One of the principle barriers to a greater sense of community among NATO member and partner nations has been the perceived disparity of commitment among those involved. Simply put, each member or partner to the organization faces a unique set of constraints that allow for vastly different degrees of participation in NATO operations. From the perspective of a state with a limited operational capacity, it may seem as though states with greater latitude may be disproportionally influential. Conversely, states with broader capabilities may view those limited states as merely sycophantic, enjoying NATO's perks without contributing to its process.
This perceived disproportionality manifests itself in a variety of ways, from military aid and economic support, to personnel and a myriad of other factors-the measure of a state's participation in NATO reflects the degree to which it is invested in the organization. To achieve high levels of involvement then, member and partner countries must be motivated to contribute as much as possible within the scope of their specific capacity.
NATO was historically much stronger when the threat of communism and the Cold War loomed over the world, and members had a common adversary in the form of the Soviet Union. Today, the enemy is fragmented and seldom wears a uniform. The nature of global conflict and global security has shifted, and NATO must adapt, or risk becoming irrelevant. The organization's emphasis must turn to member commonality, fostering a sense of esprit de corps, a means of perpetual team building. Too often, members highlight their own agendas without emphasizing shared goals and other areas of commonality, the pursuit of which can bring together the organization and strengthen the bonds of community and collective security that NATO embodies.
One specific area that can lead to increased cooperation and a greater sense of ownership and identification among member nations is joint training programs and military exchange programs. As a US Navy Reservist, I've learned first-hand the importance of cross-cultural exposure and familiarity. Participation in NATO training exercises and officer-exchange initiatives can have a tremendous impact on the operational readiness of a given force, which in turn augments the capabilities of the organization as a whole.
A structure must be established in which participation at all levels is quantified-a point system devised for each and every level of contribution from NATO member and partner states. Enforcing no-fly zones, participating in training exercises, implementing embargoes and other sanctions, distributing aid, and basing and manufacturing missile defense systems would all be assigned point values, along with NATO's countless other operations.
Such points could then be weighed against a country's "capacity" to contribute, determined through state-specific dynamics like GDP, education, income and health statistics, among others. This capacity (most similar to the Human Development Index, or HDI) would serve as a means by which participation in NATO could be definitively measured. Critics of the organization often argue that the subjectivity and vagueness that surrounds measurements of member states' participation creates divisions and internal hierarchies within the organization. Quantifying state involvement in this manner addresses that critique, putting countries with limited operational capacities on the same playing field as those with broader abilities through capability assessments and making point determinations proportional to those capabilities. This proportionality is a step towards fostering much-needed sentiments of ownership and identification among members.
A database displaying the points could also be created and administered by a multilateral action committee, allowing member nations and the public to view the point totals. Such transparency would inspire each member nations' public to rally around the actions of their government and encourage increased participation in NATO if a state's involvement is lacking. Such systems already exist in industry, where private corporations and institutions join together in groups - with the Fair Labor Association and the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition being two examples - wherein members subscribe to audits to make public their adherence to governmental and societal standards and principles.
In this way, the degree of each member's NATO participation would be quantifiable in such a way as to heighten public awareness and encourage all to contribute on the basis of their respective strengths, thereby increasing the synergy and unity of the organization and ensuring its continued worldwide impact.
An integral part of the system is the promotion of exchange programs of all kinds and at all levels. Junior officer programs, civilian academic exchanges and youth scholarship opportunities can all be encouraged and tracked through the points structure. Transnational interactions, military and non-military, will play a pivotal role in shifting the "they" into "we". Indeed, effectively combatting an enemy means knowing the strengths and weaknesses of one's allies as well, and through quantifiable participation in broad-spectrum exchanges, a sense of community and shared defense goals through NATO can be reinforced and developed.
Andrew Barr is an undergraduate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security Program. He is also a Midshipman in the United States Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. He has written for the American Spectator, The Heartland Institute, the American Security Council Foundation and several other university publications.
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February 27, 2012
Daryl Morini, University of Queensland, Silver Contributor (47)
You have written a great piece, bringing a very interesting idea to the table. I think that your “points system” is a potentially innovative approach to Transatlantic burden-sharing, and perhaps also a way of bridging the “they-we” gap in perceptions across and within NATO member-states.
