Fukushima unyieldingly shows us the birth defect of the
light water reactor (LWR). The fuel elements of LWR are
not inherently safe; they require active cooling even after the power plant has
been turned off and after they have been removed from the reactor; they
continue to require cooling for up to five years.
The
fuel elements are by far the weakest link in the LWR; they are the main reason
why the LWR is considered to be unsafe, they are the birth defect of the LWR.
The
fuel element of the LWR was modeled on the submarine reactors of the US
Admiral Hyman Rickover which were implemented in an environment where cooling
water was always (!!) at hand and where there was no (!!) human population.
The
light water reactor, LWR (boiling-water reactor and pressurized-water reactor)
and the high performance reactor, RBMK (as in Chernobyl) have their roots in military
armament as is typical of almost all reactors. Safety was never paramount in
all these systems but rather their usage. The LWR functioned as a compact,
almost maintenance-free energy source for the propulsion of submarines. The
RBMK served to generate weapons grade plutonium. The two systems are completely
different, both technically and in terms of reactor physics and they are both
unsafe for different reasons.
The
concept of the submarine reactor with its weak fuel element was developed into
a power plant on land in the early 1950's. These power
plants were built in areas where water for cooling was not always
guaranteed and which are populated. This was an abuse of a military achievement
to create an unsafe, bad design for the electricity industry; not to mention
the low energy efficiency.
The
lack of security of the fuel elements is hidden with very different barriers
around the fuel element and rigs which maintain the cooling. All of them are failure
prone systems. Pseudo-scientific risk analysis is used to disguise the
accidents caused by this weakness with the concept of improbability! No
insurance company in the world is prepared to insure the remaining risk.
Many
highly qualified engineers and technicians are still today working to improve
the safety of the LWR with the parameter that ‘safety is a dynamic term' as
written in Der
Spiegel in 1987.
The
energy sector could not and still cannot resist the temptation to put economic
profitability before safety; it is a sector where deals are made between
politics and the economy without regard for the citizens.
The
safety features of the LWR cannot be improved to such an extent that they become
immune to the effects of human error, particularly that of decision makers in
politics and management. Disasters where serious damage is inflicted upon
workers, the local population, the environment and the economy continue to be a
possibility. The disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima have
unyieldingly shown this.
The
mutation of the LWR from submarine actuator propulsion to nuclear power plant
was and remains a very lucrative business for General Electric and
Westinghouse. In this sense they have proliferated this faulty design through
worldwide licensing, like two giant octopuses of energy technology.
The
faulty design of the LWR, the fuel element, even affects the handling of the
used fuel elements in the fuel re-treatment and conditioning systems, all with
high-risk potential in the radioactive chemical processes.
There
was no closed concept for the safety for the entire nuclear fuel circle, from
the layout of the fuel element to the waste disposal, with the parameter that
excluded all but nominal potential for danger.
In
contrast to the LWR, the European high-temperature reactor (HTR) was developed
with such a safety concept; it was developed specifically for densely populated
areas like Nordrhein-Westfalen and was developed in such a way that waste could
be disposed of in a safe manner. Unfortunately the HTR failed due to economical
and political considerations. The global lobby for the LWR was too strong.
The
era of nuclear energy is over, unless, we muster the will to introduce the
inherently safe high-temperature reactor - where nuclear meltdown is impossible
- to the market, especially as a medium sized plant for cities. Even the future
of the HTR, however, is limited due to the loss of confidence in nuclear energy
in general; except perhaps in China.
All LWRs, this faulty design, should be taken out of
circulation in the medium term.
Nuclear
power plants will be replaced by highly efficient natural gas power plants.
There is sufficient natural gas globally for this.
This
means, however, that our politicians have to finally free themselves from the
CO2 lie - the lie that CO2 produced by people alters the
climate - just as it is now disassociating itself from the LWR lie.
The
so-called alternative energy sources solar, wind and biomass will make their
contribution.
Dr.-Eng. Heinrich Bonnenberg is a member of the German Nuclear Society
(associated with the German Atomic Forum), a member of the Association of
German Engineers and a member of the German Council on Foreign Relations.
Translation by Philip Evans



March 30, 2011
Member deleted
http://transpacificthinktanks.blogspot.com/2011/03/power-vacuum.html
(b) Another previously exchanged view :
http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Eco-Business_...
(3) Scientific evidence for global warming :
It is generally believed that GHG traps some excess heat from the burning of fossil fuels and etc., breaking the dynamic equilibrium of heat balances, thus, causing global warming and climate change. Which in turn probably will cool off the depleted ozone layer, further damaging the ozone layer.
Therefore, it's important to carry out a global experiment on a set amount of fund, set amount of time and, if possible, a set target(s) GHG reduction level. Followed by a close examination of the results, namely the extent/degree of global warming as a function of the set parameters dictated by the Copenhagen Accord, before next steps.