The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States in November 2008 was accompanied by popular enthusiasm in Europe. During his election campaign, he was given a rapturous reception in Berlin, where over 100,000 spectators gathered to hear him speak at the Victory Column. But the support for Obama in Europe was not confined to a popular movement; European political elites also pinned their hopes on Obama to improve transatlantic ties after the divisions that marked the era of George W. Bush. After all, Obama was a declared multilateralist in international politics and seemed ideologically close to the traditions of European social democracies on policy priorities such as health care reform, climate change and tax reform. At the same time, the European leaders in France, Germany and Great Britain were considered to be exceptionally "pro-American." The moment seemed unusually ripe for transatlantic cooperation, and it was no surprise that Obama's first overseas trip as US President led to Europe.
Less than two years later, however, transatlantic relations have reached a historic low: Last February Obama cancelled his expected visit to the EU-US summit, saying that his "agenda was full." A few weeks later, he didn't even concede a private appointment to José Luis Zapatero, who at that time was visiting Washington DC in his capacity as the term president of the EU. More recently, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly blamed the Europeans for pushing "Turkey eastward." At the G20 summit in Toronto that took place in the last week of June, Obama again clashed with his European counterparts by publicly disagreeing about the timing of public spending cuts. This accumulation of tensions led European Commission President José Manuel Barroso to announce in an interview with the London-based The Times last Thursday that "very frankly, this [transatlantic] relationship is not living up to its full potential."
What went wrong in transatlantic relations? Taking the recent divergence into consideration, two reasons may be put forward. First of all, the cooling down of US-EU relations is certainly an expression of the global shift and reconfiguration of power, which has led both parts to seek new political and economic alliances. In today's complex world, it is no longer possible to speak about a common 'West' unified against another common bloc, say 'Soviet' or 'Communist', as it was the case during the Cold War. The emergence of the Asian powers as new players in the game has shaken the balance. As Newsweek writes in a recent piece, the "United States is dedicated to building a closer relationship with Asia." It is therefore no surprise that the observers of the G20 summit noted a bias of President Obama towards the Asian representatives and against their European counterparts. At the same time, due to the fizzling domestic agenda, the advancement of increased cooperation between the US and Asia has been more difficult for Obama than expected.
The second important fault line between the US and the EU can be observed in their approach to the global financial crisis. From the very beginning of the financial crisis, the US and Great Britain insisted on the continuation of their Anglo-Saxon free-market models and tried to overcome the financial debacle via stimulus packages without substantial changes in financial structure. On the other side, the political leaders of continental Europe, mainly under the flagship of Germany and France, insisted on the reconfiguration of the global financial system and on the tightening of capital flows. Moreover, the European leaders have announced historical austerity programs while Obama's administration insists on the need for a prolongation of the fiscal stimulus. In fact, there is no clear 'exit strategy' in the minds of European leaders. This became apparent in the recent Greek crisis when they dragged their feet in acting at the 'union' level rather than the 'national' one.
So the vital question becomes: Is there a true 'Union' with which the Obama Administration can foster further cooperation when dealing with the incoming complex problems of our globalized world? The European governments obviously lack a clear vision even for their own future. Undoubtedly, this can lead to crucial problems for the functioning of the global political and economic system.
Lukas Linsi is a graduate student at London School of Economics.
Mustafa Kutlay is a political economy researcher at International Strategic Research Organization (USAK).
Related Materials:
- Erik Brattberg: Obama's Grand Strategy and Europe
- Guy Sorman: Europe's Vision Deficit
- Robert Hutchings: US-EU Co-operation is Key to Global Governance
- Kurt Volker: The "Obama Effect" Unveils Transatlantic Tensions



August 5, 2010
Felix F. Seidler, Atlantische Initiative, Platinum Contributor (329)
If you would be Obama, I would look to Asia as well. Instead of Europe, the Asians are "doing" and not constantly "talking". Look on all the Chinese infrastructure projects (railways, airports, highways, etc.). In contrast to Europe, the Chinses finish their projects in short time. A good example is the fourth runway of Frankfurt Airport. It took many year of judical proceeding before the work could start.