Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

January 6, 2010 |  4 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Tobias  Fella

Transatlantic Economic Rivals?

Tobias Fella: Competing regulatory rules and policies pose a major challenge to transatlantic relations and to the further development of the multilateral trade order. The EU and US must institutionalize a framework, which supports enhanced liberalization, thus preventing the development of competing regionalism.

The United States and Europe have engaged in multiple free trade agreements (FTAs), which are essential instruments of their foreign policies. The multilateral trade system has incrementally moved away from a hegemonic regime under de facto co-leadership of Washington and Brussels. Due to the sheer economic weight of the EU and US, FTAs involving both players can still be characterized as hegemonic, the more so when they are of the hub-and-spoke type: bilateral trade agreements of a dominant integrator with several other countries. So the hegemonic power can use FTAs to promote positive integration on its own terms, thus expanding its own regulatory system beyond its borders. This is because states, which are not engaging in American or European trade agreements, are excluded from the liberalization progress within the free trade area. As a result there is a return of power and hierarchy in economic relations. Therefore, it is essential for small and medium powers to enter free trade areas dominated by Europe or the United States.

In particular the Bush-administration engaged in numerous free trade agreements. Although such regional spheres of positive integration are not primarily measures to compete with the European Union, rather with China, there is a growing danger of emerging rival regionalism between Washington and Brussels – especially since the EU is also using FTAs to gain political influence over third countries. This can be seen as harmless when Brussels engages pre-accession countries to negotiate free trade agreements, because in this case bilateral FTAs are short-lived. However, with regards to countries like Mexico, South Korea or Mediterranean neighboring states, growing transatlantic competition is the impetus behind establishing bilateral trade agreements.

For instance, when engaging in a FTA with Mercosur, the EU was intended to strengthen multi-polarity. Indeed Brussels considered a Pan-American free trade agreement as unfavorable because a US sphere of influence would emerge in South America. In this case, FTAs with Chile, Mexico and Mercosur also served as measures to gain access to important South American markets. Thus, the EU tried to prevent a FTA between Mercosur and Washington, as well as the resulting discrimination against European companies and products in Latin-America.

Without a doubt, on both sides of the Atlantic, two competing trading blocs have emerged. Washington and Brussels have engaged in several trade agreements. The idea of a common transatlantic integration project, a Transatlantic Free Trade Association (TAFTA), no longer appears to be on the political agenda, which is surprising considering that both actors share a large set of economic ideals. An Atlantic free trade area could appear as a European-American signal, inviting all important WTO players to participate in further market liberalization measures. The assumption that there is no need for the institutionalization of transatlantic trade relations is misleading, due to deep European-American economic interdependence.

Without integrative steps, economic relations will lose their political relevance. Rivalry between the European Union and the United States could lead to an offensive regionalism by both actors, resulting in a multi-polar world based on mutual rivalry and strategic transatlantic competition. Such a development would not be in the best interest of Brussels or Washington, nor would it be conducive to global free trade.

We can only hope that both the United States and Europe will realize the undeniable advantages of deeper economic integration, since only established economic powers are able to stop the progression towards rival regionalism. The Framework for advancing transatlantic economic integration between the EU and US, negotiated in 2007, is one first step in the right direction.

In the long-term, both actors should create a common transatlantic trade area to use the advantages of deep institutional market integration. Thereby, the world's largest and most powerful market would be established, with the European Union and United States increasing their weight within the WTO. Washington and Brussels should promote a reduction in trade and investment barriers, thus creating incentives for important trading powers to support enhanced liberalization.

Tobias Fella studies international relations at Ludwig-Maximillians University in Munich.

 

Related Material on Atlantic Community:

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Christopher   Stienburg

January 7, 2010

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr. Fella,

While I acknowledge the potential benefits of deeper integration between the United States and the European Union, the political and economic consequences of not doing so are not that bad. The transatlantic relationship may never return to its post-WWII heights, but a future of "offensive regionalism" is unlikely.

Politically, the US and Europe still identify with each other more than they do with anyone else in the world. A shared commitment to representative democracy and free-market economy, as well as an ongoing practice of intelligence-sharing and military cooperation (embodied in NATO) reflect a deeply rooted relationship that may not break so easily.

Economically, the two may have more to gain in the long-run by resisting deeper integration. If a successful global trade regime is one that fully institutionalizes liberalized trade into a strong rules-based multilateral framework, then a less powerful EU-US duo at WTO negotiations may be beneficial. After all, it is their refusal to engage in freer agricultural and textile trade with the developing world that is partly to blame for the failure of the current Doha round.

Either way, the two sides have reached a level of economic interdependence that would make the costs of rivalry prohibitively high.




 
Tobias  Fella

January 7, 2010

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr. Stienburg,

i agree with you, European and American positions on free trade and the economic order have much more in common, than both actors share with important third countries like China or Russia. Of course, there is a striking economic interdependence between Europe and North America, when we are looking at the large number of mergers and acquisitions, the high stock of foreign trade investment , the trade with goods and services and so on...
So European-American economic relations are the worlds most import trading system.

