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For the first time in recent history, the United States is as divided over its foreign policy as it is over domestic issues. In order to manage this changing global landscape, the US needs to foster a stronger transatlantic partnership with the EU. President Barack Obama has announced a more conciliatory US foreign policy. In his inaugural address, he promised to “extend a hand” to those regimes that would be “willing to unclench [their] fist.” His speeches in Berlin, Ankara, Cairo and Prague, and his video messages to the Iranian people, have made him a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. But can President Obama deliver on his promise of a more peaceful world? Is he able to turn enemies into friends?

In the recent book "How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace," Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former advisor to President Bill Clinton and member of the Atlantic Initiative's Advisory Board, deals with this question. Atlantic Community member and Georgetown graduate Fabian Lieschke interviewed Mr. Kupchan soon after President Obama’s first major international accomplishment: forging the most extensive nuclear arms-control agreement with Russia in nearly two decades. Yet its ratification hinges on a Congress which, especially after the health care debate, is deeply divided.

Fabian Lieschke: Mr. Kupchan, the passing of health care reform is truly historic and a big victory for President Obama. But it has left American politics deeply divided. Congressional elections take place this fall. What does this mean for Obama’s foreign policy?

Charles Kupchan: I think that American foreign policy is entering a period of what you might call “uncharted waters” because the domestic politics of foreign policy are getting more and more complicated. The broad centrist coalition that was put together by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II lasted pretty much until the Clinton administration – or at least until 1994 when the Republicans took the House and the Senate. Since that time, there has been a growing polarization over foreign policy. Today, it is safe to say that the country is as divided over its engagement abroad as it is over domestic issues like abortion, gay marriage or the health care bill. And that’s new. It used to be that the country was quite polarized over domestic issues but came together on foreign policy. Until the center is reconstituted – and one doesn’t know when or if that will happen – any president, including Obama, is going to have a tough time trying to pursue a constant and steady foreign policy. So, I think that Obama’s instincts are to be multilateralist, to return to the traditions of liberal internationalism, to reach out to adversaries and to pursue arms-control. What remains to be seen is whether he will be able to build and sustain sufficient domestic support for his policies. Will the Senate, for example, be willing to ratify the new arms-control agreement with Russia? Will the Senate be willing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? If there were movement toward rapprochement with Iran or Cuba – would Congress be willing to back away from sanctions? These are going to be very difficult domestic issues.

Fabian Lieschke:You mention that President Obama has been reaching out to adversaries, including Iran and North Korea. At the same time he has been tougher with America’s allies – most recently Israel, but also Europe. Aren’t his critics right – the president is giving in to repressive regimes, while distancing the US from its friends?

Charles Kupchan:I think you need to treat each of these categories separately. Yes, Obama’s critics argue that he is coddling dictators – that he is not sufficiently firm in dealing with them. My view is that he is being pragmatic. He is justifiably making ideological concerns a lesser priority in order to pursue important foreign policy goals. So when it comes to dealing with Iran, the administration does not think that this is a government that deserves any kind of respect. But it happens to be the government that is in place and that makes decisions about nuclear weapons and terrorism. Obama’s view is that one has to work with the government you have, not the government you might want. I think that’s the right policy. That does not mean that Obama should not speak out against violations of human rights – for example, in Iran, China or Russia. But Obama is right to base his policies towards those countries on their foreign policy behavior and to seek to cooperate with regimes even if we don’t like the way they govern at home. I base that in part on some of the conclusions of my book, where I found that countries that are quite repressive at home can nonetheless be reliable partners abroad. Israel is a stand-alone issue in that it is a very long and close ally of the United States. And I don’t think that this close relationship is at stake – the relationship between the United States and Israel is solid. But Obama is willing to put a level of pressure on the Netanyahu government that is unusual for an American president. Given the nature of politics in Israel, small parties – which are often times less open to compromise toward the Palestinians – have a lot of influence. Obama’s calculation is that a certain amount of American pressure can be an important part of the overall equation in Israeli politics. His hope is that external pressure can give the Israeli government incentives to move forward on the peace process and gradually lead to a greater level of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians. And then on the question of Europe. Some people say that Obama is ignoring Europe or he is not being sufficiently solicitous to allies. And again, that’s not quite right. The bigger problem is that there were unrealistic expectations about Obama in Europe and about what he could do at home in the United States. So right now we are in a period of recalibration. I don’t think the United States is walking away from Europe; rather we are in a moment of strategic adjustment to new conditions.

