The events
of August 7th, 2008 in South Ossetia may have jumpstarted military hostilities
between Russia and Georgia in this
breakaway region. The conflict ended nine days later and reshuffled the balance
of power in the Southern Caucasus, specially in Georgia, which saw its
territorial integrity damaged after Russia officially recognized the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Ronald
Asmus' seminal description of the events that led to the war of August 2008
between Russia and Georgia
provides a critical window into the movements and political decisions that spurned
and enabled the August wars' end result. Asmus describes Russian military
movements along Georgian borders before the 7th of August, a greater South
Ossetian capacity for shelling - possibly provided by the Russian army - and
Mikheil Saakashvili's dilemma between engaging the incoming Russian army to
defend the People and his Presidency, or following the advice from the West and
doing nothing. Saakashvili chose the former.
However,
was this a scheme to trap the Georgian President into a situation he could
neither win nor forfeit? Was there a bigger plan behind all of these events?
Predictably,
the spillover for Abkhazia came at lightning speed, triggered by the deployment
of several thousand Russian troops in the region and the mobilization of its
Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol
towards the Abkhaz and Georgian Black Sea coast. The consequences were set to
be enormous.
Notwithstanding
the importance of assessing the progression of the conflict, this article will
not focus on military developments or on Georgia's political decisions
throughout and after the conflict. This article will provide a critical
analysis of the geopolitical motivations of the Russian leadership in
recognizing the independence of both breakaway provinces. It argues that the
war in South Ossetia was not only a reaction to regional and international
circumstances, but that in fact the entire episode might have been engineered
by a ‘hard line' faction of the Russian leadership, as a way of pushing for the
carefully planned recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Four
hypotheses are presented in this article in an attempt to assess the benefits
and geopolitical gains of Abkhazia's independence and close association with Russia, a move that would allow the latter to
dramatically broaden its presence and influence in the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Stemming from countering NATO expansion in the
region and dispelling any hopes Saakashvili might have of membership in the
West, while adding two military bases to its roster and using the region as a
platform to assist with the construction of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic
Games, Russia had an outstanding motivation for recognizing Abkhazia as an independent,
albeit heavily associated, state.
Moreover,
this association would allow rolling back the internal liberal movement brought
on by Dmitry Medvedev's curricula, which was believed to be a threat to the
established vertical power of the Russian regime.
The
recognition of Abkhazia was intensely criticized by Western powers, who
continue to support Georgia
despite some restrictions. Nevertheless, this presented an opportunity to
settle several geopolitical issues surrounding the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus, and the benefits of such recognition
proved to be immensely more profitable than any criticism or even sanction
attached to the violation of established European security doctrines.
Vasco Martins is a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security.
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