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November 30, 2009

Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)

I previously commented that, "for contemporary strategic reasons, it would be advantageous to paper over this reality for the moment. Good policy often has to glide over uncomfortable truths in order to function. It is in Europe's interest to be more embracing of Turkey so as to deal with the very immediate challenge of energy security. The larger philosophical questions can be answered later and, perhaps, in ways difficult for anyone living now to conceive. "

Those larger philosophical issues have to do with what appears to be substantive and large cultural differences between the direction Turkey is moving today and the EU revolving around Islamism, secularism and residual Christianity. However, the energy issue is so important, that the US should continue pushing the EU to offer a real membership for Turkey. Too many contemporary strategic imperatives are at stake to be obsessed with abstract (though meaningful) philosophical arguments.

On the other hand, it is prudent for the US to hedge its bets with Turkish shifts.

With that in mind, I proposed in previous comments that it is time for "A bold, "Nixon goes to China" moment with Iran could reset the geopolitics of the Middle East and create new realities that shake up conventional thinking. This might even reorient Turkish calculations and make it more amenable to Western interests even absent a full throated endorsement by the Europeans."

Indeed, a bold reconceptualization of the Middle East is probably long-overdue for the US. The rise of a nuclear Iran and a Middle East looking, somewhat Islamist Turkey represent sea changes that need to be taken into account.

If aggressive deterrence can be established psychologically (the domain where deterrence actually resides), then a "deal" can be made that will allow Iran a certain degree of security within well defined limits. The regime can be assured that no external forces or externally supported internal forces (as opposed to solely internal forces) will overthrow it. It may even be possible to envision allowing it to develop nuclear power (and even a limited weapon) capability to save face.

While this type of move would require assurances for Israel that the US understands its fears and would not allow an attack upon it to be answered with anything except the most aggressive of responses, Iranian and, more importantly, Shia-US relations can scramble the ossified Middle East. This, in turn, would force Turkey to reexamine its strategic relationship with the US irrespective of whatever the Europeans decide to do.

The US can no longer count on Turkey being a "bridge" between Europe and the Middle East. Ultimately, there may not be the capacity to build a meaningful bridge for the forseeable future. Consequently, Turkish policy must be viewed in a different light unless and until Turkey, and Europe, are able to paper over or, more unlikely, resolve their philosophical issues.

December 1, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Mr. Lawson,

Thank you for your comments. In terms of your thoughts as expressed in the following:

"With that in mind, I proposed in previous comments that it is time for "A bold, "Nixon goes to China" moment with Iran could reset the geopolitics of the Middle East and create new realities that shake up conventional thinking. This might even reorient Turkish calculations and make it more amenable to Western interests even absent a full throated endorsement by the Europeans.""

I do not believe that the internal factionalized politics in Iran at this time would permit the kind of bold US initiative you suggest. The ability of the Revolutionary Guard to infiltrate many sectors of Iran's state and society would suggest a hardening of attitudes by those who have the upper hand in power and the abiilty to act at will. We agree, I believe, that Turkey will act on the basis of its interests in the Middle East. Its offer to Iran in terms of the nuclear issue was rejected, which places the ball in Iran's court. As difficult as this is diplomatically speaking, America should keep trying to engage on that front, bilaterally, as well as in the context of the P5+1 in the UNSC. Turkey can be helpful in this context.

I believe that Turkey, in its ambitions to be a regional player, understands the value of its strategic relationship with the US, but seeks leverage given that its EU accession negotiations are stalemated. It will be interesting to see what role Turkey can play in NATO as the new strategic concept evolves and the EU digs in its heels to keep the accession negotiations from advancing. The security context is in a holding pattern in terms of the Berlin Plus agreements, which means that Turkey does exercise a key brake function. This reality has captured the attention of those European leaders who want to move ahead on issues of security and defense now that Lisbon enters into force as the treaty basis for European policy making.