But relate these so called „deep structures“ really to unprecedented market integration? From a business point of view, two motives for FDI – gaining market access and ensuring against the impact of currency changes – suggest a lack of integration rather than being proof of deep integration. Beyond that, subsidiary companies are representing themselves knowingly as local firms and brands. It is doubtful to identify this circumstance as an indicator for growing political und social integration. In consequence there is no deep market integration, embedded in nameable political institutions in the Atlantic Economic Area. Besides that, there has been an ongoing shift in global economy. The relative weight of transatlantic economic relations in global economy is likely to decrease. In addition, the Asiatic Region is to outrun the Atlantic Area in economic growth. Transatlantic trade relations, while strong, have evolved a lot less dynamically than have U.S. and EU trade with China. In 1990 both U.S. and EU trade with China were only roughly 10% of transatlantic trade. In 2007, the ratio had risen to nearly 70% for the United States, and 68% for the European Union. Furthermore, the BRIC states will outbalance the economy weight of the G6 states in less than 40 years.

And there is the - mentioned - story of regionalism against multilateralism. In the last few years, both the United States and the EU have engaged in multiple trade agreements. Hence the NAFTA countries are the United States most important trading partners. Almost 27% of imports and 33% of exports fall upon Canada and Mexico. The Bush-administration negotiated 11 free trade agreements. With a European Union going down the same road, there would be a danger of competing regionalism.

Nevertheless transatlantic economic interdependence offers a great number of incentives for political cooperation and integration. When there is an emerging shift in global economy, both actors could secure their impact on world trade order with establishing an integrated Atlantic Economic Area. The interdependence between Europe and the United States is undoubtedly unique, and both are, on an economic level, equipollent actors. But this is not only the origin of close cooperation, but also of competition and rivalry.
Tags: | regionalism | trade | economics |
 
Greg Randolph Lawson

January 7, 2010

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
An interesting idea regarding free trade, an "Atlantic Zone" or "AU", perhaps?

Though I tend to agree with Christopher Stienburg above that there is little propect of "offensive regionalism", given the highly touted "Rise of Asia" and shift of economic power eastwards, a deeper Atlantic integration would probably be much better than any petty regional squabbles over parochial FTAs.

There will be an interesting challenge for the EU as its demographic decline becomes more acute. While the U.S. has its own issues with this, it is likely to be relatively better off than Europe even factoring in the relevant immigration for both. This raises the prospect that integration could be advantageous for the EU more than the U.S. but both could gain.

Of course, would this be seen as a threat by China and would that lead to "offensive regionalism" on a very large scale? This would have to be considered.

I'm not sure this idea is a necessity, but an examination of possible benefits is not a flawed notion, though caution moving forward would be required.
 
Tobias  Fella

January 7, 2010

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
In my opinion, there i a need for institutional integration. This assumption is based on various trends and observations:

Economically there is a transatlantic balance of power which can’t be considered without looking at the American supremacy in military affairs. Especially in terms of overlapping conflicts between security and commercial policy. Resulting from this asymmetry of economic bipolarity and American military-hegemony there are increasing transatlantic frictions.

Washington uses its military power and primary in security affairs as an instrument to enforce its economic interests against European competitors. Above all American leadership in technology and the strength of the US-armour market are serving as a link between security and economy. Vice versa the European Union counteracts American strategic interests with its foreign trade policy in China, Iran and elsewhere.

Just 5% of the transatlantic trade volume is affected by conflicts. Anyhow there is a mutual loss of confidence in the American-European relationship, resulting in strategic competition on global markets, besides decreasing relevance of transatlantic economic relations in a shifting world economy. Particularly if we consider a connection of economic and security interests as there was one in the Airbus-Boeing-controversy. The real risk is the overlapping of security conflicts into the economic area, especially because there are no transatlantic institutions to settle disputes.

On the economic level there is no institution similar to NATO. De facto transatlantic trade issues can’t be settled outside the WTO. Therefore, in short term, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) should be revitalized as an early warning system for transatlantic trade issues. So the appealing of WTO ruling could be avoided. But for a long term there is a need of a new bilateral framework to deal with European-American trade conflicts. Especially when economic and security issues interact in trade conflicts.

There’s the risk that Europe and the USA, while competing with dynamic Asian economies and facing the problem of increasing macroeconomic imbalances, are outbidding themselves with protectionist measures. In fact both actors should create a common transatlantic trade area to use the advantages of deep institutional market integration. Thereby the world’s largest and most powerful market would be established, and also EU and USA would increase their weight in the WTO.
 

Create Comment

Type the characters shown in the image below into the textfield.
Captcha

What are tags?

Community

Jobs / Internships

Call for Papers

Atlantic Events

Partners

User of the day

Anna  Przybyll
Anna Przybyll
"A wise old owl lived in an oak The more he..."

Poll

Should NATO intervene in Syria?