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November 24, 2011

Jerzy S Deren, strategic analyst, DSW University of Lower Silesia Wroclaw visiting professor, Silver Contributor (43)

Good morning Sir,
My name is Jerzy S Deren. I am an independent researcher in the field of strategic analysis - visiting professor working at DSW University of Lower Silesia, Wroclaw, Poland.
Since I'm retired Colonel PL A, former (SHAPE) strategic planner, period (1998-2002 – PCC, POL/RED, SHAPE/AFSOUTH JOC), (HRF NRDC-TO 2002-2005) (2007 SME advisory team to Min A.R. Wardak), thus for me transformation of NATO in the area of defence planning process is the issue importance. In the past I have made an extensive study focused on developing doctoral thesis related to interoperability and standardization ally forces versus NATO force planning. Therefore my question is:
A)How your Headquarters copy with vital for NATO benchmark – required capabilities roadmap -related to interoperability and standardization process and both of them correlation and coordination with force planning process?
B)Is feasible implementation of a new approach to capability based planning, recognising standardization as the main tool to achieve interoperability as an element of capability?, and
C) In addition to an excellent methodology is any visible progress made in the field of NATO Force Generation process being so important for troop’s deployment?
Thank you very much for your attention
Sincerely
Jerzy DEREN Col (R), Ph.D. eng.

November 25, 2011

valentine anatolevich akishkin, Entrepreneur , Silver Contributor (40)

‘NO SMART DEFENSE’ SYSTEM FOR EUROPE’
PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH

There is an ever growing and unconcealed temptation of the US war lobby to subdue Iran. It is quite obvious that US war mongers have promised Europe, within NATO, some form of ‘protection’ against any attacks that Iran may be driven to make when the Americans, by way of Israel, start up a new reckless war against the country; a war which Israel has recently been so impatiently proclaiming and just as courteously been held back by the US administration arguing that the moment is not yet ripe. There are enough indications showing that the US goes to war as easy as a duck takes to water. Presently, the question is only measured by the time necessary for preparation.
We know what happens to an atomic power station when hit by a tsunami. A good example is Japan’s Fakusima. We should expect a considerably more grievous outcome should Iran’s atomic facilities be bombed.
Is there a US- Israel plan to start a war against Iran – who doubts it! This European anti-missile system being set up by the US is not part of a defense system as the US advocates it; it is an element of a knavishly prepared aggression. The anti-missile system is intended to convince Europeans into believing that should Israel, led by the US, start bombing Iran, no danger engraving Europe’s safety will follow. By starting this war, the US, in no way, endanger their own territory whereas they leave vulnerable to the rebuff of Iran a herd of thoughtless and irresponsible scapegoats in the form of 28 European countries held hostage to the lust of international oil and gas companies yearning to get their hands on Iran’s natural resources. They are just craving to find a suitable excuse to start the war. The justification will be arranged either as a regime change similar to that in Libya to promote ‘democracy’ or as a well-known repel to “weapons of mass destruction’ that was used in Iraq.
The deployment of an anti-missile system in Europe is making Russia give second thought to ensuring its safety. If the US remains insistent on implementing its far-flung plan and that seems to be the case, it is Europe that will be held hostage and victim for the profit of a greedy overseas merchant-venturer.
Make no mistake there is a war in sight. With Europe’s economy down to its heels, more concern should be paid to economic appraisals rather than trying to bargain implements of war for a cheaper price. What endangers Europe more; the aggressive notions of a bankrupted and impoverished economy or the ephemeral ‘threats’ of a third grade Arab country which is being hound dogged by an unprecedented military block that misses an enemy.

November 25, 2011

Lawrence Efana

The purpose this time is to put-up relevant questions to General Abrial on issues raised. Yet the issues have history and reaction cues, in my opinion to coordinate further in an effort to construct and ask questions. My questions will be sent as requested by editors. For now however, complex though those issues are, I feel the need to first of all make a 'general' appraisal - one also to represent my comments ahead of the questions to be forwarded later and soon.

I do this as one who loves challenging analyses: the types to give rise to "action-plans" in a variety of ways. That variety of ways is particularly demanding in the case of NATO. That is, to emphasize the burdens of whatever must be agreed upon as the substance of the action-plans. Comment efforts are indeed not opposed to the care with which NATO's "improved" values in recent times witness. Personally, for the little I might be credited with as a curious analyst in a different culture, I pointed out sometime ago that both the new administration in Washington and the background of the new NATO secretary general: a Scandinavian: together], are the arms through which NATO might evolve into the kind of a "military" organization wished. One well able to wake a 'true' understanding - not surface or simply positive, but well able to set the pace of incentives for a wider partnership, break new grounds in the improvement of forces, sensible introduction of science into defence development by way of investments and research, hence at the end reap a "win-win" result: one to open-up global eyes and consciences for the peaceful world we fight to bring about.