Here I believe that enhancing the opportunities Turkey's multilateral foreign policy provides is a way ahead. Turkey is an important strategic member of the Atlantic Alliance, which is why Europe and America should cooperate to make sure that Turkey contributes constructively in crisis management operations using NATO assets, not in an obstructionist way out of fear of being shut out of the decision-making process because it in not a full member of the European Union.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette Mazzucelli

December 1, 2009

William R. Honyotski US citizen for world peace

The toughest thing for Turkey (or any community, state, country, even person) can do is maintain self-esteem or sameness while trying to join a group/coalition/union of other like minded persona. The whole world wants peace in the middle east. Turkey will be a major partner in establishing this peace. But Barack Obama should take a slow and gradual approach. Many of the middle eastern civilizations have been around much longer than modern US government and survived, so most of the middle eastern peoples tend to feel resentment towards (western culturalization). It must be made clear that we the US and EU wish to share in their culture and learn from it, not replace it with our nouveau culture. A culture that has pushed us -the west- into Future Shock (a novel by Alvin Toffler). I pray President Obama will hold back any dramatic or emotional speech. Turkey is coming to the US to help us as well as for us to help them. I can only hope language will not become a barrier, because as all know [or should] language is our greatest barrier to peace.

Thank You

William R. Honyotski

December 1, 2009

Ira Straus

3 theses.

1. EU membership could not integrate Turkey with the West, because it would more likely destroy the EU. A popular super-majority in the EU is against it and doesn't want to be part of a common citizenship space that includes Turkey.

2. Prof. Hall Gardner has proposed a second-class EU membership, with sharply limited EU voting and citizenship rights, for Ukraine, Turkey, and the other "European Neighborhood" countries. This would be a way to square the circle, IFF Turkey would accept it as adequate for anchoring its identity to the West. Turkey won't accept it if it's for Turkey alone. It probably will at most half-accept it if it's classed with Ukraine and others hitherto defined as farther away than Turkey from EU membership. It probably would have accepted it if the same second class status had been given to all of Eastern Europe, something I advocated in the 1990s as a transitional stage to eventual full Eastern European membership, so as to allow a more gradual transition in the East and less of a leap of faith in the West; but that's water under the bridge. The EU will have to live with the consequences, some good some otherwise, of full Eastern European membership, and a sharper divide with any kind of second class membership it can create for larger countries farther afield.

In short, there is no good EU solution; the most the EU could do would sitll leave half or more of the issue unresolved.

The West cannot subcontract to the EU the work of integrating Turkey, because the EU is too small and intimate for this to work. This returns the question to its natural venue: the West as a whole.

3. It is only in the wider Western space, defined by OECD and NATO itself, that the question of Turkish integration with the West can be resolved. Even here the resolution will be imperfect; but it is feasible, IF the collective West is willing to do some heavy integration lifting and stop subcontracting all the hard work to the EU.

To accomplish this,

a. OECD, or a willing majority of its members, would have to be upgraded into a common economic space or free trade area, with a strong name and community-identity. It could not have a common citizenship component in this era, since that is exactly what Europeans won't accept with Turkey, and in any case it is doubtful that Americans are ready to think of any kind of common citizenship with Europe; but a Common Economic Space or Atlantic Community is something they might be able to welcome.

b. NATO would have to find flexible formulas for use of its assets, not just making it a matter of either the US or the EU using them, but finding voting formulas for making assets available also for its ungrouped members (principle that means Canada, Norway, etc., and Western and Eastern Europeans when they don't have the full EU behind them, as well as Turkey), as long as there is a sufficient weighted majority supporting it. This would arguably be in keeping with the views of James Jones, now National Security Advisor; and with original American 1990s intentions about coalitions of the willing and CJTFs, long stalemated due to its unfruitful reduction to a question of either US or EU use of NATO assets, and its failure to look at flexible voting formulas, which would be less prone to stalemate than the search of unique US-EU special arrangements that could hide behind a facade of consensus.

