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NATO will not expand to include Ukraine or Georgia - at least not any time soon. There are many reasons - and many good ones - that membership hasn't yet extended to these countries. Alas, it is difficult not to have the impression that it was Russian grumbling that ultimately deterred Western leaders to invite these former Soviet republics into their military alliance.

True to style, Russia took NATO's decision as a sign that the West is unwilling to face the newly emboldened, post-Soviet Russia - much less commit to defend Russia's neighbors against possible outside aggression. The ink on the unsigned Membership documents wouldn't have been dry, when Russia stepped up its contribution to the ruckus in Abkhazia, a formerly independent Soviet -and now aspiring-separatist Georgian- province. With flyovers and Russian ‘peacekeepers' uninvited by Georgia, Russia lays further claim to Abkhazia as belonging to its sphere of influence.

NATO's dilemma - apart from the general unease with which the West views Russia's gloves-off power politics - is clear: It cannot give Russia, no member of NATO, a de facto veto over NATO membership decisions, whether it concerns a bordering nation or not. At the same time, denying Russia a veto does not logically require tha t the Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. It would be folly to conclude that everything but Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership would mean having caved to Russian pressure.

There are good reasons for and against the Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO that can be considered independently of the noises coming from the Kremlin. Among these reasons is - also logically - the reaction in Moscow. Not because the West bows before the increasing belligerence with which Russia plays its international game of intimidation and threats, but because the West has an inherent security (and otherwise) interest in the relationship with Russia. And while the relationship is not good, it need not be made worse by decisions which offend, and which are not absolutely essential to Western strategy. The dilemma doesn't end here: Since the cold war ended, NATO has been an outdated security alliance desperately in search of meaning. It has found its meaning in expansion for its own sake and must therefore be intent on spreading its military wing to more countries that used to be "the enemy". New members are thus very welcome.

But as the recent rifts between Georgia and Russia in Abkhazia's Kodori Valley have shown, the Eastern NATO members may take the common defense obligation a little more seriously than the allies likely feel comfortable with. When NATO last expanded, its main role was that of antechamber to EU membership: NATO has come a long way from essential military alliance to free trade zone prerequisite.

A realistic assessment of NATO's utility is that of sweetly forcing greater transatlantic ties in times where friendship alone can't be counted on to do the trick - not unlike a marriage vow: When times are rough, the partners can't run off quite so easily. If NATO is more than a rich kid's club with military toys, the expansion to the Ukraine and Georgia - put off for now, but a forgone conclusion - should recall the question of original importance: Would we, were these countries attacked in some way, be willing to put everything on the line in defending it?

The official answer is clear, of course. And perhaps, though unlikely, even the honest answer would be "yes". But what security could NATO actually offer vis-à-vis Russia (neither an official nor even potential enemy, of course) when half of Western Europe is desperately dependent on Russian oil and gas? Russian leaders are keenly aware of this problem - and know they need not to fear their policy of aggressive audacity elicit any meaningful policy response from the West.

Where once the Soviet Union's military potential made Western Europeans shake in their boots, now it'd be one cold winter without Russian gas. A point that only underscores the futility with which Georgia, with NATO now sidelined, appeals to the EU for protection of its interests.

The only possible conclusion from this is that at the beginning of any true security policy for Europe would be a smart energy policy, ideally coordinated with her transatlantic allies. NATO's upcoming 60th anniversary meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl will show if there are any leaders bold and realistic enough to touch on this subject.

Jens F. Laurson is Editor-in-Chief of the International Affairs Forum. George A. Pieler is a senior fellow with the Institute for Policy Innovation.

Related materials from the Atlantic community:

• Heinrich Bonnenberg: Ukraine's Future Lies in the EU, not NATO
• Richard G. Lugar: A Transatlantic Energy Security Strategy is Essential
• Memo 6: NATO and Russia: Relationship Must be Redefined