Permit me to think and translate "Smart Defence" formally incorporated and defined as “ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.” Both instances mentioned above came into force in one of the most difficult eras of stories of the experience of our economic value practices and political-will dilemma. NATO's new approach [advocated for nations to “pool and share capabilities, set the right priorities, and better coordinate collective efforts more effectively], is enough to broaden our senses of security. "We will change, because we are learning as things become clearer"!

For many people, especially, those we cannot reach but assume that they know what the issues are about, it could mean that we must go to the roots of things now and then and as often as we individually or in group think it necessary. Thinking thus, is essential for NATO and the need for various "publics" to continue to know more and be reminded from time to time in these sentimental days that the memories of most people are unfortunately rather short. My comment shows concern therefore, for methods on how to harvest minds in the fields in order to make partnership not a "culprit in fears" about NATO's demise, but a force of strong attraction to join the reform or transformation work ongoing. In that wise, many do stick to precision and technical details at the expense of the many without glues about what the matters are - coined technically or handled aloof. I am trying to come to the level of everyone, hopefully to the benefit 'grounds' to see that NATO does try hard.

A question to myself first. What does the latter paragraph mean for my comment here? I am going it this way, because I am unable to reconcile raising needed questions in the way the publics that forget would benefit without going into selected details, hence more additional but extremely brief reviews. The purpose, I am sure wakes and strengthens the knowledge and relevance about the scope of interrelated issues, making it possible to eventually direct or focus question. On the internet, it is not sure that one writes only for a targeted audience: in this case Transatlantic, as I try to keep understanding and defining publics beyond - many of which come in now and then in need of events history, not having accessed them before or be intimated well to want to do so in detail.

The brief selected details might be read in greater details on Transatlantic website under the following source topics: (a) "NATO partnership: shaking hands or shaking system"; (b) "Conference Report: Re-engineering the transatlantic security and defence relationship"; and (c) "Rumors of NATO's demise have been greatly exaggerated". Two of these came as reports and one: the last - an effort to articulate the publication of Thies, not-accessed yet by me. Of these three, two are documents . the reports, of which the most central one is (b) "Conference Report: Re-engineering the transatlantic security and defence relationship" , for those who have not yet read it---because of the forth-coming conference in the home state of the President of America in 2012: the election year. Materials on transformation action-plans or reform programs of NATO are incremental and in phases, which is indeed good. I just cannot help thinking that the links and connections are so tight that chains are not forgotten as questions are formulated and raised to General Abrial. The problem is what to select, specify in the interconnections as questions are posed. That does worry me, due to the "substance" of the "whole" as the ultimate driving force.

So, what is (c's) main argument? Its argument seems to magnify the problem that the expansion interest of NATO would have to be seen in relative terms as a cause and effect of exaggerated fears about its demise as a military organization with established history. This seems to explain reference to Thies, and the counter arguments: (i) that expansion policy as a cause is deeply flawed, (ii) that such interpretations or views are a result of inappropriate theoretical lenses of what NATO is for; and therefore (iii) that these lead to conclude that if a more appropriate theoretical lenses or perspectives come into use, such exaggerated postulates are possible to nullify. (c) thus takes us to (a). So, what is the argument there too? Many will find that I did comment this nice report earlier. Because of interconnection arguments above, a few relevant contemporary viewpoints to pick-out are: (i) dangers if NATO drives its business as usual? -- what does it mean for partnership?; (ii) danger if NATO allows the idea of partnership die - contrary or in agreement with above?; (iii) partnership idea should be invigorated and more-so, in fact, with renewed spirit of commitment, but in line with how "scenarios" create room. Here, scenarios' argument include many interpretations but they in the meantime seem to condense into (a) military transformation; (b) conflict challenges and international terrorism/cyber crimes; and (c) post-conflict stabilization - in which active as well as soft diplomacy are to play parts. In a way, these do overlap as problem phases. The report is significant with progressive ideas and sound empirical arguments, even if here abstracted.

