Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "The Absurdities of German Foreign and Security Policy "

With the resignation of German President Horst Köhler on Monday, 31^st of May, the current debate on the Germany's strategic interests and the foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr, the country's armed forces, has claimed its most prominent victim to date. The shocking resignation came after Mr. Köhler stumbled across one of the absurdities of German foreign and security policy: Despite the fact that the country has gone through a staggering normalisation process in its foreign and security policy since the early 1990s, some words (e.g. "war") are still taboo in the political arena. In Mr. Köhler's case, the mere mention of "strategic interests" proved a stumbling block.

The resignation came shortly after Mr. Köhler had given an interview, in which he had stated that the German public was increasingly aware that its economic interests as an export-dependent trading nation might one day necessitate military intervention in defense of its interests. Politicians, and in particular representatives of the opposition parties, accused the President of advocating the "unconstitutional use of the Bundeswehr". For the hapless Mr. Köhler this represented the final straw.

Ironically, this grave accusation came from Jürgen Trittin, leader of the Green parliamentary party. A year and a half ago the German Parliament, the Bundestag, sent naval vessels to the Horn of Africa to participate in the EU-led anti-piracy mission Atalanta. By custom, the constitutionally required mandate passed the Bundestag with a broad cross-party majority. Many Greens voted in favor of Atalanta. Even though the official aim of the mandate was to protect ships carrying food on behalf of the UN World Food Programme, one should make no mistake about the real objectives: One of world's most important maritime trade routes passes by the Horn of Africa. That is why the EU, NATO, Russia, China and others have sent vessels to the region. For an economic giant like Germany, the participation in Atalanta was a perfectly legitimate strategic interest and perfectly constitutional. So, how can anyone who voted in its favor accuse the Federal President of "advocating unconstitutional use of the Bundeswehr"?

The allegation points to one of the great dilemmas of the foreign and security policy in the united Germany: The normalisation process by-passed the constitution and its seemingly clear restrictions on the use of the Bundeswehr. It was neither accompanied by a public debate on Germany's international role, nor was it ever completed by a formulation of Germany's strategic interests. It was only after the Bundeswehr was increasingly drawn into the war in Afghanistan that a serious debate began to evolve. With the Euro-crisis it unfortunately came to a premature end.

After two World Wars had been initiated from German soil, the founding fathers of the Federal Republic wanted to ensure that no German army would ever again be used as an instrument of power. Therefore they inserted two articles into the Basic Law: Art. 87a (2) specifically restricts the Bundeswehr to territorial defence, while Art. 26 (1) declares that any preparation for a war of aggression is unconstitutional and a criminal offense. When, following the end of the Cold War, the ‘normalisation' of foreign and security policy came onto the political agenda, it was expected that amendments to the constitution would be necessary. A lively debate on the issue began, but died instantly after the Federal Constitutional Court opened the backdoor for foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr when it decided that "Article 87a (2) ... must not restrict the permissive membership of the Federal Republic in systems of mutual collective security (i.e. UN, NATO and (W)EU) and the participation of its armed forces in missions conducted within the framework of these systems." As a consequence of the ruling, a mandate from any one of these organisations allows for the participation of the Bundeswehr in accordance with the constitution, no matter what the purpose of the mandate is.

Today up to 1,400 German sailors participate in Operation Atalanta to secure open maritime trade routes. Simultaneously, up to 5,350 soldiers are on duty in northern Afghanistan in the most dangerous foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr to date. They risk their lives to defend two of Germany's most sensitive strategic interests: Free Trade and the viability of NATO. It is time to end the hypocrisy. We owe some honest answers to those who risk their lives.

Stephan Vormann is a PhD-candidate at the Centre for the Study of Wider Europe at NUI Maynooth

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June 16, 2010

Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)

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The recent proposal from to drastically cut the German armed from defence minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg highlights the problem of Europe.

As it struggles with its own fiscal crisis of "Greek" proportions writ large, Europe appears as it will become less and less of a partner with America in helping secure trouble spots in the world. This is ironic and very disturbing given President Obama's desire to retrench and expect our "friends and allies" to pick up the slack.

I wrote an op-ed here a while back where I stated,

"Obama wants to manage conflict through the institutionalization of cooperation while focusing on domestic concerns. It's an intriguing wager: betting that others will take on responsibility and be willing to cooperate effectively enough that we can greatly reduce our international responsibilities while reforming our society.

We should pause, reflect and consider the consequences if the wager is wrong. What if global order is about not only cooperation, but also the ability to project meaningful diplomatic and military force when needed? We won't get another chance to make another bet."