Fabian Lieschke: So how can Europeans help the United States in making friends?

Charles Kupchan: I’d say two things. One is that the Europeans in general are engagers and historically have been more ready to engage adversaries than the United States – in the belief that over time, engagement can lead to the settlement of political disputes. And so, in that sense, the EU’s engagement with China, with Russia, with Iran and Syria can help backstop US diplomacy. The other way in which the EU can help Obama is by becoming the better partner that Obama and most Americans now want. Obama is facing an America that is to some extent tiring of the burdens of global leadership, tiring of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US needs help to manage a changing global landscape; the more ready the EU is to offer such help, the stronger the transatlantic partnership will be. It is for this reason that there is a strong U.S. desire for a more capable partner in Europe. And Obama is a president who is more pragmatic and less sentimental. So he is constantly going to be asking: “What are the Europeans bringing to the table?” And that has led to a situation in which there is a certain impatience in Washington, particularly after the Lisbon Treaty. There was a hope that Lisbon might prove to be a turning point and there would be a greater and more coherent European role in foreign policy. But that doesn’t seem to be happening – at least as of yet.

Fabian Lieschke: What do you think explains the United States reaching out to long-term adversaries at this point in time? You mentioned President Obama is pragmatic, but is he also a more peaceful human being than George W. Bush?

Charles Kupchan: You know, I don’t think that George Bush was a warmonger and that Obama is a peacemaker. Obama has made clear that he is quite willing to use force when he thinks it’s necessary. He made that clear in his speech when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize. And he is being much more aggressive, for example, with drones in Pakistan than was George W. Bush. It would be inappropriate to cast them as polar opposites. But yes, there are a couple of differences when it comes to the way they think about foreign policy. One is that Bush was more ideological. Obama is more pragmatic. The neo-conservatives under Bush initially took a pretty simple position: “We don’t talk to nasty regimes. Nasty regimes need to go. They aren’t countries we do business with.” And Obama says: “I might not like these regimes, but in the service of stability and peace we may have to do business with them.” It is also worth pointing out that despite Bush’s rhetoric, by the time he left office, he was negotiating with North Korea and allowing American envoys to meet with their Iranian counterparts. So in that sense, Obama is just being more forthright about what must be done in reality.

Fabian Lieschke: The Munich Conference of 1938 and British Prime Minister Chamberlain’s “appeasement” toward Hitler still have an important place in today’s US foreign policy making. How can President Obama make sure that his offers are reciprocated? How can he make sure that there is “a give and take”?

Charles Kupchan: Well, he can’t make sure. You start by making certain judgments about the nature of the adversary. And so it seems to me that in 1938 the mistake was trying to appease a country that had already demonstrated that it was an aggressor and that it was interested in predatory conquest. Engagement makes sense only when you think that you are dealing with a country that may be willing to make peace, that may be willing to compromise. You have to make that initial judgment call. The kinds of things that Obama can do to raise the chances of reciprocity are making offers that are clear and that indicate a willingness of the United States to back away from rivalry. At the same time, diplomacy can be more effective when there are sticks as well as carrots. So in the case of Iran, Obama is right to keep the door open to diplomacy – to look until the eleventh hour for some kind of compromise on the nuclear issue. But that compromise may become more likely by also increasing the sanctions and trying to create a united diplomatic front. So engagement and a coercive diplomacy at times can go hand in hand.

Fabian Lieschke: So let’s look at Obama’s first fourteen months in office. There seems to hardly be the kind of reciprocity that you are referring to. President Obama pursued direct negotiations with Iran and North Korea. He began scaling back sanctions against Cuba and approached Syria and Burma diplomatically. But Iran continues to pursue the means to build an atomic bomb, and North Korea tested nuclear weapons and missiles. Cuba’s regime bases its legitimacy on anti-American sentiment. Burma and Syria pay lip service. Is Barack Obama’s engagement strategy naïve?

