Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Ankara: Looking West, Moving East?"

November 20, 2009 | 4 comments | Print this Article | E-Mail Your Opinion

Ankara: Looking West, Moving East?

Gamze Avci: Turkey’s fatigue with the EU has accommodated the diversification of its foreign policy. The perceived uncertainty about the accession process has slowed down reforms and has reduced EU leverage over Ankara. But, at present the mainstay of Turkish foreign policy remains EU membership.

In December 1999, Turkey was officially recognized as an EU candidate and in 2005 the European Council announced that it would open membership negotiations with Turkey. Since 1999, and particularly since the election of Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP, or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), a conservative Islamist party ,in November 2002, there has been radical and rapid political reform in Turkey. The EU goal has been a very important framework in underpinning these reforms and uniting disparate groups around reform. Yet since 2005, the reforms have slowed down and there seem to be increasingly problems and obstacles along the way. At this point, reforms are not complete and there seem to be persistent bottlenecks along the EU integration process. This essay will point to key obstacles that have haunted the negotiation period and suggest that they have facilitated a shift in Turkish foreign policy that is detached but not necessarily removed from the EU.

The EU's accession process has numerous ‘mechanisms' that affect change and transformation in candidate countries (such as alignment of legislation, financial aid and technical advice) that are part and parcel of negotiating with the EU. Yet, in the Turkish case various dynamics have hampered these mechanisms and have consequently limited the EU's role. The ‘snowballing' effect of negotiating with the EU has been haunted in particular by the perceived uncertainty of the outcome of the accession process. In other words, there is an apparent weakness in EU commitment which relates to the lingering fundamental question of whether Turkey ever could actually become a member of the EU. Consequently, the EU's leverage and conditionality mechanisms do not work at its full potential. This makes the use of the European dimension and European issues a more complex (domestic) political resource compared to other candidate countries.

The ‘informal' messages originating from EU countries-in other words those that are not necessarily coming from EU institutions- are increasingly burdening the EU-Turkey relationship. Most evidently, the opposition of politicians in Germany, France and Austria have been rather harmful to the process. Politicians such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have advocated a privileged partnership rather than a full EU membership. Inevitably this has had an impact on Turkish public opinion and Turkish elites, Polls show that public support for EU membership slipped dramatically in Turkey in recent years. This negative trend has been reinforced by negative public opinion polls in Europe indicating that the European public is generally opposed to Turkish accession.

Furthermore, the EU dimension has not become an integral part of the domestic political atmosphere in the sense that it is a political issue that is a constructive force in reform. This is mainly due to domestic constellations such as the polarization between the AKP and the old secular establishment (often referred to as the Kemalists, after Republican founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) but has also been aided by increasing Euroscepticism in Turkey. More recently, Premier Erdogan has addressed ‘reform fatigue' by appointing a new chief negotiator and embedding his position in the Prime Minister's office. Furthermore, new impetus was given to the European integration process by the symbolic step of Turkish state television beginning to broadcast in Kurdish.

A crucial hurdle in EU-Turkey relations since 2005 has been the frustration with the negotiation process. As such, the negotiations have been more about stalling than ‘negotiating". Hitherto, only one of the 35 chapters -science and research- has been provisionally closed. The EU has suspended the opening of eight chapters due to Ankara's resistance to opening its ports and airports to Greek vessels and aircrafts. France also unilaterally blocked five chapters. This means one-third of the sections are untouchable at this time. Currently, the Greek Cypriot administration is blocking the opening of additional chapters, including those on energy and education and culture. Turkey on the other hand just announced that it plans to open the environment chapter next month at the Intergovernmental Conference. (Hürriyet Daily, November 16, 2009). This has made the negotiation process a game of petty politics and a futile exercise instead of a process where Turkey speedily aligns its legislation to that of the EU.

The Turkish foreign policy establishment is very well aware of the fact that Turkey's accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential. Nonetheless, without a chance to anchor its policies in Europe (via the negotiation process) and without any stakeholder attitude of the EU, realistically the EU at this point cannot be anything more than a remote ‘anchor' for Turkey. Consequently, we can observe that without detaching from the EU, the AKP has ‘diversified' its foreign policy. The change entails a more proactive stance in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood by assuming increasingly the role of a regional ‘soft power'. This role has included mediation between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the US and Iran; rapprochement with Armenia, closer relations with Russia and the development of a secure energy corridor. The changes in Turkish foreign policy can only be partially explained by the AKP's political agenda and profile. The dynamics surrounding negotiations with the EU have undoubtedly facilitated the changes. Yet, without question the mainstay of Turkish foreign policy continues to be EU membership. It will, however, remain to be seen whether Turkey's activism in the East will make Turkey more valuable for the EU.