December 1, 2009

Christian Andreas Morris, Sciences Po, (3)

Perhaps the most fascinating feature of the way in which Turkey has chosen to relate to the rest of the world as of late, is the diverse array of choices it has from a foreign policy perspective. Despite the fact that the motivations of its leaders’ erratic behavior may not be entirely transparent, and its decision-makers may not always fully account for the costs tied to their actions, Turkey’s current foreign policy is a message about the country we knew a few years back and how it has been replaced by one that is much more proactive and interested in shaping its own future.

After years of waiting in Europe's anteroom, it comes as no surprise that Turkey is now eager to make its own luck. That is not to say EU membership for the country has been rendered irrelevant, on the contrary, Turkey’s newly found confidence as a regional power and conflict broker may just be the appropriate card to play in order to highlight what an invaluable asset it can be as a partner. A strategy carried out with disdainful independence, of course.

This is thus a critical juncture; it is a moment to be seized not only by Turkey but by the United States and, accounting for a more nuanced situation, by Europe as well.

In terms of US foreign policy priorities in the Middle East, Turkey is far from the perfect ally, but it is also as good as it gets. If the objective is a stable Iraq, Turkey’s importance as one of its main trading partners could be cited as crucial to this goal. Similarly, Turkey’s neighborhood policy with its recent emphasis on rapprochement (Armenia) and cooperation has gained the goodwill of many in the region, including that of Iran.

The United States ought to encourage Turkey’s role as a mediator. Treating Turkey as a partner and without condescension can go a long way! Whether it be to help address Iran’s escalating nuclear ambitions or seek positive developments on the Palestinian front, it could be very helpful to bring in a party these actors can trust. Naturally, in the latter instance, the current state of things would also require that the United States use its considerable leverage with Israel to accomplish something, if anything at all. All the same, the point is, Turkey’s rising stature could prove very useful to the US from a realpolitik vantage point.

As for EU membership, let us not forget the foreign policy doctrines of countries’ are often Janus-faced. EU membership may continue to be at the top of Turkey’s main concerns, but it is also true it cannot build trust with its Arab and Persian neighbors were it not for the tinge of Islamic ideology coloring the Erdogan administration. Albeit, there are worrisome signs on issues of principle, such as turning the Armenian Genocide into a problem of semantics or vouching for Omar Al-Bashir, which are actions clearly out of step.

Be that as it may, the above reasons fail to warrant barring Turkey from EU membership. Turkish accession, as pointed out by Ms. Yavkan Ural is a matter of identity politics and as such it can only be resolved if the EU commits wholeheartedly to building a multi-cultural identity beyond the religious divide, while Turkey positions itself unmistakably and UNAMBIGUOUSLY on the side of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and secularism in the political process, which constitute not western but global values.

Should Turkey decide to pursue leadership in a Turkic Union, this could mean reaping plentiful benefits; however, such a union is no replacement for EU membership and it should not be used as an alternative to liberate Europe from the burden of stating clearly why its union is exclusionary, even if it risks not having a very convincing explanation!

December 2, 2009

Bernhard C. Bockmann, University of Bonn, (3)

The full membership of Turkey into EU is unlikely, because it depends on a certain "Western Way" of formulating, communicating and dealing with politics which is not - so far - aknowledged or even adopted by the Turkish mentality. The copying of EU legislation is not sufficient to get the entrance ticket: Turkey has to prove that it regards European "l'esprit de loins" not just as lip-service, but as a true guide-line for their own sensing and acting for politicies. Insofar, Turkey has to go the longest way to EU than any other state the EU-membership was granted to. And Turkey has not fulfilled the necessary obligations of the 'aquis communautaire' yet, especially not value based issues.

As consequence, there should be a true debate in Turkey, whether full membership is indeed worthy the sufferings on the way to it. Politicians have pointed out for decades that EU-membership will leverage the condition of the Turkish nation - no one has mentioned the transformation of the society according to European standards. As long as the aim of a EU-membership was limited to military and westernized elite of the Marmara region, a broader discussion of cultural changes was not necessary, but now, having a government of more democratic and broader base and of Anatolian and islamic origin, the Turkish majority gets a glime how far their country have to transform for EU-membership - there are not just benefits from EU to gain!

As a result, Turkey opens to the East, but without loosing ties to the West as its commerce and trade with EU is further growing. Turkey is testing other options, which, from todays point of view, are not a match to a European perspective. Turkey has far more to gain from the EU than any other state in the Middle East can offer. Therefore, perhaps, in upcoming years, Turkey will value a special partnership with EU just the perfect solution to dissolve the conflict of economic westernization and muslimic tradition.

In any case, neither EU nor NATO are forced to take extraordinary and urgend steps binding Turkey stronger to the West, as long as the alternatives presented by Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria do so poorly shine. It is just testing its price for the next bargain with EU.

December 2, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Hello Ira,

It's great to see your comments in this forum. Hope you and the family are well! Let's dialogue once again...

I believe in a common economic space provided it does not establish more permanent structural barriers between Turkey, which would be inside an OECD-led coalition, and those countries to the East, that would remain outside. This scenario would be difficult in that bridge building is more problematic as globalization exacerbates gaps between those countries still wedded to land in their economies and those capital-intensive countries that revolutionize in services: in other words, what Rosecrance defined about a decade ago as 'virtual states.' Turkey has taken steps to reform in the later direction, even if some of its measures have stalled more recently.

I wonder how the implementation of coalitions of the willing would work, for example, in light of President Obama's speech re Afghanistan last night. How could CJTFs be used to integrate Turkey into a broader allied effort within NATO? Can the Turkish stalemate with the EU be overcome in Turkey's interest given the fragility in Pakistan and the dangers posed by proliferation to non-state actors. This is a critical test case. Turkey offers strategic assets to the West; yet, concerns over Cyprus lead to stalemate. If this remains essentially a Greek-Turkish bilateral standoff that has become Europeanized, the West, if we use the categorization here, is part of the problem as it strives to identify a solution.

As for European integration, if Ukraine can be envisaged as a future member, why not Armenia in two generations time? The logic of integration, or as some have argued Empire in the case of the enlarged European Union, pushes expansion further eastward. This evolution can have profound implications for the development of human capital, which is why the form of governance it assumes is critical. Some form of Union with Turkey with implications for the Caucasus will be pushed to the forefront politically. Given the likely demographics change within EU member states and future geopolitical realities, there are questions as to what role the West should play in this cross-regional transformation.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

December 3, 2009

Ira Straus

hi Colette,

sure, an upgraded OECD, or OECD enhanced cooperation group, should not establish larger new barriers to external intercourse. Like the EU, it would have to collectivize what are presently national barriers, and sometimes reduce them in the process.

In other words, negative integration implies positive integration. Destruction of separate state policy capabilities (including capabilities for maintaining barriers that for some purposes of economic and societal management have hitherto been needed) requires creation of common policy capabilities. Our old friend John Pinder.

This in turn entails that such an upgraded OECD grouping should be able to consider new barriers, just as nations always consider new barriers that may be needed. The difference would presumably be that it could do this with greater positive effects in some cases, and would in most cases do it in a more rational way, after more careful technocratic vetting and less easily influenced by short term political passions, than can be done when such measures are considered on a national basis. For example,

(a) controls on exports of dual use, military, nuclear, CBW, environmentally hazardous, or otherwise dangerous products and technologies. This is already done on a national basis, ineffectively; and coordinated on an international basis by a myriad of "suppliers clubs" (often similar in membership to OECD), usually not effectively enough. An upgraded OECD group could hopefully have the institutional capabilities to do this better, and if so, it could and probably would consider strengthening these control regimes.

(b) response to the fear of a "race to the bottom". A still messier subject. The essence of this fear is that capital export through globalization will continue to mushroom until tipping points are reached and wages plummet in the OECD space. This fear seems in the immediate view selfish and immoral, since it is virtuous for First World capital to be used for poorer Third World workers than continue to remain mostly used for First World workers. Nevertheless there is also a moral virtue to social continuity and stability, and perhaps some moral claim of workers on some of the capital remaining with workers who have helped develop it. In any case, the First World integrated its working class into middle class society in the course of the last century, with some difficulty and fears of revolutionary failure in some periods; and a central aspect of this integration has been thanks to having a substantial amount of capital that accompanies labor. We keep hearing that wages in some sectors have been driven down by globalization; also there are those who argue that wages overall in the First World have been driven down, perhaps invisibly in absolute terms but substantially compared to what they would have been. Could a tipping point be reached where wage lowering has social stability consequences? I'm not sure here, although it seems a logical possibility; and if possible, then could it become probable or inevitable, by simple extrapolation of trends? If so, is there anything that can be done to prevent this (after all, social destabilization could have huge economic loss consequences, dwarfing the gains from globalization; and only slowing down the pace of capital export could be effective, job retraining and welfare seem to have proved very costly and ineffective salves)? I'm not sure here either. The one thing I am sure of in all this is that anything done would be done more effectively, and in a more measured rational way, on a collective international basis, through an OECD-sized grouping, than through national policies. National policies of renewed capital flow controls would be influenced heavily by nationalist passions and cries for national-sized protected markets. They would be directed recklessly against all external economic flows, not discriminately against relevant ones, without rational calculation of how much restraint of those flows is needed. If national controls at first proved ineffective because of sieve effects, nationalism would react with even more extremism and measures to cut off all sieve effects. OECD is precisely the natural "sieve" space for flows that lack any race-to-the-bottom aspect, but would serve as a sieve if not coordinated OECD-wide. Whether OECD-wide controls would in fact be needed, and how specifically they could be drawn up and organized to be effective, and rationally calibrated - this is a further subject that presumably an upgraded OECD would have some capability for looking into.

with my best regards,
Ira

December 4, 2009

David Foster, Henry Jackson Society, Silver Contributor (39)

Building Turkish confidence in the EU is not an easy task. Turkey is very patriotic and protective of their sovereignty and do not trust other countries easily. In order for Europe to convince Turkey that the EU recognises that Turkey is as an important strategic ally, they should touch subjects that are meaningful in Turkey.

1. Strengthening cooperation against the PKK.

One of the main causes of Euro-scepticism of Turkish citizens has been over the PKK, a terrorist group founded in 1978 demanding an independent Kurdish state. Between the 1960s and 1990s, a substantial number of Kurdish people left Turkey to find asylum or work in Europe, especially in Germany and France. The terrorist group has found an environment to establish bases in Europe, taking advantage of Europe’s highly democratic freedoms for funding and acquiring support. Although European countries continue looking for terrorists and have carried out important operations to break down PKK activities, the EU countries would need to make a determinant decision on taking strict actions against the PKK in Europe.

2. Releasing pressure over Cyprus.

The EU has been, arguably, unfair about the Cyprus issue having an effect on Turkey’s accession. The Cyprus Dispute should be taken into consideration because it does not affect Croatia or Ukraine the same way it does Turkey. The Cyprus Dispute includes a bloody civil war, decades of not recognising the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and almost a war between Greece and Turkey. Apart from that, in 2004 the Annan Plan Referendum, which aimed at uniting both sides of the island with reasonable polices, was voted against by the Republic of Cyprus [mainly Greek] but voted in favour by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, now a member of the European Union, voted against a sensible solution to unite the island, and this action was ignored by the EU. The Turkish Republic in the North of the Island, who voted in favour of the Annan Plan, received no reward for their support in ending the dispute. Now the EU requires that Turkey to open trade and communications with the Republic of Cyprus as a requirement for accession. In this case this case the EU should remember the history the Cyprus Dispute and Annan Referendum, when Turkey wanted to end the dispute with a reasonable solution, and take it into consideration to exempt Turkey from recognising the Republic of Cyprus.