I think its a losing bet and Germany is shining a bright spotlight on the future of what will happen if this is correct. Who will take over? This is a question worth asking. I also stated in another op-ed here:

"Credibility matters. If the US is perceived as declining, we really cannot be sure what will happen if others test our resolve. This could pave the way for the destabilization of the regional balances of power. It is through that door that renewed Great Power conflict could step and shock a world that has forgotten that relative peace is secured through strength."

Great Power conflict need not include Europe on the front end, but can anyone with any historical background not be aware that Europe will inevitably be impacted if the relative peace of the post World War II era dissolves?

Isn't it better to prevent this from happening so that the fruits gained from that struggle and the Cold War can continue to be harvested? It seems the "West" is bent on a grand experiment to find out if its Kantian hopes are real or illusions, but it might be better to continue thinking that only a Hobbesian view of security can underwrite the relative peace of the ideal.

Hedge the bets, don't double down on unproven formulations.

June 17, 2010

Member deleted

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Western policies of "conflict synthesis followed by theatrics of conflict resolution" in the last century seems to have led mankind nowhere but needless generation of blood, sweat & tears so far!

I suppose one recent comment by Joe Biden that it is better for all to follow its opposite, a policy of conflict prevention, may need to be supported wholeheartedly by the Europeans, too.

Such a radical change in the basics of world politics may be, I think, the shortest cut to a peaceful world order.

Once that is accomplished the mankind will be at a much better position to tackle such common problems humanity has been facing for some time by now such as climate change, depletion of resources, energy generation, etc.

I personally believe that mankind needs to focus her capabilites in such directions rather than quarrelling in vain often in quite primitively....

June 17, 2010

Olaf Theiler, Political Scientist, German Armed Forces, Platinum Contributor (173)

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Germany's security policy after the End of the Cold War developed in two phases: First a period of what former Minister of Defense Volker Rühe once called “salami tactics”, followed by a period of “Vogel Strauss” tactics as a result of the experiencing deep concerns about the use of military force in Kosovo 1999.

The “salami tactic” referred to a careful step by step customization of the German public to the use of military force as part of the new foreign policy in an dramatically changed security environment. German troops in Somalia, soldiers as part of IFOR first only deployed in the more secure Croatia but working in Bosnia, then finally deployed in Bosnia itself as part of SFOR, followed by a participation in the extraction force waiting in Macedonia to potentially rescue the OSCE observers in Kosovo during the winter of 1998/1999 and finally the Kosovo war with German Tornados fully participating in the military action, these were the steps accompanying the transformation of the German armed forces from static border defense towards a more agile army capable of crisis management in cooperation with international partners in EU and NATO.

But it seemed that Kosovo was a step to far or to fast for some in the German public. The criticism the Bundeswehr got afterwards was heavy and looked like a revival of the once powerful peace movement of the 80ties. This negative impression was even worsened by the fact, that a new red-green coalition hat to explain their participation in the first war-like effort of Germany since the end of the Second World War to their basically pacifistic motivated voters. The overall result was that since then the gap between the transformation of the army towards a more and more expeditionary force on the one hand and the political rhetoric about the peaceful approach, the consistent call for a comprehensive pol-mil approach and the projected image of German soldiers as helpers and feeders, if need be also as protectors on the other hand. Officially, they were everything but fighters.

This led to the dilemma of our Afghanistan engagement, where the image of “technical aid with weapons” did less and less coincide with the reality on the ground. It was astonishing to listen again and again to official statements negating the fact that Afghanistan had in reality become a war. With the Kunduz-incident last year and the deaths of several German Soldiers in combat this spring, the reality finally hit ground in Germany’s public.

President Köhler tried hard to match the rhetoric with the reality, but for some politicians it still was too tempting to apply to old sentiments and the pacifist baseline of German public. This was irresponsible and unjust and still is. Irresponsible in terms of our international relations and partnerships, where Germany is expected to take its share of burdens and risks; unjust in terms of the Soldiers who were send into harms way by politicians that either do not read the mandates they sign up to or are cynical enough to gain some short term political gains despite better knowledge about the realities.

We need a public debate on why Germany has still an army, what kind of missions we want this army to be able to tackle and what training and equipment needed for these tasks. We need to match the transformation process with the promises Germany made in international fora, but even more we need to match the public rhetoric with the actual decisions made and the interests our nations has, politically as well as economically. The current economic crisis and the new cuts it is enforcing on Germanys armed forces might be the best chance for years to come to finally match political rhetoric and military reality.

