President Barack Obama took office in late January 2009, and there can
be little doubt that he remains highly popular in Europe a year on. But
it is also hard to escape the conclusion that despite the best of
intentions on both sides of the Atlantic, there is dissatisfaction with
the state of transatlantic relations. One hears criticism from Europeans
about a US lack of attention, about engaging with Russia more than
with America's own allies, especially in Central Europe, about
under-valuing the European Union and about waiting for the Obama
Administration to make up its mind on Afghanistan.
Equally, one
hears American frustrations that despite President Obama's investment of
time and energy, including several trips to Europe, there has yet to be
any substantial increased European investment in joining with the
United States to meet global challenges, starting with NATO's top
priority, the war in Afghanistan. For many Americans, working with
Europe is seen as process-oriented and time-consuming, without
delivering real results.
These criticisms are all a bit unfair, but on both sides the unrealistic
euphoria of a year ago has given way to a perhaps exaggerated sense of
disappointment and bruised feelings.
The more realistic view is
that both European and American complaints reflect long-term underlying
challenges, and that these have come into sharper focus because it is no
longer possible to blame them on the Bush Administration. For one of
the major effects of the Obama presidency is that by taking the Bush
Administration out of the equation, some uncomfortable truths have been
exposed.
First, despite all the rhetoric of European unity and
the new Lisbon treaty, there are major policy differences among European
nations on some of the most important foreign and security policy
issues: Russia, energy and Afghanistan spring to mind, although there
are others too.
Second, because of these policy divisions, the
advent of the Lisbon treaty, which mostly promises structural and
process changes, appears unlikely to make a real difference to Europe's
inability to act as a coherent player that is able to make full use of
its substantial political, economic and security resources. Where its
member states already agree, the new EU "foreign minister" appointed
under the treaty will have solid ground on which to act. But on the most
important and difficult challenges, EU governments will still hold
strongly to their national prerogatives and positions.
The
signals from the selection of the EU's new President of the European
Council and its High Representative for Foreign and Security policy show
that the major European states recognise this. Rather than select
well-known, charismatic and strong leaders, EU heads of government
instead chose lower key consensus-builders whose role is likely to be
that of coordinating member states. And rather than putting their best
people forward for the Foreign Minister portfolio, many member states
put a higher priority on securing key economic portfolios in the
incoming European Commission.
Third, despite the efforts of
committed Atlanticists in both the Bush and Obama Administrations,
working together with Europe does not in itself seem to be a priority
for a United States that must turn its attention to the economy,
healthcare, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia and engaging such troublesome
actors as North Korea and Burma.
Continue reading the full article at Europe's World, atlantic-community.org's new partner.
Kurt Volker is the former US Ambassador to NATO, and Managing Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a member of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group (SAG).
Related Material from the Atlantic Community:
- Tobias P. Fella: Obama's Foreign Policy: The Right Grand Strategy
- Marie Grunert: Global Development Still on Top of Transatlantic Agenda
- Djörn Eversteijn: The US Wants its Allies to Support Themselves



March 23, 2010
Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)
The U.S. and Europe have differing strategic interests and focuses. To expect them to converge at all times so that cooperation will be easy (or even possible) is folly.
President Bush was not the fundamental problem even if he helped provide the illusion that it was all "his fault" through clumsy diplomacy and needlessly bellicose rhetoric.
As power shifts eastward, so to shall the U.S.
This in no way means that Atlanticism is dead, but it does mean that it will not punch at the same strategic weight it did in the past.