democracy is the end state to which all political systems are heading, despite whatever detours they take along the way.
Some argue using the "prerequisites" tradition. It looks at institutional factors that allow for the transformation from authoritarianism to ensue. In order to dampen the strength of a coercive establishment, it must be institutionalized. The higher the institutionalization of the apparatus, the more willing it will be to disengage from power, allowing political reform to proceed. Once this apparatus is institutionalized, it follows a commitment to a broader national mission that ultimately serves the "public good" rather than confines resources for the self-enrichment of elites.
Other theories look at the larger structural variables and varying conditions that account for the authoritarian transformation to ensue. An example would be the strategic decisions of party leaders, opposition and incumbent leaders. Opposition actors often do not stand a chance of delegitimizing the current regime through boycott if they are not cohesive and strained by ideological or political differences. Authoritarian rulers can easily capitalize on such a weakness by engineering multi-party elections only to legitimize their position and forestall the challenges that can be brought about by the opposition. The opposition often refuses to shrink away from electoral participation as it gives them a modicum of legitimacy. If coupled with efforts to question the rules of the game, overtime, fairer elections may lead to the "gradual erosion of authoritarian rule".
A more compelling argument, however, and in some way a form of rebuttal, is Stephen King's "Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa." It argues that the international and domestic pressure to liberalize provides an opening for the state and the rent-seeking urban and rural elites to form a "distributional coalition" that may be in favor of economic growth but not necessarily of transparency or of democracy. This "crony capitalism" that is also referred to as an "alliance for profit" developed such that the marginalized peasant population and their capacity to self-mobilize as an opposition are institutionally weakened and their resources diverted by the coalition. Instead of leading to democracy, a more ambivalent form of middle class is instead created. One that has patronage links with the state. Authoritarianism is therefore sustained because of this coalition and because non-elites have been weakened to the point that the chance is lost to become a viable opposition to the regime. Resources under the control of rent-seeking elites and the government create a space for authoritarian rule to remain in place through incentives.
Indeed, there is an argument that can be made that historical circumstances also play a role. But structural elements and human agency are both necessary "ingredients" in the analysis of "stubborn authoritarianism". While structural arguments give us a picture of what opportunities constrain and limit human behavior; actor-based arguments also tell us that any change or period of transition in the regime structure opens up the system to opportunities such that the most opportunistic and manipulative elements of human behavior can also make a significant impact.
Afton Køren Briones Knox is studying International Law, Russia and East European Studies at Georgetown University
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- John Dalziel Frew: Globalized Decision-Making Demands New Acting Styles
- Tobias Weise: Global Governance in 2020: The Return of the State
- Maie-Brit Rüter: Re-evaluating Economic Governance In the Financial Crisis
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March 25, 2009
Florian Kuhne, Freie Universität Berlin, Gold Contributor (116)
If these two points can be achieved, every country is able to shake off Authoritarianism. But, as Ms. Knox points out, there are a lot of stumbling blocks in the way for a "Liberalization". The term is difficult. As you said, it is hard to distinguish between what comes first, political or market liberalization. And I would like to give cause to concern by arguing that market liberalization may turn out contrary to achievement of better circumstances to the citizens. One of the best examples provides Nicaragua in the aftermath of the elections in 1990, when the left-oriented Sandinistas where ousted by conservative and neo-liberal, US-paid elements of the Nicaraguan elite. (A very good study is offered by the Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/nitoc.html)
In my opinion continued stay-in-(at least economic)-power of local elites is one of the most dangerous elements in countries at transitional stage. The adherence to power and the ongoing influence on the system must be broken to develop a fair and free structure.
If these tasks are not coped with, something like a "Low Intensity Democracy" (Gills, Rocamora, 1992) may emerge with fatal effects on society (see Nicaragua).