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Think back 15 years. Yugoslavia was burning and Europe did little but watch how NATO tried to extinguish the fire. It left European states feeling guilty and powerless, and ‘never again’ was the dominant discourse heard: ‘at least not in our back yard’. They set about establishing the – recently retagged – Common Security and Defence Policy to allow the EU to ‘fully assume its responsibilities for crisis management’ in its own vicinity and beyond. No need to call Washington again, right? Well, no, wrong.

Europe's back yard seems to reach further than it used to and the developments in the North African METAL states (Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya) have shown that the EU’s ability to act has changed little – if anything – since the Yugoslav wars. Europe as a political entity has been remarkably quiet in relation to the rapid corrosion of neighboring METALs, not least over the vexed question of military intervention.

Conclusion: European interventionist discourse is as hollow as ever.

North African countries quiver, but beyond French and British unilateral blundering, the EU’s default option has been to call Washington again. Even if Europe could agree to join in on ‘easing’ Colonel Qaddafi from power, such an operation would almost certainly be launched under a NATO flag. The Arab League or African Union would obviously provide a useful political answer to neo-colonial impeachments, but the hardware - and hard decisions - to actually do it, would be unmistakably American. In short, not much has changed: crises arise in the European neighborhood and the EU is smothered by incapacity, indecision, and fragmentation.

One could argue, fair enough: Europe has never been good at the ‘hard stuff’, so leave the heavy military interventions to NATO. But the real question is can the EU do the soft, or rather smart politics needed to help reinforce the METAL states in its own southern neighborhood.

Current proposals on the table lack substance; the deliberate vagueness is designed to please national European interests rather than those of the METAL states. Fragmentation shows conditionality-oriented countries such as Germany and the UK opposing member states like Italy and Malta that prefer neighborly relations with the region based on commercial interests. But policy differentiation is not the root of the problem: upcoming summits rethinking EU (neighborhood) policies will fail in the first place because Europe is still totally lacking any political imagination as to what must really be done. That's a real shame; there is never a better time to recast the policy iron than when the 'METAL' is hot.

Step One: Enhancing European defense with credible assets to militarily intervene – or at least provide the credible appearance this could be done – is a prerequisite for breaking with US military dependence. Clearly this won’t happen overnight, and will require some difficult conversations between defense and finance ministers in the current setting: the US defense expenditure in real terms close to triples that of the EU 26.

Step Two, which is arguably cheaper and more effective: totally revise Europe’s political and economic strategy towards the METAL states.

Instead of merely focusing on more aid, less immigration restrictions and lower trade barriers tied to financial and regulatory carrots, political cooperation should go much further. Market access is a very quick and easy step to help strengthen METAL economies, and indeed, reduce migratory flows. It would also fortify Europe’s role as the largest economic zone in the world. Political reform will be more time-consuming, but the long-term goal should be an enlarged political community – obviously not in the sense of EU membership, but through genuine dialogue and engagement. The core of this would entail profound institutional transformation towards fairer, more transparent elections, constitutional reform and robust judicial systems. Enhanced EU civilian crisis management capabilities will be needed, as well as the promise of a fully-fledged EU-METAL political partnership. Democratization and constitutional change, as well as the terms of trade and market access offered, should be steered by METAL states as much as by the EU. Making sure states are dealt with on a policy specific and individual basis will be another critical factor for success.

But re-engaging with the METAL states is not just about North Africa. If Brussels – facing as much internal financial and political problems as foreign policy failure – is unable to act now, the METAL story might come at a high geopolitical cost for Europe’s global credibility. The EU will always struggle to be a military giant, but still can be a political and economic heavyweight in its broader region. If Europe can offer the METALs something real, it will show that the EU can act in times of crises, and – more importantly – it could make the occurrence of such crises become less likely in future.

Mutual economic and political benefits are the only credible way forward to bond METALs in North Africa with non-METALs in Europe. Get that formula right, and who knows, Europe could start applying it elsewhere. After all, ‘METAL’ is inherently malleable.

An Jacobs is a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, Switzerland. This article was submitted on March 11, 2011.

This article was submitted for the atlantic-community.org's competition: "Empowering Women in International Relations." It coincides with the 10th Anniversary of UN resolution 1325 calling for an increased influence of women in all aspects of peace and security. The contest is sponsored by the U.S. Mission to NATO and the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

You can read more submissions from the competition here.