There are indignation about NATO's raison d'etre and strong attempts to lift-out problems defined as "internal and external" - a part of what the organization made public also in its efforts to earn popular acceptance and support as well as sympathy - see NATO 2020, etc. Nevertheless like in (c), where calls are made for theoretical perspectives, people's nerves will not relax until such perspectives are democratically well monitored. (a) in a similar way argues, calling for the construction of convincing narratives also as a way of giving more life to NATO in difficult times. Even-so the expression: "convincing narratives", like call for theoretical perspectives must always remain a "suspect" even from the "best" academic environment! In each case, what must be the contents, or how are they to be interpreted in the process of finding workable solutions or answers against some back-drops of the lack of political will: a real problem though - yet one that 'might' need patience, diplomacy and well thought out solutions, for example, Iran at present.

For all that may be said on the request to post questions to the General, (b): "Conference Report: Re-engineering the transatlantic security and defence relationship" is the main bottom or base of the issues that the General is on for questions. Elements of history or the "cause" and "effect" crowding NATO and netting its future, are also to be inferred from both (c) and (a). The arguments on the issues are therefore rich and interconnected, and can pose problems for aggregating to make the choice of questions necessary. I would like to therefore state that (b) does just that: perhaps "though" the job of aggregating is in itself latent. Whatever one is to lean on, this is the most important working paper for reaching the substance of action-plans. They will leave for the US Presidents home state in 2012, with concrete materials in conference bag: (1) The idea of common security for allies is a dependent factor, hence must work-out alliance strengths in favor of global partnership------thus partnership cannot be and will not be causal to NATO demise if done well in: (a) the larger Europe; (b) within the frame of the United Nations; and (c) in open and willing consideration for private organization, engaged in conflict zones that NATO is involved. And yet, that is not all, as partnership, more-so, for PEACE belongs here in many ways, open too to Asia and elsewhere, with possibilities to fight terrorism and cyber crimes, etc. (2) There is political gridlock in the US, paralleled by economic downturn, but not a sign of second-dip. So far, we can assume the same in Europe, hoping both will work to break political gridlocks and come out of the crisis. Constraints from both of these problems are interesting for understanding and assessing determination of NATO to turn on partnership, beyond allies doorsteps.

The purpose here is to improve on the 2% GDP benchmark set for member states on the support of the organization. Willing partners might watch out for the sense of priorities in hard times, to which NATO has responded as observed from member states with cuts in defence budgets and the organization itself trimming down costs. Action-plans are reviewed and include (a) force qualitative improvements, (b) elimination of outmoded programs and weapon systems, (c) rationalization of expenditures, (d) avoidance of any form of duplications, (e) pooling resources and capabilities---ALL OF WHICH FORM THE CRUX OF THE CONCEPT "SMART DEFENCE".

(3) To stress the seriousness of this new form of awareness, that work is truly going on with transformation - useful and admonishing in the partnership argument, efforts are launched on "Mission Focus Groups", with the duty to organize core capability requirements, hopefully to further rationality of strategic concepts like: (a) collective defence, (b) crises management/cooperative security ---in which both European and Canadian allies take charge. Critical areas of responsibility, defining defence spending and investment priorities of participating allies, belong here. As mission goals, allies are however free though, are to live-up to them in reasonable manners. (4) It is my belief that partnership willingness by outsiders will be much spurred by recognition that "SECURITY DOES (NOT ALWAYS) COME FORM THE BARRELS OF GUNS. Hitherto, political realism drowned some politicians and scholars on this type of value. There is now more open sensitivity, which indeed puts DIPLOMACY --- that prodigious non-military resource more to the forefront, opening newer paths for allies use intergovernmental fora and its arenas. A new military and diplomatic school and ethics are gradually coming into play - much needed at this time of our civilization and crisis of experience and progress.

Resources are going to be better pooled, conflicts mitigated to step-up initiatives against the proliferation of tensions, promote reconciliation works, and curb or reduce the risks for proliferation of missile systems/their misuse, etc. The lessons that have come from here and there, especially Afghanistan and Libya, are increasingly being well slept on by policy-makers, generals and advisers. It is not however, clear whether the definition of Western security, political and economic interests will appreciate transformation endeavors to in that way ease understanding resource and consensus problems, and truly emerge in the end as a value to salvage how the burden of sharing also matters more in and outside of the alliance. This is essential for partnership hence need to keep membership doors flexible and open. Where there are unequal capabilities consensus, political outreach is a source of solace and trust. Afghanistan and Libya show the importance of burden sharing of recent, of-course! And so NATO's transformation action-plan is not blind of conditions in which there are (i) those able and willing; (ii) those not able and unwilling; (iii) those able but unwilling; and or any other combination. The organization has also grown aware of the fact that they way scenarios are constructed could ease problems here, hence all we mean with our theories and narratives for one or the other purpose are under watch for what they carry as 'quality' and what they ask as 'sacrifice' and 'support', etc.

