Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Frankenstein's Monster and the Law of the Eternal Compromise"

Frankenstein's Monster and the Law of the Eternal Compromise

André Budick: The EU is often criticized for its apparent deficit in formulating a coherent foreign and security policy. Yet, that ‘deficit’ really lies at the heart of the EU’s identity as a transnational entity, outside the norms of conventional thinking on International Relations.

That phone number which American Presidents and their administrations have been looking for ever since a certain Henry Kissinger was trying to ring it: It's still missing. Worse: There is not even a directory where US policymakers could start searching for Europe's phone number!

Shapiro and Witney, wrote on atlantic-community.org about that well-known criticism of the EU's foreign and security policy - or rather, the lack thereof. Many EU member states still like to interact individually with the US in the mistaken belief of thus exerting influence. If only those Europeans would start getting their act together, just like they do on trade, and "...act together and speak to the US with one voice."

Indeed, it is just not going to happen. Not because of a lack of (at least publicly stated) will, as reaffirmed in one solemn declaration by EU leader after another; not because of a lack of ideas being debated and theorized upon in many a seminar, academic treatise or diplomatic gathering; and not because of a lack of public visibility, as there already has been a High EU Representative on Foreign Affairs for years.

Alas, the EU is not a nation-state according to the established norms and procedures of international law - and will not evolve into one anytime soon. It is and will continue to exist - at least for the foreseeable future - as a unique entity within the realm of the international system. The EU remains a hybrid between a single state entity and a loose confederation of sovereign states - Frankenstein's Monster of international relations - as it continues to be defined and interpreted by many policymakers, diplomats and academics.

The German constitutional court, in two landmark rulings, has extensively dealt with the legal questions on how to measure the EU in terms of sovereignty. In its 1993 ruling on the Maastricht treaty, the court coined a new German term - "Staatenverbund" - by fusing the German words for "state" and "federation" into one. In its recent decision on the constitutionality of the Lisbon treaty under the Basic Law, the Court defined limits for further transfers of sovereignty from EU member states to the supra-national EU level. The Court drew a line regarding culture and language, education, health care and social security, and in particular military and defense: Should future German governments and lawmakers decide to transfer significant additional powers in those areas unto the EU level, they would fundamentally alter the nature of the German federal republic as a formally sovereign state. Such a massive undertaking would then require, the Court implied, a constitutional convention, because the existing Basic Law would de facto cease to exist.

That core of national sovereignty, as defined here in German legal terms, does in a similar fashion apply to the rest of the EU-26. Large and small alike, they retain, by popular will and constitutional tradition, significant residual powers to deal bilaterally with third powers on the global stage. Despite all of this, however, EU leaders are nevertheless in a constant process of negotiating common positions on foreign and security matters. This 'strange trans-national entity‘ called the EU will continue working through its arduous mechanisms to agree on those clear-cut, coherent, stringent positions which Shapiro and Witney are calling for. Call it the Law of Eternal Compromise of the 27.

Although countries like the US, China, Russia and emerging Brazil or India may claim to adhere to consistent foreign policies, such claims may look superficial at a second glance. Given the influence of domestic pressure groups, vested economic interests or bureaucratic inertia on formulating policy by those "sovereign actors" in the international system, that "poor EU monster" may start looking much less confused and weak at all. In a world in which, as so many knowledgeable experts make us believe, globalization also means growing interdependence and less independence (i. e. 'sovereignty') as it pertains to individual states, no matter how big or small they are, the EU monster may have the last laugh.

André Budick is a Legislative Assistant with Bernhard Kaster, MdB.

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December 4, 2009

Member deleted

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The speed of EU reform, after approval of the Lisbon Treaty, is astonishingly fast, as can be seen in numerous e-mails EU sent, and received, and speed is power indeed. The road ahead is probably long and hard, but many would perhaps prefer to deal with an EU that speaks with one voice, eventually.

It's a process of evolution instead of revolution, and thus, will take time.

December 4, 2009

Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (469)

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I like the terminology employed in this article. The EU is a very complex, "Frankenstein's Monster" sort of entity. I suspect, at the end of the day, the EU will remain what amounts to a glorified free trade zone. That is what it is now and what it will probably always predominatey be.

I understand why no medium sized power (like a Germany or France) would want the EU organs to become too powerful and possibly conduct policy inimical to their interests. However, by not attempting to give more influece to two supposedly key roles within its bureaucracy, the EU contines to look unable to punch at the political weight one would expect from its relative economic base.

Meanwhile, it remains the EU's individual constituent nation-states that hold the real diplomatic power. With that in mind, I do not think the "EU Monster" will have the "last laugh." Indeed, I think it illustrates a truth that runs beneath much discourse regarding the entire EU project and the notion of any trans-national structure patterned upon it.

There is altogether too much faith that "transnational entities", of which the EU is the ultimate example, are the definitive wave of the future. Certainly, there will be a role for economic cooperation and interdependence on some policy issues (certain health issues, global warming, international terrorism, some financial regulation). However, when existential questions are raised, nations as well as subnational rather than transnational actors hold sway. This is because most people are loyal to what they know and see around them.

Loyalty to abstactions is difficult. Even the Westphalian "nation" occassionally has problems maintaining loyalty. To think that real loyalty can emerge to a quasi-federation of supposedly sovereign, yet not entirely indpendent nation-states, can be achieved seems a bit overindulgent .

I would even submit that it borders on the height of rationalistic hubris to think that larger conglomerations will be able to hold onto the imagination of the masses, as opposed to the intellectual elites.

Ultimately, that is why we will all have to continue living in a complex world of ever shifting state based alliances concerned with permanent interests dictated by historical context, culture, and geography.