Gamze Avcı is an assistant professor at University College Utrecht in the Netherlands. She received her MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Georgia in the United States and her MSc degree in European Politics and Policy from the London School of Economics. Her research is primarily on Turkey's relationship with the European Union, and Turkish immigration to Western Europe.

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November 20, 2009

Greg Randolph Lawson, Personal, Platinum Contributor (224)

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It strikes me that European attitudes, particularly the German and French, make it highly unlikely that Turkey will ever join the EU. THe EU, unquestionably, would like a "priviledged "relationship so as to help diversify its energy resources away from overreliance on Russia. However, what is "privledged" in the eyes of the Europeans is probably not going to satisfactory for a Turkey that had been making great efforts to reform. It will seem more of an insult. Even with what I think is necessary American prodding, I am not sure the cultural gap between Europe and Turkey will be bridged.

As I referred to in another post, this is why America must plan for this contingency.

November 22, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (252)

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Dear Professor Avci,

Thank you for a most informative commentary. In my view, the Union should try to engage Turkey broadly across policy areas. Turkey as a member of the European Union would not have the freedom to be as active in the East. While its elite may realize this, it is not clear if the larger segments of the Turkish society are truly cognizant of the constraints EU membership imposes on a member state's national sovereignty.

Instead of focusing on the differences in an enduring rhetorical war over Turkish accession, Europe’s leadership must act strategically in ways that consistently strengthen Turkey’s integration into EU frameworks. This is critical for Turkey regarding openness in global trade relations. Moreover, Turkey’s human capital must be developed to respond to a service-oriented environment. Education is one area that must receive more attention in order not to squander the youth potential, which is a vanishing asset as the Turkish population of approximately 72 million ages.

As Turkey overtakes Germany in population growth after 2023, the country’s leadership will face the same problem demographically in terms of policy choices as Europe. This suggests that an openness to global networks may be of greater benefit to the country over time, especially since, in terms of the energy routes that are increasingly essential to security, Turkey is already part of the EU's orbit. Its role in the immediate neighborhood can be developed strategically without full membership. This option may turn out to be the most viable policy alternative to explore on both sides with US support in the years ahead.

Sincerely, Professor Colette Mazzucelli

November 23, 2009

Stefanie Jennifer Tetenburg, King's College London, Silver Contributor (56)

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Dear Prof. Mazzucelli, thank you for your enlightening comment. You point to the constraints that EU membership would pose on Turkey's room for manoeuvre in the Middle East. Could you elaborate on that? At present the advantages of membership still weigh heavier for Ankara it seems, as EU membership remains the mainstay of Turkish foreign policy, as Professor Avci points out. Do you think this is likely to change?
Also when you talk about developing Turkey's role strategically, are you then talking about a strategic partnership? Turkey has made it very clear it is not interested in anything but full membership, so do you see any way of overcoming this hurdle?

November 27, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (252)

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Dear Stefanie,

Thank you for your questions. My comment above relates to the ways in which member states in the European Union try to use the EU's economic clout in the Middle East region. I believe that with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the new position of European foreign minister, this policy trend is likely to intensify with possible political and strategic implications over time. The large states will want to retain a decisive voice in foreign policy decisions. As we know, France and Germany as well as Britain retain strong interests in the Middle East, which they will fight to defend in a European context.

Turkey, as a very large power that wants to keep its policy options open in the region, is not likely to appreciate having to realign its interests in ways that may limit its ability to play the role of 'tribune,' speaking for the Muslim world to the West. As the Union becomes larger, more and more decisions will come to be taken by qualified majority or, in the case of foreign policy, in groupings like the E3 vis-a-vis Iran. As I understand this context, the longer Turkey is kept waiting outside the Union, the more likely its elites and the majority of its population may come to the realization that Turkey can do quite well by taking advantage of European networks. This is likely, in any case, given Turkey's geographical location, with implications for energy security, its resources, and its increasing economic strength, particularly as the country develops its services sector.

Turkey has cards to play over time. How may a placement in Europe's, as well as Southwest Asia's, orbit play to Turkey's advantage? In several decades, Europe's leaders may well decide that Turkey inside the Union is part of integration's evolution. A question to ponder now is will Turkey still consider EU membership a natural part of its national development at that point in time given the natural ambition of a large state to be a player in global affairs?

Membership in the Union may be so fraught with internal problems, particularly in Council decision-making with so many small members and so few really large states, that the costs may outweigh the assets of full membership. The question is how Turkey can maximize its leverage as a key player in the European neighborhood while playing its cards in the Muslim world minus the constraints on its sovereignty that EU membership will certainly impose. I would appreciate your thoughts in this matter.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette