Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "European Stability, Not Global Power Projection"

The key for the future of NATO is to once again establish a clear strategic rationale for its existence. This was a relatively easy task during the Cold War, when the threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was very real and perceived as existential. In the years since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this is obviously no longer the case. NATO's actions since that time, in terms of its use of military force against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s and its extensive work in Afghanistan, illustrate how NATO can work and how it really cannot.

The key question is this: Should NATO in the twenty-first century be used primarily to defend Europe from external aggression while also facilitating intra-European stability, or is it to be a platform for external stabilizing missions in other geographic regions, such as the Middle East or East Asia?

The answer is that it should remain focused on what it can do and do well.

If NATO was largely created "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," as stated memorably by the Alliance's first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, this should in large measure be maintained as a raison d'etre. The questions of Russia and Germany continue to be, as they always have been, of paramount importance to European stability. NATO can and should deal with this. The Alliance should remain a serious player in Europe, capable of defending against any potential external aggression, especially coming from Russia (even though this scenario seems highly unlikely any time in the foreseeable future). It should also retain the ability to maintain a sense of order in the continually tumultuous southern side of Europe, especially the Balkan tinderbox.

That being said, NATO must re-examine its capacity to engage in missions outside of Europe, and should probably scale back any extra-European ambitions. The fiscal and military resources are not available to engage in global operations, and the scarce resources that are available are better spent in the European neighborhood.

Referring again to the Kosovo air campaign, it appears that NATO can use force effectively when deployed against malefactors within the general European area. By contrast, although NATO has played a significant role in Afghanistan, the ambiguities of general policy towards that nation and the larger issues pertaining in particular to stability in Pakistan have made it a far less successful endeavor. Granted, much of this is due to internal policy divisions within the United States, which is quite evidently the largest player in the Afghan theatre. However, the projection capabilities of NATO are not all that impressive when looking outside of Europe. Attempting to bolster that in order to essentially become some kind of global constabulary force seems unwise.

At the end of the day, each region of the world will require its own multilateral (though not pan-global) institutions.

The US will, for as long as it remains the single most powerful nation in the world, play a key role in each of these regional institutions. Yet these institutions should remain regional, focusing on their own neighborhoods so that they can be more effective, rather than morphing into grandiose institutions with ambitions far exceeding capabilities. That is a sure-fire recipe for ineffective institutions that spend more time talking than acting on the imperatives of the moment.

Greg Randolph Lawson is the Director of Communications for a US based political advocacy organization and is a life-long observer of political and foreign affairs.

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August 31, 2010

Paul-Robert Lookman, http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/, Platinum Contributor (280)

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The author’s article merits reading and rereading, including between the lines. The way I perceive his rationale is that for him the key question about NATO’s future role is if it should define itself to defend Europe against any aggression - including from Russia - and facilitate internal stability, OR additionally be involved in missions outside its traditional geographical sphere.

The author seems to favour the first option: no extra-European ambitions (by Europe), the fiscal and military resources are not available. Essentially: NATO should not police outside Europe. At the same time, the author seems to imply that in his view the US must go it alone, involving itself with regional institutions outside Europe, as long as these do not develop any global ambitions. In his view, the US is fed up spending a lot of time talking, where “action” is required.

Can the author please confirm if he is actually saying: “Europe, take care of your own defence, we will act in the rest of the world as we see fit”. Perhaps he can then also explain if the US has sufficient resources of its own to make its global ambitions come true, or that it will lean on regional institutions that will go along with it without spending “time talking”. Will going it alone include respecting Security Council Resolutions?

Lastly, can the author please shed his light on the possibility of a European NATO, without the US, but with Russia?

August 31, 2010

Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)

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I do favor the first option.

I do not necessarily think the U.S. should "go it alone" but I do think it may have to work within coalitions of the willing and certain regional organizations that have more skin in the game on certain issues than others.

It may make no sense to France or Germany to engage on a potential altercation with China over Taiwan. Conversely, it could worthwhile for Japan or South Korea to engage as they are likely to be far more nervous about Chinese military capabilities and what a military action seizing Taiwan would mean for them.

In this respect, regional institutions seem to be far more capable of finding consensus on issues of importance in their neighborhood than groups whose primary location is on the other side of the globe. Also, with that in mind, I do not believe Europe should be left alone to "take care of its own defense."

I think the U.S. remains unique in its ability to play the role of off shore balancer in all regions including Europe. So I envision a robust relationship between the U.S. and NATO continuing, it would just be under more circumscribed circumstances.

As for American resources- this is a legitimate issue and one that is very troubling. At present, it does appear the U.S. may not have the resources over time to play the role I think necessary. If that happens, I am quite concerned that we will not see order, but a neo-Middle Ages comprised of a cacophony of disparate voices, disparate interests and clashes not only between non-state actors and states, but a resumption of more traditional state conflict as well.

No other nation, even if it were to build the capabilities the U.S. has built and maintained will ever be seen as disinterested enough to not be seen as a threat. The U.S., despite its numerous errors in the past, is largely seen as relatively (though by far not absolutely) benign. This means that should any other single nation attempt to fill a vacuum left as a result of a lack of American capabilities, it is unlikely they could do so without inviting the type of counterbalancing that has historically been the norm since the beginning of the modern state system.

I do not see NATO working without the U.S., much less working with Russia. While a cooperative council between NATO and Russia should exist (and does), it seems unlikely that Russia could ever work within the NATO confines. A special relationship between the U.S. and Russia will always be necessary due to its geopolitical location and relative geopolitical weight.

