The September 11 terrorist attacks prompted a reevaluation of NATO’s deterrence strategy and invoked debate on a wide array of policy options. As such, the concept of anticipatory force has gained considerable attention amongst NATO members since September 11, 2001. To be sure, debate concerning NATO’s use of anticipatory force is not entirely new; this issue was a source of contention following NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. However, the interrelated threats of failed statehood, weapons of mass destruction and non-state terrorism have reshaped the debate by elevating anticipatory force to the realm of self-defence.
This paper will analyze the underlying notion of anticipatory force in NATO’s strategic doctrine and what this emergent theme could mean for the future of the Alliance. This topic will be approached by examining changes in the transatlantic political climate since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the status of anticipatory self defence under international law. The role of threat perception and other practical considerations in determining NATO’s future use of anticipatory force will then be explored. It will be concluded that despite the emergence of new security threats and subsequent developments in political and legal understandings of anticipatory force, this remains a pervasive yet obscure theme in NATO’s evolving strategic doctrine.
Jonathan Preece is a Research Analyst with the Atlantic Council of Canada and a Security and Defence Forum Intern. He completed his BA at Wilfrid Laurier University and MA at Queen’s University. His interests include Canadian foreign policy, international law, and transatlantic relations.
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May 5, 2011
Sara Chupein, New York University, (9)
As your paper points out, dealing with a collective body like NATO means exposure to varying and broad state interests. As complicated as it would be to define, an anticipatory self-defense position is important to prevent the body from fracturing along internal alliances to act against threats that haven’t actually materialized into an attack. Not only would this undermine the Alliance, but could damage Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.