The Caucasus region has never been as strategically important for the international community, as it is now. The escalation of a long-lasting political crisis and the resulting five-day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, ultimately reveiled the region's "significant strategic importance" not only to European Union, but also to other political key players including the United States of America, the United Nations, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the Council of Europe amongst others. The fifth wave of EU enlargement (2004) has brought the European Union much closer to the Caucasus region and its current problems. In order to avoid any kind of dangerous instability on its new borders, the European Community has started to actively seek ways of effectively resolving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. Most political experts however agree, that the EU became so "devotedly interested in the stability and prosperity of the South Caucasus region mainly in order to ensure its own access to Caspian oil and gas, develop transport and communication corridors between Europe and Asia, as well as successful prevention of such big inner threats as smuggling of drugs and weapons, human trafficking and other dangerous types of transcontinental crime." (Europe report, 2006)
In this MA thesis I determine and analyse the consequences of the Russia-Georgian War on EU foreign policy, not only in regard to Russia - its biggest and most powerful economic partner in Eastern Europe, but also in relation to 'pro-western' Georgia and Ukraine. I conclude that the war has severly threatened European geopolitical interests and its future energy security and independence from the Kremlin. Therefore it would be highly desirable for Ukraine and Georgia to access both the EU and NATO as soon as possible in order for the EU to succesfully apply its tactic of "defending its eastern flanks" from overwhelming Russian influence in this very strategically important "west-orientated" geopolitical region. But, unfortunately, numerous internal problems in these states make the implementation of such an external policy in practice into a real dilemma if not an utopia. With regards to Russian-European relations I conclude that the "Caucasus crisis," despite its large political dimensions, does not have a real potential and possibility to change cardinally the overall dynamics of previous tight socio-political and economical relations between Brussels and Moscow. This is mostly due to the most powerful and economically-developed European member states, notably Germany and France, having no interest in any kind of economical or political sanctions on a so called "aggressor-country," which is their long-time successful and reliable business and trade partner.
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January 19, 2010
Helen Turek, University College London, Bronze Contributor (25)
One of the most significant changes in EU policy has been the introduction of the Eastern Partnership agreements. Although their launch in May last year may have appeared to be the EU attempting to co-operate with the former Soviet states and challenge Russian dominance in the region following the war, many consider the policy to be weak and half-hearted – and it was in the pipeline before the war broke out in any case. The main problem with the partnerships is the lack of consensus within the EU towards the region (which you discuss in your thesis).
It is worth looking at US policy towards Russia and Eastern Europe, which has also evolved since August 2008. The main changes over the last year have been the withdrawal of the missile defence shield plans in Poland and the Czech Republic and the attempt to ‘reset’ relations with Russia. Although these policies could simply be considered part of Obama’s general goodwill strategy, it is still worth noting that the initial condemnation of the war seems to have been sidelined and the US is now pandering to Russia.
These changes in policy indicate that Russia is considered - as you make very clear in your conclusion - too important to forsake relations with.
I don’t necessarily think that it is a question of ‘selling out’ or taking sides (the war is still one of the greatest obstacles to establishing co-operation and trust) but the result of an assessment of the major foreign policy challenges facing the US and EU today (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan), where Russian co-operation is important.
It would be interesting to look at the repercussions of withdrawing the missile defence shield plans and attempting to draw closer to Russia. How are US relations with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union going to be affected?