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The best test of the strength and cohesion of an international body occurs during trying times. The test of the Caucasus crisis proved to demonstrate how far the alliance has fallen - an alliance that played an important role in the process of Central and Eastern European integration with the European Union: the Visegrad Group.

The V4 - as the initial members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic were called - began its decline shortly after the former communist-bloc conutries joined the EU in 2004. The disparity of the partners, of which Poland alone was bigger in population, territory and military power than the rest, made it impossible to find new common goals in Europe under the Nice treaty. (This could become even more difficult under Lisbon, should it come to fruition). While Poland felt free to act as if it were a major european power, being the sixth largest EU state, the smaller V4 members (or V3?) tried to find a comfortable niche in the european policy puzzle, not aiming higher than their least common denominator. Except for the strong defense of the nation state, the V3 avoids going outside of the main-stream.

The last Visegrad Group summit of prime ministers in June ended in little more than calls for intensifying cooperation and understanding among member states. The primary international initiative at the time was the EU's Eastern Partnership. Proposed by Poland and Sweden, this intiative received tepid support at best. But then came a salient example of the breakup, manifesting itself in what had been Visegrad's strongest link.

In regard to the Russia-Georgia conflict, there was a noticable difference of opinions as voiced by the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic. It became glaringly evident that although Lech Kaczyński and Vaclav Klaus may share a common euro-sceptic view inside the EU, when it comes to launching a controversial, one-sided foreign policy campaign, the Czechs choose realism over romantism - even if keeping a low-profile may provoke charges of cowardice by rallying leaders, as was the case in Tbilisi.

This effectively led to the failure of the most recent V4 presidents' summit in Piescany last month. Hosting the event, the Slovakian president, Ivan Gasparovic, spoke cautiously about the prospects of Ukrainian and Turkish membership in the EU and the obstacles to their accession - in the form of a non-ratified Lisbon Treaty; a view that counters the current Polish stance completely. Nor did the presidents issue a strong common statement on Georgia - except for a condemnation - and failed to join Poland's Lech Kaczyński in blaming Russia for the conflict. At the same time Slovak-Hungarian resentments have grown to the level that makes any serious cooperation in the V4 forum impossible. Warsaw's tough stance against Russia was much more attractive to the Baltic states - traditionally very sensitive in these issues - than for Poland's southern neighbors.

Poland has decided to develop political links north and eastwards. Sweden, the Baltic states, Ukraine and much more distant Georgia and Azarbaijan have replaced the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary as Warsaw's closest international partners. Czechs and Slovaks haven't managed to heal the wounds of their breakup; Slovaks and Hungarians never forgot the dividing issues of minorities. An alliance of countries sharing much common history was tested by history, and failed. The friendship turned sour and everyone now seems happier on its own, seeking friends and alliances beyond the neighborhood.

Marek Swierczynski is a journalist with a special interest in defence and security matters and and a member of the Polish Euro-Atlantic Society.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Marek Swierczynski: Dead End in Sight for Poland's Missle Defense Site
• Ryan R. Miller: The Polish-Lithuanian Tandem
• Victor Friedmann: V4 Perspectives and Opportunities