September 6, 2010

Darrell Calvin Brown, City College of San Francisco/TTC, Gold Contributor (102)

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Recommendations by former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (Chair of the special committee concerning the "new strategic concept" of NATO) to the present NATO Secrtary General, Anders Fogh Ramussen;show forth the USA as contributing a great cooperative sense and sensibility about the present and future structure and functioning of NATO. Lord Ismay's statement then is reflective of the pain resulting from one country's destructive behavior, growing global suspicions of another country's intentions, and the successful heroic efforts of the United States in maintaining "liberty and justice for all." Each country of the global community is primarily responsible for its own state of security. Europe, being in a state of civil stability presently, is not in dire need of military aid beyond the implementation of each of its respective countries own policing policy measures. Unless Europe is planning on expanding its borders, Afghanistan and Pakstan remain in Southeastern Asia.

September 12, 2010

Darrell Calvin Brown, City College of San Francisco/TTC, Gold Contributor (102)

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CORRECTiON- Southwestern Asia : ).

September 13, 2010

Stephan Vormann, NUI Maynooth, Silver Contributor (65)

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Having read the article, two questions/comments spring to my mind:

1. "The questions of Russia and Germany continue to be, as they always have been, of paramount importance to European stability."
The whole argument here is based on the assumption that NATO is needed to address still lingering German and the Russian questions. Is that really the case? While Russia has recently shown its preparedness to use force against its neighbours as a means of politics, I do not see that Germany - despite all worries that have been articulated in 1989/1990 - has shown or is showing any signs of willingness to resort to pre-1945-power politics. The country certainly is the economic hegemon within Europe, but this hegemony is hardly a concern for NATO. As political scientists/ analysists we do not have a "test-Europe" where we could see how the continent would do without NATO in the future. NATO has played a decisive role in the peaceful transformation of the continent in the last two decades and it will hopefully further continue to do so. But to suggest that Europe would be less stable if NATO was not there to countercheck Germany is - in my view - an underestimation of the stability that has been accomplished as a result of more than 50 years of European integration and a misjudgement of Germany's intentions.

2. "Referring again to the Kosovo air campaign, it appears that NATO can use force effectively when deployed against malefactors within the general European area."
Agreed. BUT, it was exactly the NATO air-campagin against Serbia that convinced US-policy makers to conduct "no more war by committee".
The Balkans - and in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina and to a lesser extent maybe Macedonia - continue to be troublesome. But as Croatia and Serbia have embarked on a pro-European journey the Balkans are hardly "a tinderbox" anymore. Only last week we have seen a profound Serbian policy-shift in its relations with Kosovo which will further add to stability in the region Western Balkans. Large-scale conflict in the region has become highly unlikely, and as 2008 has shown, there is little willingness on NATO-side to get involved in conflicts that are located in a perceived Russian "sphere of interest", i.e. Ukraine and Georgia. What "European malefactors" are left that NATO can/ should deal with?

September 15, 2010

Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)

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In response to Mr. Vormann:

You state, "But to suggest that Europe would be less stable if NATO was not there to countercheck Germany is - in my view - an underestimation of the stability that has been accomplished as a result of more than 50 years of European integration and a misjudgement of Germany's intentions."

I agree that this perception may be correct, but the operative word is "may."

Germany already shows a disinclination to subordinate itself to to whims of bailing out its southern neighbors. This could, over time, lead to profound shifts within the entire EU project. Certainly, I am not suggesting a "4th Reich" of some overtly militant variety, but, we really can't say for certain what the future disposition of its government will be. Consequently, NATO does play a stabilizing role in ensuring that there would be limited backsliding, even if such backsliding is difficult to conceptualize at the moment.

You also state, "Large-scale conflict in the region has become highly unlikely, and as 2008 has shown, there is little willingness on NATO-side to get involved in conflicts that are located in a perceived Russian "sphere of interest", i.e. Ukraine and Georgia. What "European malefactors" are left that NATO can/ should deal with?"

The issue of what "malefactors" is not necessarily an issue of the moment. The key to NATO is its ability to continue making the prospect of future "malefactors" emerging so remote as to make it seem fanciful to ever consider their rise at all. In other words, NATO is preventitive and should continue to remain in place to prevent potential instability. Its past and present success is what has allowed your perspective on the unlikelihood of large scale conflict to ever be countenanced.

Much conventional wisdom seems to assert that Europe has transcended its past permanently. I would agree with such conventional wisdom up to the point where it indicates that European power politics and competition do not seem to be anywhere on the immediate geopolitical horizon.

The key to being forward thinking, however, is to not let the past act as a mental prison yet allow it to inject a reasonable dose of realism into policy discussions. To assume that Europe has permanently transcended its historical tendencies (which were present far longer than the 65 years that have elapsed since World War II) seems just as narrow minded as it would be to assume that it will necessarily fall back into those historic tendencies.

History teaches by inexact analogy. It is an imperfect guide. But it is the only guide we really have despite those limitations. Assumptions not built on history are assumptions built on mirages, hopes and fears. They "could" be correct. Yet is it not prudent to be prepared for most contingencies, both good and bad, rather than be surprised because poorly founded assumptions fail?

February 14, 2011

Stephan Vormann, NUI Maynooth, Silver Contributor (65)

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Dear Mr Lawson,

My sincere apologies for reacting so late to your clarification. I had read it at the time and was absolutely sure that I had written a short note in response.

However, belated as my response is, I would like to seize the opportunity to thank you for what indeed has been a clarification. I certainly can and do agree with your views on the future role of NATO. I was simply confused at what appeared to me to be a sense of urgency in dealing with Germany, Russia and the potential malefactors. Thank you for having clarified that.

With kind regards,

Stephan Vormann

February 19, 2012

Nagdi

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"I also dont beelive that Fjordman feels that Europe is 'lost'. If he felt so, he would'nt bother writing."Hm, I feel I have to point out that the author, Bill Deedes, is about 90 years old!

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European Stability, Not Global Power Projection

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