3. Condemning France’s Law on the Armenian Genocide

The EU should disapprove France’s Law which punish those who deny the Armenian Genocide. Turkey is very sensitive of this matter; because they believe that Armenian Genocide Recognition Movement is more anti-Turkish than anything else. Firstly, the Armenian Genocide, it has been argued, that it cannot be compared to the Holocaust because there was no open political movement at the time against the Armenian Community and there were numerous killings not solely on Armenians, but also on Turks (who have a Memorial in Igdir), Pontic Greeks, Assyrians and Kurds. Secondly, it is a subject still researched by historians and prosecuting those who do not believe that the event cannot be called ‘genocide’ is absurd, especially for political reasons.

December 5, 2009

Ghassan Dahhan, King's College London, Bronze Contributor (14)

The problem with the suggestion that Turkey should be offered an alternative strategic partnership is that it mistakenly presupposes that it would bring a change in the present situation. Turkey is already engaged in several strategic partnerships ranging from military and economic collaborations. The only facet that Turkey misses is a political partnership equal to that of the EU. It therefore wishes to become a full member. The only problem is that Turkey’s ambitions reach further than to take satisfaction with a peripheral agreement as some propose.

A European rejection of Turkey to the EU will be harmful to the West because it would certain reduce the West’s geopolitical position in the world. The establishment of a Turkish Union would be a bad thing for the West for the reason that on the long term Turkey could become a regional peer competitor in Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey would become to perceive the region more actively as its own backyard, which would make it more difficult for the West to exercise control in the region without risking its relationship with Turkey. The establishment of a Turkish Union will certainly come at the expense of the West’s favorable geopolitical position in the Middle East and Central Asia, and is from a Western point of view therefore not desirable.

The problem that the West is currently facing with regard to Turkey hasn’t yet materialized in a way that there are no possibilities left open. Nonetheless, a continuation of the status quo is simply not possible. Any Western attempt to return to the situation in which Turkey is being seen as a peripheral state will only contribute to the suspicion that lives among many Turks that the West is trying to keep Turkey weak. Turkey wants the West to recognize that it’s too big to be ignored, and more importantly, it is big enough to start a club of its own. The West is learning to understand that Turkey has an enormous political potential, either positive or negative. Therefore the West needs to make far-reaching adjustments in its foreign policy if it wants to keep Turkey on its side.

If the EU closes the door for Turkey’s accession the outcome will be harmful for both the EU and the US (and Israel). If this transpires, there are still some possibilities left open for the EU, though not infinite. In order to maintain decent relations with Turkey the EU should not only reassess its relations with Turkey but that with Israel as well. One important factor that can explain the Turkish-Israeli alliance is that Turkey hitherto was focusing on Europe rather than on the Middle East. Since an irreversible rejection of Turkey’s accession to the EU will foster Turkey’s ambitions to become the regional dominant force in the region, rather than a constructive partner within the EU, Israel and Turkey will have to deal with each other, in which there is no room for the regional ambitions of both. This will inevitably lead to (at least) a political confrontation between the two states.

The West, but the US in particular, faces a difficult task if its foreign policy's main goal is to enhance its strategic position in the world. Unconditional support for Israel along with the commitment to its security, and the desire to prevent Turkey from going eastward could become incompatible goals if the current trend continues, whereby the West could be forced to make painful decisions; either to let Turkey go, or to release its commitment to Israel’s security. But in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further, the improvement of ties between the two nations is essential for the West. Nonetheless, such measures will only have temporal and limited effects. Therefore, the only way to prevent the EU and US from making even more painful decisions in the future is by offering Turkey real membership prospects to the EU.