June 17, 2010

Wojciech Z. Kornacki, Oxford University, Bronze Contributor (18)

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Certain topics in different countries are taboo. In the U.S. saying anything positive about communism is a sure thing to alienate a bunch of people. In China, openly criticizing the government is a taboo. Drawing pictures of religious figures is a taboo in other countries. In Germany, stating that German Armed Forces are to be used to further Germany’s political or economic interests is still a taboo. As Mr. Vormann rightly points out, 2 world wars originated from the German soil and they ended on the German soil. In the process, Europe suffered an enormous destruction. German public and its politicians remain highly alert of this historical fact. So does the rest of the world.

Today, over 50 years after World War II, Germany struggles to overcome its historical baggage with its global responsibilities. Almost each year there is some kind of an anniversary of an important event from World War I and II. On the other hand, Germany today is a stable, rich, and democratic country, the main economic engine of Europe. Only recently it has been replaced by China as the main exporter of goods. German and international public seems comfortable with Germany fulfilling its international obligations, as a part of NATO, UN, EU or other organizations. German Armed Forces participate in peacekeeping missions, anti-piracy missions, and other important military missions. However, the response would be different if Germany unilaterally deployed its forces in a foreign country to support its economic interests. Almost the same issue arose during the last World's Cup in Germany. Was it okay for Germans to display their nation's colors to celebrate its soccer team's victories? The answer was a strong yes. However, if someone said that German soccer players were physically and mentally superior to other players, this comment would meet with a strong rebuke. This is probably the crucial difference between the statements of Mr. Köhler and what the public is comfortable with. Of course, no one seems to have asked Mr. Köhler what exactly he meant, in what context he said it, and what exactly he said. It would be interesting to read it before calling for his resignation.

June 19, 2010

Eva Maria Krockow, GIZ, Ghana, Platinum Contributor (209)

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The insufficient constitutional clauses on German defence and security politics have once more become evident in the recent debates questioning the lawfulness of private ‘security companies’. The planned military deployment of German mercenary soldiers in Somalia’s ongoing civil war caused public outrage due to its breach with the UN’s support for the official interim government. However, due to Germany’s missed adoption of the 2008 Montreaux directives regarding mercenary forces, the recruitment by Asgaard German Security Group could only be condemned on a moral rather than a legal basis.
In fact, the German Grundgesetz allows for the development of parallel strands of military politics completely independent of official security policy, which typically aligns with international organisations such as UN and NATO.

An all-encompassing revision of current security and defence regulations in Germany is, therefore, necessary to avoid further discussions of that kind and to provide the nation with a coherent military identity they can understand and support.

June 19, 2010

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (503)

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I would like to add a short note: Nobody asked Koehler to resgin (to my knowledge). Even the Left Party thanked him for finally saying what everybody knew, but no one dared to say. That the Bundeswehr is in Afghanistan for strategic interests and not in order to teach the Afghan girls reading and writing.

We fought two world wars under different agendas, but with a similar conclusion: the goal never justifies the means.

Some of the allies today seem to think that the Germans are against wars because they lost. But this opposition is much more fundamental. It stems from learning that our people were seduced by lies to commit very severe crimes against mankind, which only came to light because the wars were lost.

War is not a legitimate way of pursuing polictics, at least it should not be. We don't want to participate again in what can be perceived as colonial imperialism or the strong guys taking from the weak ones. If the west can't keep its economy running with its available resources, it has to change its consumption patterns, not to invest in more arms in order to "discover" and exploit more riches abroad.

We want neither Salami tactics nor Vogel Strauss. Thanks god that the financial crisis prevents further armament of the Bundeswehr. Koehler resigned because of this fundamental disagreement with large parts of the public, meaning that he probably felt offended and lacked the empathy to understand and represent this part of Germany.

June 21, 2010

Olaf Theiler, Political Scientist, German Armed Forces, Platinum Contributor (173)

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@ Eva Maria Krockow
First I have to say, that I don’t know what you exactly mean with “the development of parallel strands of military politics completely independent of official security policy”. There is nothing like a state policy allowing the build up of independent military politics in Germany. The German Foreign Ministry stated that it knew nothing about the contract and the activities of the Asgaard Germany Security Group. The Defense Ministry also confirmed that it has never entered into any contractual agreement with the company. The contract of a private owned security company, founded and registered in Germany, with an Somali based War Lord has nothing to do with Germany’s foreign or security policy, to the contrary, it is in clear violation of Germanys engagement through the EU and UN to help to stabilize Somalia and to ease the humanitarian situation in this war torn country.

