In “How Wars End”, Dan Reiter sets out a theory of war termination behaviour. Whereas the topic of why wars/conflicts start, has been much theorized upon and debated about, war termination remains a relatively unexplored field of study. Central to his theory are the information and credible commitment propositions. The former refers to the conventional wisdom that “following a combat success, a belligerent will raise its war-termination offer; however, following a combat defeat, a belligerent will lower its war-termination offer.” The latter refers to the phenomenon that there is always a lesser or higher degree of uncertainty as to whether a belligerent is going to adhere to a war-termination agreement, which is a direct result of the non-existence of an overarching world-government or institution that can enforce agreements. Although the credible commitment proposition has been extensively used to explain why wars start, Reiter demonstrates that it also affects how wars end.
By using a non-random but representative sample of wars that were fought between the 1860s and the 1950’s, Reiter demonstrates how the combination of information dynamics and credible commitment problems determine war termination behaviour. The central proposition of the book is that the information proposition cannot exclusively explain war-termination behaviour, and an understanding of the credible commitment dynamic is required to understand why belligerents choose to fight on (in pursuit of an absolute outcome) or are willing to make compromises (limited war outcome).
The starting point of Reiter’s argument is that wars, in simple terms, break out over a disagreement about the distribution of a particular good (often territory). To put it bluntly: If belligerents possessed perfect information about the military capacities and motivations of their adversaries, they could redistribute the disputed good as to represent the actual balance of power, thereby evading the costs of war. However, the reality is that belligerents tend to overestimate their military capabilities and often do not possess sufficient knowledge about those of their adversaries. After a war has broken out, the information proposition and credible commitment proposition dictate war termination behaviour. Other factors Reiter adds to the equation are shifts in the balance of power, notably third party intervention and the acquisition of new weapons, the effects of escalating costs, public pressure due to mounting casualties and the divisibility of a disputed good.
One of his case studies is Japan during the Second World War. Japan continued fighting for three consecutive years although it suffered considerable setbacks and no major successes from 1942 onwards. Where the information proposition predicts that Japan would make concessions, Japan decided to fight on for one more victory, in an attempt to render the US goal of unconditional surrender too costly. Therefore kamikaze tactics were employed, which inflicted many casualties, and negotiation was off limits as it was feared it would be considered a sign of weakness. The information proposition also assumes transparency about battle outcomes and shifts in the balance of power. However, in reality, as Reiter points out, this is not often the case. Japan was aware it was not doing well overall but individual battlefield losses were not always reported back, underestimated, or considered unrepresentative of the military status quo. The US stuck to its goal of unconditional surrender and foreign imposed regime change, as it considered the likelihood of Japan breaking a limited war-ending agreement too big. Eventually a drastic shift in the balance of power - the use of atomic bombs and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war - brought Hirohito to his knees.
Reiter presents a very detailed and well-structured argument, and provides rich empirical analysis. However, his theoretical framework does not account for the irrationality of war. Although the credible commitment proposition which made the US unwilling to settle for less than unconditional surrender explains why Japan continued fighting, rationalist explanations fall short in explaining the sacrifices in human lives Japan was willing to make to maintain the kokutai. But, one could argue that the credible commitment proposition is in itself an acknowledgement of the irrationality of belligerents, in that it accounts for fear and mistrust. Also, Reiter does briefly mention the role of spirituality in the Japanese society.
The main conclusion is that absolute war outcomes are key to overcoming credible commitment problems. In the final chapter Reiter demonstrates how his findings are relevant for present-day US foreign policy making, especially in the context of pre-emptive wars and attacks. The US “most worrisome foes” at present are rogue states and terrorist groups who cannot be trusted to adhere to a war-ending agreement. The Bush doctrine can be understood in this context as the pursuit of absolute outcomes to overcome credible commitment issues. But attacking rogue states has proven very costly, with anti-Americanism being one of the biggest head aches the US government is facing at present. Other than rogue states, the so called war on terror is ultimately problematic in that terrorist movements like Al Qaida are fluid and quickly disperse across borders and into societies. As Reiter suggests, diplomacy and deterrence may prove far more efficient and less costly to deal with present-day security threats. All in all a very informative read, that will be of interest to international relations scholars or anyone with an interest in the problem of war.
- 1