Although I see its intuitive appeal, the main concern which NATO policy-makers may have with this idea – which may simply need further refining – is that this proposal in essence seeks to codify, and publicise, static inequalities in the relative distribution of military power within the Alliance. Of course, due to NATO’s consensual decision-making approach, all Allies are formally equal; but it is no secret that some Allies are more equal than others.
To implement this idea would presumably require the agreement of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, we can foresee some disagreement on the part of smaller NATO states – Iceland for example – which we can safely predict would think twice about quantifying its capabilities into an official NATO database. (Iceland has no standing military). To an extent, the Defence Policy and Planning Division at NATO Headquarters already implements the policy you suggest, by mapping the individual capabilities of Allies, and working to synchronise NATO militaries into highly inter-operable and complementary fighting forces, including through ongoing NATO officer-training courses. Therefore, we can only expect all Allied nations to agree to this points system on the condition of no strings (responsibilities) being attached to nations’ scores.
Hence, one major reason for nations’ resistance, I would surmise, is firstly that it would insinuate a de facto recognition of the power imbalances within the Alliance. This would undercut the consensual approach of the NAC, by suggesting that, much like the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union, NATO members’ voices formally carried unequal weights, due to members’ vastly different population bases, GPD and other indices of power and capabilities. Unless managed tactfully, this points system could unintentionally alienate smaller NATO states.
Secondly, even some larger and more capable NATO states would balk at the idea of quantifying their capabilities – especially Germany – as their higher point score would automatically imply their greater degree of responsibility in NATO operations which, in the end, remain sovereign political decisions. Let us take the case of Operation Unified Protector. In this mission, relatively less capable NATO members, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, made important contributions to the air campaign, whereas Germany, a potentially much more formidable contributor, made international headlines by desisting from participating in this particular military intervention. Objectively speaking, Germany’s larger capabilities should have warranted a greater degree of input, but this dispassionate quantitative analysis ignores the deep historical-psychological reasons which arguably contributed to German inaction during NATO’s intervention in Libya. Hence, NATO member-states, even the more capable among them, are likely to jealously guard their sovereign decision-making prerogative. Although it is an idea I would support, we must be aware that even this points systems proposal would remain hostage to national political preferences and expediencies.
With reference to the above scenario, I would have to disagree with the idea that “allowing member nations and the public to view the point totals...would inspire each member nations' public to rally around the actions of their government and encourage increased participation in NATO if a state's involvement is lacking.” I simply do not see how this dynamic could have been achieved in the case of Germany, for example – where one poll revealed that 66% of Germans were against participating in the Libyan intervention – or generally for that matter. I sincerely doubt that such a rally-around-the-flag effect can easily be achieved by NATO nations intervening in out-of-area operations far removed from the bread-and-butter issues of domestic politics, whether military capabilities are on display or not. But I would certainly agree that openly sharing national capabilities and point scores between NATO members, and with their respective publics, can only enhance Transatlantic burden-sharing, by pointing out scope for Allied defence specialisation, greater inter-operability and therefore a more integrated NATO in austere times.
I would only finish with a more philosophical set of questions to feed our policy discussion. Hans-Georg Gadamer famously wrote that statistics “are such excellent means of propaganda because they let the ‘facts’ speak for themselves and, hence, simulate an objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of the questions asked.” I am simply wondering which concrete criteria you would consider to compare and measure the national capabilities of NATO members, and how you would prevent potentially serious disputes arising between the Allies over comparing military capabilities and other indices of national power directly affecting their international prestige? This might turn out to be an immensely subjective ordeal, rather than an objective technical-military process, and it would not be surprising if nations squabbled over the scores their nation were assigned in comparison to those of their Allies. How do we prevent this from becoming a source of discord in NATO, rather than a bridge to closer cooperation? And what are the legitimate criteria and questions to ask in order to arrive at undisputed scores?
Thank you kindly for your patience, and my apologies about this rather long first response, which was due to the interesting and thought-provoking nature of your own piece. Well done again!
Daryl