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In contrast to the EU's goals to spread stability and prosperity to the region through its Neighborhood policy, Moscow's politics destabilize former states of the Soviet republic. Georgian President Saakashvili may have stepped into a Russian trap when he launched his invasion, but it was Russia that inappropriately escalated the conflict. Though the EU's leverage is limited in the crisis, it should send a clear signal to Moscow that it is willing to run the risk of isolating Russia when Europe's own vital interests are at stake.

Too much is at risk for the transatlantic community as a whole, as well as for the EU itself. First of all, South Ossetia and Abkhazia might be set up as supposedly independent countries ("like Kosovo," Russians would say), but would in fact be satrapies of Russia. While Moscow might see this outcome as proof of its comeback as a major power - playing out a parody of recent US international actions like the support for "self-determination" and "independence" in Kosovo, "regime change" as in Iraq, or the "fight against genocide" as in Darfur - this may well be the beginning of the Balkanization of the Caucasus. Second, the threshold of military conflict in the region could be lowered, e.g., in Azerbaijan's breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh or over water and energy rights in Central Asia.

What can the EU, as well as the entire Euro-Atlantic community, do in this situation? Both Russia's actions present difficult dilemmas. On the one hand, they must respond forcefully to reduce the pain and suffering of the Georgian people in the coming months and not shy away from the Russian threat. On the other hand, they definitely have conflicting interests in the region: democracy and territorial integrity for Georgia and access to Caspian energy, but also access to Russian energy and Russian support in other pending crises in the world, e.g., Korea and Iran. Last but not least, America and Europe's ability to act militarily (an unthinkable worst-case scenario for the EU and the US) is extremely limited by their own commitments elsewhere (Iraq and Afghanistan), by Washington's weakened moral authority following its own mistakes in the recent past, by the EU's lack of political will and disunity among its old and new members regarding the current threat perception, and - finally - by their need to prevent further escalation of the conflict. In this situation, this is what the EU (and the US) can do to "behave in a responsible manner:"

1. The EU's political, economic and moral leverage with Russia is now greater than Washington's. For this reason, it must sustain personal and high-level engagement with Medvedev, Putin and Saakashvili.
   
   
2. There is a great economic interdependence between Russia and the EU; Russia is in great need of European investments into its energy sector and infrastructure. This is why the EU (and the US) should make clear to Moscow that at one point, it will move beyond its current mediating role and suspend trade, investment and also political dialogue - including G8 and other summits - until Russia pulls out its troops, provides an acceptable peace and autonomy agreement for Georgia, and agrees on UN-supported multilateral negotiations over the settlement of the territorial disputes; the European Council's decision to postpone meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement was a first step in that direction. At the same time the EU should increase its assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe as to reduce the region's vulnerability to Russian pressure.
   
   
3. The EU must come up with a consensus on how to deal with Russia. It must avoid another split between old members and new members like the Baltic states, the Poles and the Czechs, all of them having more recent memories of Russian domination. Thus, the key European leaders in this conflict so far (Sarkozy and Merkel) have to provide the platform to generate a common EU position, which as many members as possible will support.
   
   
4. For NATO, as for the EU, there is no military solution to this conflict. What NATO can and should do in this situation is to postpone further cooperation with Moscow and send a clear signal about the desires of Georgia (and the Ukraine) to ultimately enter the Alliance. It would be disastrous if Russia concludes that its tactics have won itself a veto over decisions on NATO membership. This message should be supported by Georgia's efforts to galvanize Georgian democracy and meet the criteria for a NATO membership.
   
   
5. The EU should seek the UN Security Council's support to initiate negotiations with Georgians and South Ossetians and in parallel with Georgians and Abkhazians to settle these conflicts. At the same time, the UN and the OSCE should expand their observers on the ground to help hold the parties accountable.

The author is a professor of International Politics at the Institute of Political Science at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg and a senior fellow at the Center for European Integration Studies at the University of Bonn.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev: The Transatlantic Divide Over the Caucasus Conflict
• Parag Khanna & Alpo Rusi: Europe's Century
• Mark Brzezinski: Renewed Alliances: How to Face Today's Threats