Charles Kupchan: Again, a strategy of engagement is no guarantee that the other side will reciprocate. Accordingly, you must begin a process of engaging regimes of the sort that we are talking about with your eyes wide open – fully aware that if you stretch out your hand, the other side may not reciprocate. The second point is that these kinds of engagements take time. They take years, not months. In the cases that I looked at in the book, it usually took somewhere between five to ten years of negotiation, mutual exchange, concessions and confidence-building to get to the point where the two sides call it quits and the mutual antagonism ends. And so to be about a year into Obama’s engagement strategy and say: “Well, it hasn’t worked, let’s give up” is being way too hasty and rash. The problem is that there isn’t much patience politically in the United States. You will, especially as the November midterm elections draw near, hear more and more of Obama’s critics saying: “Where is the beef? What do you have to show?” I think it’s very useful for Obama that he was able to close the arms-control deal with the Russians because now he will be able to say: “This is what I have to show. Here is what engagement can bring when it works.”

Fabian Lieschke: What if engagement doesn’t work, say, in the case of Iran? Would military force be an option under the Obama administration?

Charles Kupchan: I think that there is a searching debate going on inside the US government about diplomacy with Iran and about what to do if diplomacy fails. This debate is about the relative costs and benefits of living with and deterring a nuclear Iran versus the costs and benefits of a military strike. So I would think that the military option is one that is being studied.

Fabian Lieschke: You alluded to President Obama’s resolve toward actors in the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan where he has increased the rate of drone attacks. It seems that he prefers killing high-value targets because capturing them would put him in a difficult legal spot, given that he intends to close Guantanamo. He has also increased the number of troops in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda. So the president may be engaging toward some, but he shows an iron fist toward others. Is his approach contradictory? Could he, as a result, face an international public relations problem?

Charles Kupchan: No, I think that this comes back to your question about 1938 and Munich. Just as engagement with Hitler did not make sense, engagement today doesn’t make sense with adversaries that are hardened extremists. And that’s because they are ideologically committed to war against the West. When you face an ideological movement that is bent on aggression and destruction, you have no choice but to stand firm and, if necessary, use force. That is why Obama is attempting to neutralize militant leaders in Pakistan with drone strikes. It’s useful to distinguish between al-Qaeda or other extremist groups in the Pakistani borderlands that the US is attacking and some members of the Taliban who are not necessarily ideologically committed to war against the West. With more moderate elements you have a chance that engagement can bring them back into the political process. So I don’t think it’s inconsistent to use violence against some adversaries while seeking to engage others. It’s just that the US is up against different kinds of enemies – some may be open to reconciliation, some not.

Fabian Lieschke:The promotion of democracy and human rights abroad has always been an ambivalent, yet solid pillar in US foreign policy. Does President Obama compromise American values by seeking rapprochement with autocratic regimes?

Charles Kupchan: I don’t think that it compromises values in the sense that he is setting priorities, not setting aside democracy promotion. I said earlier that the Obama administration should be quite vocal in saying to the Chinese: “You shouldn’t censor Google. You should release your political prisoners.” Or saying to the Iranian government: “Stop beating up the opposition.” Or to the Russian government: “You need to move in a more democratic direction.” Speaking out against violations of freedom or human rights, however, shouldn’t preclude engagement for pragmatic reasons. Obama is fully justified in criticizing infringements on political freedoms in China while at the same time working with Beijing to curb global warming or contain Iran’s nuclear program. If you look at American foreign policy historically, that is generally what the United States has done. It has promoted democracy by example and by encouragement, not by force or by believing that it can remake the world in America’s image. So the George W. Bush administration was more the exception, and the Obama administration is turning to a more centrist brand of democracy promotion that resonates with American history.

Fabian Lieschke: In your book, you show that history is supporting Obama’s strategy of engagement. You describe successful rapprochement between the US and Britain, Norway and Sweden, Argentina and Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia. These countries all share cultural and religious roots. The US and most of its adversaries today do not. Is peace possible only between foes with similar cultural and religious identities?

