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From Ben Gurion's «periphery strategy» doctrine to the present, Turkish-Israeli relations have had their ups and downs. Their partnership was largely influenced by regional developments and the prerogatives of Turkey's foreign policy orientation. The latter changed significantly after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power.

Three developments changed the scope of Turkish-Israeli relations after 2003, while also altering the direction of Turkey's foreign policy: the AKP's rise to power, the military's loss of political leverage in the context of the EU criteria, and Turkey's refusal to allow the US to use Turkish territory as a base for launching military actions against Iraq. The disagreements between the US and Turkey also affected Turkish-Israeli relations. Nevertheless, two regional problems were even more to blame for the deteriorating relationship between Turks and Israelis: the Palestinian cause and the matter of the PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party). Israel kept on blaming Turkey for not supporting Israel in the Palestinian issue. Meanwhile, Turkey in turn accused Israel for training Kurdish terrorist groups in the northern Iraq and supporting the PKK, which has been labelled a terrorist group.

Under the AKP, Ankara is turning its attention to the East, as Turkey intensifies its relations with Iran. Despite US misgivings and Turkey's inability to conduct its policy of balancing power between the West and the East, Turkey has launched a new phase of Turkish-Iranian cooperation. Turkey's relations with Iran are influenced both by economic and political interests. Turkey, which is seeking to become the leader in the region, tries to maintain friendly relations with all actors in the region. This includes Turkish attempts at mediation in the talks between Iran and the United States over the Iranian nuclear program. As Iran provides Turkey with oil and gas, there are considerable economic interests at stake.

However, it would be too limiting to study Turkish-Iranian relations solely from the angle of the cooperation mentioned. Turkey is concerned about Iran's growing influence. This mainly refers to the following three interrelated circumstances:

1. Ideology plays an important role. Turkey is still a secular state, and the Iranian revolutionary theocratic state to a certain degree represents a threat to Turkey's secularism.
2. Turkey is alarmed by Iran's development of a new generation of the strategic «surface-to-surface» missiles Shahab-4 and Shahab-5.
3. Turkey is worried about the stalemate in the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. Though Turkish officials are not against the development of nuclear energy by Iran for peaceful purposes, Turkey is highly concerned about nuclear proliferation in the region and Iran becoming a nuclear power.

After the Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, harsh Turkish criticism of Israel led to a further detrioration of Turkish-Israeli relations. This had an impact on the Israeli lobby supporting Turkey interests in the US Congress. In 2010, the Jewish Lobby refused to oppose resolution 252. The Anti-defamation League, which up to now has been a strong proponent of supporting Turkish interests, this year failed to support Turkey in the US Congress. This was a message to the ruling party in Turkey in response to its continued criticism of the Israeli policy in Gaza.

There are five "ifs," the presence of even one of which could promote an improvement in Turkish-Israeli relations:

1. If Israel restarts negotiations on the Palestinian issue and eliminates Turkey's concerns regarding this problem,
2. If Israel and Syria restart negotiations and Turkey resumes the mediation efforts,
3. If Tehran obtains nuclear weapon, this will hinder further Turkish-Iranian rapprochement and increase Turkey's willingness to cooperate with Israel under US patronage,
4. If there is a breakthrough in the EU-Turkish negotiations over Turkey's membership,
5. If a military coup takes place in Turkey and the military elite takes the foreign policy course in its hands.

The absence of any such developments at present gives Turkey the leeway to increase its role in the Greater Middle East for the time being. Concerning the "zero problems with neighbors" strategy implemented by the current Turkish authorities, it might not work under the circumstances mentioned above and the "fight on two fronts" may not give the expected results. One reason for this is that Turkey cannot at the same time promote its ties with Israel and appear to defend Muslim rights in the Middle East. While Turkey needs Israeli technology just as much as Israel needs Turkey in order to avoid complete isolation in the region, the relationship will not return to what it was in the 1990s. Even if Turkey acknowledges the importance of its ties with Israel, it cannot make an about-face after it has positioned itself as a supporter of the Palestine cause and a mediator in the conflict.

Angelina Harutyunyan holds a master's degree in international relations from Yerevan State University in Armenia.

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