West Point, NY - June 1, 2002: Then US President George W. Bush gave one of the most consequential speeches of his presidency. Following up on his State of the Union Address several months earlier, Bush outlined the US Grand Strategy for combating terrorism. The speech culminated in what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine: The U.S. would reserve the right of using military force preemptively. Thus, the address became a harbinger of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the most serious transatlantic rift in recent history.
West Point, NY - December 1, 2009: Incumbent US President Barack Obama gave the most important speech on foreign policy of his presidency so far. (Watch the video at the bottom of this article.) Following up on his March speech on overhauling US efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mr. Obama outlined his strategy for dealing with the AfPak conundrum. After weeks of intra-administrative deliberations with the GOP already mocking his dithering and indecisiveness, he announced a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy backed up by a troop increase of 30,000. Thus, he has made his opening bid for negotiations between the US and its allies about the future conduct of the Hindu Kush mission and set the stage for another conflict within the alliance.
Why is that? Well, your chief military advisor on the ground, General Stanley McChrystal, has asked you for at least 40,000 additional troops. Due to growing public skepticism and severe budgetary constraints you can only afford 30,000 - with Democrats in Congress still mad at you. So what do you do? You might want to turn to your allies to make up the difference (after all, what's the point of having allies?). And word has it that the Obama administration will do just that. Europe's response has been lukewarm at best: Poland could commit up to 1,000 troops; the U.K. will send another 500; Germany's new Minister of Defense Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg has announced that, depending on Obama's decision, Germany might consider considering the scope of its mandate - whatever that means; French President Nicholas Sarkozy has balked at any request for additional troop so far.
With several European allies all but certainly unable to live up to the expectations of the Obama administration, a transatlantic rift about the solidarity within the alliance and the purpose of the mission is not an unlikely scenario. On the one side, we find the US, the UK, Canada, Denmark, or the Netherlands, in short: the countries already fed up with the graduated solidarity that NATO displays in Afghanistan. On the other side, we find those who are widely perceived to contribute below their economic and political weight - essentially pitting the US against France and Germany. Déjà vu? The Obama administration may be more inclined to deescalate such a conflict than the Bush administration was, but given that its stakes in the issue are very high it is extremely unlikely that it will settle for polite European nays to its request. Putting all his eggs (troops) in one basket (Afghanistan), the president has tied the foreign policy record of his first term and some of his chances to win re-election in 2012 to the success of his Afghanistan strategy.
There are only two conceivable options left to the new German government to avoid the rift. Either you go along with the US and commit to a substantial troop increase (we're not talking tens or hundreds here!), or you quickly put forward a sensible strategy yourself. The former involves overcoming substantial domestic opposition and straining the Bundeswehr's capacities. The latter involves finally making up your mind about your actual goals in Afghanistan, relating it to your available means, teaming up with some like-minded states (necessarily a coalition beyond the usual suspects of anti-Americanism), coming up with a comprehensive plan, rallying broad domestic support, and then trying to sell it in good faith to the U.S. In short: do right on Afghanistan what the Schröder government did wrong on Iraq - and what the Grand Coalition failed to do on Afghanistan. If Mr. zu Guttenberg, who will soon be tied up in parliamentary hearings on the causa Klein, deems both options too costly or unfeasible, he will have to accept the inevitable, i.e. he will have to prepare some good answers to the upcoming questions about the purpose of the transatlantic alliance. Herr Minister, whatever road you choose: you're in for a rough ride. Good Luck.
Thomas Rausch is Program Officer for Transatlantic Relations at Haus Rissen Hamburg. His views expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect the views of Haus Rissen Hamburg.
Related Material from the Atlantic Community:
- Marco Vicenzino on Upgrading Support for Afghanistan
- Greg Randolph Lawson on Maintain Strategic Flexibility
- Josef Braml on Germany's Grace Period is Over




December 2, 2009
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