Charles Kupchan:The outcome that I was studying in the book is one particular and very deep form of peace – a peace in which the countries in question demilitarize their relationship, in which competition is completely gone, in which the idea of war or the use of force becomes unthinkable. That’s a very high bar. And I do find that to reach that level of peace, cultural commonality is important. So in the case of Norway and Sweden, there was the common Nordic heritage -- language and religion. In the Anglo-American case, there was a common Anglo-Saxon tradition. The upshot of that, though, is not that if you don’t share the same culture, you can’t get rapprochement between adversaries. You can get rapprochement – but it may not run as deeply as between countries that share a common culture. In other words, the process of reconciliation may not go all the way to the end where you become close cousins. But the general model of accommodation and reciprocity that I outline in the book, I think, applies to US-Iran or US-China relations. Trying to assure the other party with step-by-step efforts to move from rivalry towards cooperation is possible. That can happen even when there isn’t a common culture.

Fabian Lieschke: You also studied the relative impact of economic integration and diplomacy on rapprochement. Which of the two is more important for creating stable peace?

Charles Kupchan: I was quite surprised by the findings in the book on this question, because we are generally taught to believe that commercial integration and commercial interdependence are important ingredients of peace. But I found that rapprochement isabout politics and diplomacy – it’s not about economics. In all of the twenty cases I looked at there is only one exception – that was German unification in the 19th century. In that case, economic integration preceded political integration. But the norm is that political integration and political settlement precede and clear the way for economic integration. So only when you get the politics right, does economic integration have a consequential and benign geopolitical effect. Once the diplomats have laid the groundwork, then the traders, the investors and citizens come in and close the deal. But they can’t create rapprochement on their own unless the diplomats and politicians first settle the fundamental political issues at stake. And that’s an important conclusion. Because we are often led to believe: “Well, let’s give the Israelis and the Palestinians some money and they can invest in each other.” “Let’s have joint partnerships between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.” “Let’s get Japan to invest in China and peace will break out.” Well, it ain’t gonna work that way! If Israelis and Palestinians reach a peace settlement, then you may see economic integration and joint economic prosperity. But the politics comes first. That’s the chain of events.

Fabian Lieschke: In the beginning of this interview you pointed out that Obama’s critics don’t think he is sufficiently firm with American adversaries. At the same time, Obama has raised expectations abroad that he can turn enemies into friends by seeking dialogue. How can he bridge these different political pressures? What is your advice for the President?

Charles Kupchan: When a leader reaches out to an adversary, he or she takes a risk. So it’s important to be able to demonstrate to the American public – and also to publics abroad – the concrete benefits of engagement. There are always nationalists and members of the opposition waiting in the wings to say: “You are being soft in the face of a security threat. You are appeasing an aggressive regime.” Obama is certainly running a political risk by engaging adversaries, but he can try to parry criticism of engagement by showing that it pays off. The example of the new arms-control agreement with Russia is a case in point; it will help him make the case that engagement works. And Obama can point to history. What was it that led to the breakthrough in Sino-American relations? It was Nixon and Kissinger willing to engage China and go to Beijing. Why do we now have a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel? Because Sadat was willing to take a risk and go to Jerusalem. And so Obama can say: “Look at these examples; Let’s give engagement a try.” Another strategy that could be helpful would be to start looking a little bit more carefully at the domestic politics of engagement, making sure that he has a legislative strategy to back up his diplomacy. Getting Republicans involved as negotiators is one idea: bringing in a Brent Scowcroft or James Baker to be involved with the Iranians or to be involved with the Syrians to give engagement a bipartisan imprint. Another piece of advice is that Obama has to be quite explicit in saying that this process of engagement is a two-way street: “This is what America gives, here is what the other party has to give in return.” That way Obama makes it clear to voters that the United States is not simply letting down its guard, but that it is making an offer to the other side that is contingent on reciprocity. Washington will continue in the direction of engagement only if its gestures and goodwill are reciprocated.

Fabian Lieschke: Mr. Kupchan, thank you for your time.

Charles Kupchan: You’re welcome.

Charles Kupchan is a member of the Atlantic Initiative's Advisory Board. Prior to the election of President Obama Kupchan penned an article on the potential for renewed transatlantic relations and an emergent liberal internationalist agenda entitled, "Obama Will Win Back Europe's Support."

Fabian Lieschke is a Georgetown University Graduate and author of various Atlanic Community articles. He is currently writing from Washington, DC.

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• Tobias P. Fella: Fight Not Flight for US-EU Strategic Dialogue
• Robert Hutchings: US-EU Co-operation is Key to Global Governance
• Kurt Volker: The "Obama Effect" Unveils Transatlantic Tensions