All in all therefore, going to the President's home state is bound to be important, especially on the thesis: "Americans show more isolationist tendencies ... shifting more to Asia than Europe". I have listened to GOP presidential candidates on this as a special problem and fear that they are more extreme than the balance position of current administration on the feeling of European friends and strong allies. The CHICAGO conference is not ill-advised as the Report tends to worry about. It is indeed an opportunity in many positive ways on the issue of qualitative politics that is to carry the mantle of defence and PEACE, capped by open hearts, trying one's best to join hands and cooperate near and beyond as a way of making win-win more conscious and viable in the difficult world we have carved and have to live in with approaching end of times!

November 27, 2011

valentine anatolevich akishkin, Entrepreneur , Silver Contributor (40)

As I gathered from the extensive and very unclear lash-up sheet above, NATO is facing a serious rebus. Not because European countries don’t want NATO, they just can not afford to pay the commitments. Fading economies both in Europe and the US have made NATO authorities’ stir up and fumble for a cognitive factor that might help transform the alignment into something useful and expedient, something that might moderate a temperament within the block countries and make them believe that this good old anti Soviet anachronism can still serve a purpose. So it addresses you people out there to give it a helping hand to turn the existing military machine into a more affordable adaptation of what could figuratively ‘harvest a crop’ and thus authenticate its requisiteness. Well, one way to ‘harvest a crop’ without too much refashioning would be to attack another country to take over its resources and get rid of untended to debts, as in the case of Libya. Iran looks like the next reference point in line drawing NATO’s attention. Well, at least it is the unquestionably agenda under which NATO has been acting. None of the NATO members want to spend on ‘security’ not being faced with any serious menace that could match the required expenses, whereas, on the other hand, they apprehend missing the quotation of apportioning that might follow a little productive war. The exhorting realities of recession are the next instigating factor that causes even the most reserved and better off participants, such as Germany, to stand patiently aloof closely watching the scornful proceedings fearing its reserved unresponsiveness might be taken for gradable opposition.
What is NATO all about? What purpose does NATO serve? With 28 European country members; for one thing it certainly keeps them away from mischief when interacting. That in itself is more than a worthy cause; which however has not kept them out of external follies. Europe has been known to be the conceiver of too many destructive wars to leave it with any authority to proclaim a ‘blitzkrieg’ or whatever these NATO authorities label their military operations, on any sovereign country.

November 27, 2011

Lawrence efana

And so my good friend, where do you place reform or transformation as a great task or an unusually challenging phase of awareness in the ongoing endeavors with the light we see in the tunnel? Should the public psychologically admonish the present attempts or not in this "real world", while the Almighty is doing the best as usual through all his signs, patience and love that we might learn, understand and in the end act?

It is possible to see the present efforts within the frame of the last sentence in my paragraph above. Until then we must keep praying - the answer of which you are indirectly asking for! Let us keep appreciating every upgrade of efforts and understanding in our bitter world of hard learning, where political will is scarce, solidarity meager and greed vast! Mysteriously, we have to see and "make sense" with the economic constraint - the schooling long awaited, because we are doubters! Understand what transformation "ought" to be and keep joining the debate to trim for general good! In doing so, angry words would not carry us far, for then it lacks the soft diplomacy, I guess we need most! Lessons and fear brought NATO about now that greed and lack of political will complicate all. Let us all join in unwinding back to the type of balance functional and godly! Forgive if I offend!

November 27, 2011

Kazimierz Wiesak, Pennsylvania State University, Silver Contributor (73)

"The Norfolk, Virginia-based ACT is at the forefront of implementing Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen's call for "Smart Defense," which he describes as "ensuring greater security, for less money..."
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First, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is the same Rasmussen who as a premier of Denmark strongly supported attack on Irak in 2003.

Second, the best way of "ensuring greater security, for less money" is to not invade other countries. It costs nothing and doesn't create enemies. And Europe is too strong to be a subject of agression by someone else (save USA).

I am afraid that Mr Rasmussen really means "subjugating other countries, for less money". But I have no intention to suggest any ideas that would help him and his likes to achieve that goal.