The leaders gathering for this week’s Ukraine-EU summit have more in common than a shared concern for Europe’s future. They have also recently experienced significant and sometimes unsettling political change. In the EU, this was caused by an unprecedented wave of enlargement that brought in twelve new member states and a hundred million new citizens. Thankfully, the EU is now beginning to realize the fruits of its efforts. The new accession states are making an important contribution to the economic and political renewal of European life and the EU is now finalizing its Reform Treaty.
It is now Ukraine’s turn to demonstrate similar resilience. The Orange Revolution was a major step forward, but it was only the beginning of Ukraine’s transformation process, not its end. Our recent parliamentary and political crisis shows that it is often easier to create democratic institutions than learn democratic habits. The fact that we have agreed to settle our differences at the ballot box, rather than on the street, shows that we are passing the test.
The progress we are making illustrates the principle difference between Ukraine’s path of political development and the model of “managed democracy” found elsewhere in the post-Soviet world. It has been made possible thanks to the extraordinary growth of a strong and independent civil society started by the Orange Revolution.
Our objective at this week’s summit and beyond is to consolidate these changes by confirming our European choice and opening a new chapter in our relations with the EU. Anchoring our political future to a united Europe is our top priority. In our view, this must be based on a new realism—a realism that keeps the question of membership in perspective. We need to focus on the substance of European integration and not become pre-occupied with the end point. Our ultimate goal is to transform Ukrainian society according to European standards and acquis communautaire.
The main vehicle for realizing this ambition must be a new and enhanced bilateral agreement that recognizes the specific requirements and characteristics of both the EU and Ukraine. I sense that both parties have the political will to make this happen and that detailed negotiations will start in once a new government takes office in Kiev. That makes it all the more important that our elections are conducted in a way that reflects well on Ukraine and strengthens our negotiating position.
Ukraine expects that the new agreement will change the nature of Ukraine-EU relations from partnership and cooperation into integration and association. We also hope that visa arrangements can be reformed to encourage the greater interaction of peoples and make it easier to do business. We want to see more scientific cooperation, cultural exchange and contribute to Europe’s emerging role in security affairs and peacekeeping. More than anything, we would like the centerpiece of our new agreement to be the conclusion of a bilateral free trade agreement. We welcome the support of our European partners as we aim to secure accession to the WTO by the end of the year.
While we look to the EU for support and encouragement in our efforts to create a free and prosperous country, we know that responsibility for success is ours alone. We cannot fulfill our European ambitions with words and statements alone. It will also require tough decisions and a willingness to embrace difficult reforms. If Ukraine wants to complete its European journey, it cannot afford leaders who deal in rhetoric while ignoring the substance. For that reason, President Yushchenko during his last visit to Denmark has called for a New Realism in eurointegration. The key point of such policy must be to meet the Copenhagen criteria—unilaterally, if necessary—within a ten-year timescale.
It is an ambitious target and we have no illusions about the enormous challenges involved. But if we are really determined to make it, we have no choice except to become masters of our own fate. It is the only way Ukraine can expect to take its rightful place in a united and democratic Europe. But we, Ukrainians, also believe that without full-scale integration of Ukraine into the EU, Europe will be neither united nor democratic in precise meaning of these words.
Oleksandr Chalyi is the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Former Ambassador of Ukraine to Romania and Strasbourg, Former State Secretary on European Integration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President of Ukraine.
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September 21, 2007
Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College, Platinum Contributor (327)
But the "new realism" the ambassador discusses will depend on Ukrainian voters accepting the gamble of undertaking reform with no guaranteed end point (accepting the argument that "virtue is its own reward"), but also on European willingness to be prepared to give Ukraine real access to its market in all areas, not just in certain areas--and this would include sensitive commodities such as agricultural products and steel.
On the U.S. side, I don't know how effective Washington can be if the perception in Europe is that we continue to urge our partners to expand the Union again and again and to absorb the costs in the process, especially since a U.S.-Ukraine free trade area is unlikely any time soon. So what can the U.S. do to help this process along?
Finally, what remains open is whether the various ideas of "privileged partnerships" or schemes to bring Ukraine "in without being in" to Europe would be sufficient to help the process along, especially if some tangible benefits were offered.