The recommendations issued by the Group of Experts aptly reflect the Alliance's thorny attempt to cope with the structural changes that were brought about by the end of the East-West division, exactly twenty years after the collapse of the Cold War structure of international politics and German reunification. On the one hand, while poignantly reaffirming the fundamental function of Article 5, the document underlines a number of adaptations that have marked NATO's evolution in the decade between 1991 and 2001. Such adaptations include: NATO's out-of-area projection (particularly in the Balkan region), the establishment of partnerships with a number of former enemies and non-member states, the enlargement process, and a deepening of relations with other international institutions (e.g. the UN, the EU, and the OSCE).
On the other hand, the expert recommendations also review additional initiatives to strengthen or reinvigorate the Alliance that have been taken in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. This list includes: the engagement in the fight against transnational terrorism and piracy, the contribution to maritime security in the areas bordering the North Atlantic perimeter, NATO's prolonged and highly controversial presence in Afghanistan, the attempt to build a truly amenable relationship with Russia, the development of global partnerships with a number of like-minded non-European states (Australia, New Zealand, and Japan), new partnerships established with the Arab countries of the Gulf region, a persisting involvement in a number of conventional security fields (e.g. disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation), and a growing attention to non-conventional security threats, such as energy and cyber security.
The resulting picture is simultaneously reassuring and challenging. On the one hand, unlike some had predicted in the early post-Cold War period, the Alliance remains alive and kicking. Although the perceived Russian threat has receded, the foundations upon which NATO was built during the Cold War remain solid. On the other hand, NATO - and the panel's recommendations prove this - has struggled to cope with the structural changes that have been brought about by the disappearance of the most important among its original triggering motives. Adaptation to these changes has come at a price. While during the 1990s, deployment in the Balkans marked one of the biggest successes in the Alliance's history, NATO's capability to address non-conventional security issues, measured particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, has proved limited.
The Alliance was not defined by its founding fathers to deal with an expanding number of non-conventional security threats or to engage in prolonged military operations far away from the Euro-Atlantic perimeter. While during the 1990s the conflict in the Balkans provided a terrain to which NATO could rapidly adapt, where traditional state actors or would-be state actors continued to be the Alliance's main political interlocutors, this has not been the case in Afghanistan. The Allies have been operating not only without a strong enough mandate, but also without the presence of robust local interlocutors. The ambitious number of tasks, which the Alliance is called upon to embark on by the Group of Experts, risks exposing even more the gap between NATO's limited political and military capabilities and an increasingly fragmented international security environment.
In this scenario, it is likely that the Alliance's ability to retain cohesion among its original Cold War and post-Cold War members and to design effective solutions to engage new partners, old enemies, and emerging powers, will be the keys to determine this institution's future and vitality. Despite the magnitude of the task, the Alliance's planners should focus upon these priorities rather than spelling out a vast and complicated array of new threats. NATO's future must be conscientiously planned rather than shaped by occasional circumstances.
Dr. Luca Ratti teaches international relations at Roma Tre University and the American University of Rome.
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