There has been much discussion and speculation in recent years about the perceived ‘drift’ in Turkish foreign policy away from Europe and towards radical Islam. It has been suggested for instance, that Turkey’s closer relations of late with Iran and its changing domestic political situation at home are evidence of this ‘drift’ away from Europe and the west and towards a new Islamic alliance in the Middle East.
Since coming to office in 2003, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan has pursued a markedly different foreign policy from that of its predecessors. However, the suggestion that this new policy is part of an attempt by Turkey to establish a ‘Neo-Ottoman’ alliance in the Middle East and Asia Minor can be disproven with a careful examination of the facts as they stand.
Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu has defined Turkey’s new foreign policy as “Zero Problems with Neighbors”. Put simply, this approach has involved positive engagement with all of Turkey’s immediate neighbors in its region with a view to establishing meaningful dialogue, thereby reducing the potential for conflict. It ought to be pointed out here that this policy has been directed not only at Iran, a predominantly Muslim nation, but also at Russia, Armenia and Greece, all of which are overwhelmingly Christian.
Indeed, the main beneficiaries of this new policy have been Turkey’s above mentioned predominantly Christian neighbors. The bi-lateral relationship between Turkey and its old rival Greece has seen a dramatic improvement since the arrival of the AKP administration, to the extent that Greece now fully supports Turkey’s bid for EU membership. This would have been inconceivable only ten years ago. Similarly on the other side of the Black Sea, the Turkish-Russian relationship is stronger than ever before, with Turkey likely to play host in the coming years to a major Russian gas pipeline known as ‘Blue Stream II’. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu sees Turkey’s challenge for the twenty-first century as recognizing the fact that it lies at the intersection of numerous geopolitical regions (Europe, Middle East and Eurasia) as opposed merely to being an appendix of Europe.
Turkey’s thriving relationship with Israel further disproves the theory of the ‘drift’ towards radical Islam. Turkey remains the only nation in the world with a predominantly Muslim population to accord full diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel. This remains the case despite the ‘Flotilla Incident’ in June 2010 which caused considerable strain to the bi-lateral relationship between these two nations.
According to the EU Commission’s Strategy for Sustainable and Secure Energy, within 20-30 years Europe will be dependent upon imports for 70% of its gas requirements, most of which will originate in Russia. Dependency upon a single supplier creates obvious security concerns for Europe. The potential sources of gas in the Caspian region could however alleviate this problem. Once again, Turkey will be critical in this regard. Turkey has agreed to play host to the proposed ‘Nabucco’ gas pipeline which would carry gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan all the way to Austria right in the heart of Europe. The political significance of this project has not been lost on the EU, with the current Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso predicting "a new age in relations between Turkey and the European Union".
The challenge for the European Union and for NATO in the immediate future will be to recognize Turkey’s growing geopolitical significance and to harness the benefits this could offer Europe in critical areas such as energy and regional security. EU leaders will also need to have the foresight to work now to secure the Union’s long term regional security interests by cultivating and maintaining strong relationships with those nations that are best placed to guarantee those interests.
The principal challenge for both the European Union and Turkey remains to recognize that despite political, cultural and religious differences, ultimately their long-term security interests lie together.
Fintan Hastings is a graduate of the MA program in International Relations at University College Cork, Ireland.
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December 14, 2010
Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (708)
thanks for your remarks regarding my recent article. My assumption towards the current Islamization efforts remain an open question. Therefore, I was careful with predictions and just concentrated on political issues such as the Iran-Syria-axis and the NATO defense shield. Howewer, I listed some indications how we have to assess these Islamization efforts, which can´t be denied.
The questions are:
Are there remaining secular forces who encounter Islamization efforts?
Which effects on international relations do these have?
In the first question, I was very clear. I concluded that significant forces in society established an Islam-dominated political environment altogether with state-inititiatives removing secular control mechanisms. Mainly the judiciary and the military.
The issue of media and society are issued in these publications:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=...
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=262
The second publication by Soner Cagaptay indicates the connection between nationalism and religion, which tend to implicate opposing secular statehood. Mr. Cagaptay is a main source for my assessments.
Another aspect I want to stress is the attitude of the Turkish government.
Daniel Pipes states:
"Contrarily, while the Turkish government presents few immediate dangers, its more subtle application of Islamism's hideous principles makes it loom large as future threat. Long after Khomeini and Osama bin Laden are forgotten, I venture, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his colleagues will be remembered as the inventors of a more lasting and insidious form of Islamism."
http://www.danielpipes.org/9123/islamist-turkey-secular-iran
There are several statements of Erdogan and Davutoglu that indicate their Islamic background and their understanding of the role of Islam and the state. Are you familiar with these or shall I give some material?
Here the source regarding the latest cables: http://asbarez.com/89407/wikileaks-reveals-us-views-of-turkish-gove...
The thesis remains open how these insights are to be judged, but I have the impression that you try to pretend that they are not relevant. If there is no relevant spin towards Islamization of Turkish democracy, we have to falsify this thesis. Your claim of Davutoglu´s "Zero problems with neighbors"-policy is consistent with that thesis under the premise of the concept of "velvet Islamization". There are very much indicators for that thesis, and from my perspective you don´t offer an assessment which judges theses indicators in a coherent theory.
I perfectly agree to your thesis regarding the significance of Turkey´s role for the EU but we have to understand the premises of Turkey´s rise and it´s self-estimate.
These suggestions shall be an opener for our discussion, please take the indications into account that I have listed in order to falsify my theory.