Second, unfortunately, the Montreaux Document does not provide any legal basis to condemn mercenary activities at all. It is only summarizing best practices and the minimal legal obligations of all nations either hiring or hosting private security companies. Nothing in this document is legally binding or provides the basis for legal activities against misbehaving private security companies. Nevertheless, according to Rainer Stinne, a FDP foreign policy expert, Asgaard might be made accountable because the contract violated UN sanctions. I hope this legal path works out in the end.

@ Bernhard Lucke:
You might have misunderstood Koehlers reasoning as much as the overall issue of “defending econonic interests”.

So far, we can only speculate about Koehlers motives since he has not made them public in any way. My understanding is, that he stept down because of a lack of political support and not because of any feeling of disagreement with the public. Such a reasoning would really surprise me, especially since he had always very high ratings in the public opinion polls. So if there was a “fundamental disagreement”, it could not be with “large parts of the public”.

The question if it is just or unjust to defend national economic interests if need be also with armed forces started in 1992, when General Klaus Naumann (later to become one of the most prominent Chief of Defense of the German Armed Forces and a still well remembered Chief of the Military Council in NATO) used this phrase in a draft of the “Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien” (Security Policy Guidelines) as one of the future tasks of ther German Armed Forces. The idea to “defend” economic interests also appeared in a softer version in the German White Book of 1994. There it is explained, that this is not to be seen as a return of any kind of “Kanonenboot-Diplomatie”, but meant instead the need to protect vital trade routes. Exactly that phrase became part of the mandate of ATALANTA, the EU mission against piracy on the Horn of Africa. A mandate provided by the German Bundestag, including positive votes by members of theGreen Party and the Social Democrats with only 42 votes against.

In the public debate about Germany’s participation in the Kongo mission ALTHEA, it was also argued that we would have a reasonable economic interest at stake that would allow the participation of German soldiers in a UN mandated mission to secure (almost) democratic elections in Kongo. Naturally, the idea was not to occupy gold mines or anything so stupid, but to help to stabilize a country after several years of unrest, in order to allow companies to act a free market system and to compete in legal ways about officially available resources instead of having numerous warlords selling the rich resources of this country on a black market in order to finance their wars against each other.

Therefore, I would argue, that if you put away dogmatic thinking and any kind of deliberate misrepresentation, if you than add the existing legal restrictions, the still existing culture of restraint in Germany's foreign and security policy, and the clearly expressed limitations of political will in all German political parties, than you will not be able any more to find any evil in Koehlers words nor in the mandates under which the German Armed Forces currently are acting.

June 21, 2010

Eva Maria Krockow, GIZ, Ghana, Platinum Contributor (209)

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@ Olaf Theiler

Concerning your first statement, this is actually exactly what I meant. The military activities of Asgaard Germany Security Group are indeed completely independent of Germany’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, due to its geographical location and its recruitment of former Bundeswehr soldiers it may still be associated with the German state and cause international offence based on its support of an anti-governmental movement in Somalia. Germany needs to make sure it establishes comprehensive legislations preventing such oppositional military developments (which I previously termed parallel strands of military politics) operating from its national territory.

Yes, it is true that the Montreaux Document does not provide any binding directives. It nevertheless could have served as inspiration for an extension of German constitutional clauses regarding security politics. Hardly any internationally agreed documents are in fact legally binding and therefore cannot be enforced. However, this does not preclude their relevance in contemporary policy-making. Many states adhere, for example, to the Human Rights Declaration, the Geneva War Convention or environmental directives. For this reason, I am disappointed that Germany did not realise the importance of the Montreaux recommendations and failed to effectuate respective amendments to its legislations.

Like yourself, I am hoping that Asgaard will be brought to justice and stopped in its attempt to undermine official German military strategies through references to the violated UN sanctions.

June 22, 2010

Olaf Theiler, Political Scientist, German Armed Forces, Platinum Contributor (173)

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@ Eva Maria Krockow

Many thanks for this clarification, I probably have misunderstood your formulation.

On the normative influence of non-binding declarations I can only agree, at least with the hope for it. Although, there is still a difference between the legal implications of broadly supported and constantly renewed declarations which became factually part of the international law and more pledging declarations like the Montreaux document that tries to remind nations on their obligations regarding these laws.

But I agree that it would be much better for Germany and many other nations to sign up to the Montreaux Document, even if the existing U.S. signature does not seem to help a lot….

October 26, 2010

Matthias Menke

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I would like to put it in a nutshell: BZ (naval signal meaning "well done")

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The Absurdities of German Foreign and Security Policy

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