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February 23, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (708)

Throughout the latest articles regarding Iran, Atlantic Community has taken an unusual one-sided approach not taking critics (as well as, from my perspective, any real developments and international discussions) of the engagement strategy into account. The memo does thus not represent the issue as currently discussed - which could be avoided by consulting different opinions.

Whatever stance towards Iran at stake, arguments from many perpectives do in any case contribute to more insight. AC missed the opportunity in that instance.

February 25, 2012

Paul-Robert Lookman, http://geopolitiek-in-perspectief.blogspot.com/, Platinum Contributor (280)

As history of the last couple of years has shown, veteran contributor Niklas Anzinger is always quick to give his views on articles relating to Iran. Interestingly, this time he succeeded in posting his reaction the day before the article itself was published, while concurrently obtaining a “rating as outstanding by one User.” Bravo!

As regards the bearing of his reaction, Atlantic Community (AC) also publishes pretty bellicose articles on Iran. For example, AC saw fit to publish Aaron Ellis’ article “We Need More Strategic Thinking in the Iran Debate”, which openly suggests illegitimate “solutions” such as “targeted killings”. Clearly, Mr Anzinger opposes any engagement with Iran, a country which - according to US Secretary of Defence Panetta - is not attempting to build nuclear weapons, a fact that was even confirmed by Israeli intelligence.

Where the author speaks in pretty vague terms of “the conflict” which must be addressed “in a fundamental and comprehensive manner”, the real issue is not whether Iran is developing a nuclear weapon, but may develop a nuclear [arms] capability. Such a capability would in no way be the existential threat the Israeli’s have claimed. It would however put a lid on US power in the region.

With a divided Europe and major players actively having pushed for more sanctions, it is an illusion to think that Europe can take any lead in engagement with Iran. What Lady Ashton could do, however, is get a consensus in Europe over unconditional support to the negotiations to achieve a nuclear-free Middle East, to be held in Finland later this year. And to make the European point, she should do so expressly without "close consultation with the US."

March 6, 2012

Anna Sliwon, King's College London, (1)

I wouldn't support the EU taking the lead in negotiations with Iran either. Despite the Iranian issue having a strong proliferation basis it is still, at the bottom of a matter, a regional rivalry between two states, one of whom is enjoying a explicit financial and military support from a power with a robust arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons. Israel's quite a strong stance in the Middle East, it's religion, way of being and also relations with the United States stand in sharp opposition to what the Iranian leadership has historically imagined for their state - the Islamic caliphate.

Nevertheless, the nuclear dimension of the issue is predominant. The global non-proliferation regime is facing another blow to its long-established principles and honourable goals, if the Iranian nuclear activities will turn out to have produced either the bomb or the level of expertise sufficient for an assembly of a nuclear device. Therefore, negotiations on establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East should be taken into serious consideration by all parties involved, and not evolve into meetings with a foreseeable outcome of Israel denying the need to renounce its nuclear inventory. It might be very difficult to sway Israeli behaviour in that direction especially as they have heard repeated threats to the state's existence, which have effectively infused the state with a sense of paranoia. What the United States could do is to assure the Israelis of their commitment to preserving their security in exchange for refraining from a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. As risky an option as it is there may be a way of accompanying these diplomatic discussions with similar efforts to get Iran to be more transparent on its activities in the nuclear field and work on this state's security concerns that might shape its behaviour towards Israel. This would call for normalisation of relations with its neighbours. This particular policy path would be based on presumption of Iranian leadership's rationality in their foreign policy planning and execution.

The first and second points of the memo even though instrumental in resolving the deadlock with Iran they constitute fundamental elements of an expected policy change that might be quite time-consuming in implementation as it would require a great deal of political will. But as the deadlock drags on it might be right time to consider the changes.

March 7, 2012

Yasmin Jeanice Mattox, St. John Fisher College Graduate International Studies Program Alumna and Government Contract Analyst, Silver Contributor (29)

This article is straightforward and insightful however at times too optimistic in its policy recommendations. On the first point, Mr. Clapp is absolutely correct in asserting that Israel receives too much favor and possibly assistance when considering how powerful it is. It would be interesting to further read about the author’s thoughts on the issue. At what point, if ever, could unconditional support of Israel have to be abandoned and under what circumstances? This in itself is an incredibly interesting issue with widespread implications. Clapp then mentions how there are bigger strategic dangers in the region than Iran but he doesn’t explicitly identify them and the criteria by which they should be deemed bigger threats.

On the second point, Mr. Clapp’s comments about U.S. arms hypocrisy should not go unnoticed, because it is an important observation. The United States’ calls for Iran to cease its nuclear program without addressing its own are politically understandable and realistic. However, the United States’ expectation that Iran “go without” when it seems as if every other state has nuclear weapons is pretty delusional. Clapp’s comments that the United States should decrease its arsenal “down to the hundreds rather than the thousands” in order to demonstrate a symbolic show of good faith is well meaning but seems as if it would fail. It does not seem as if it would provide a strong enough incentive for the Iranian regime to cease its nuclear program, especially since those remaining U.S. nuclear weapons would still easily annihilate Iran if it came down to that. The United States could have only one nuclear weapon and still have first strike capability, so reducing the U.S arsenal to the hundreds would still be a source of great paranoia and distrust for Iran. A U.S. unilateral reduction policy while a positive symbolic move would lack any real benefit for Iran. It would however be advantageous for the U.S. since Iran would effectively be left with even less bargaining capabilities if it seriously committed to abandoning its nuclear program while the U.S. would still have a flush nuclear arsenal. Thus, the idea of a modest arsenal decrease for the United States, while symbolic, appears to be too idealistic and lacking much practical use to provide any meaningful incentive for Iran to reverse its course. If anything, the goals of nuclear reduction in conjunction with an unwavering commitment to future non-proliferation ought to be analyzed from an Iranian non-state actor and grassroots level. For example, what can liberty movement members, ready for positive change, do to dilute the regime’s power or strip it completely? External, e.g. inter-governmental organization-led, nuclear non-proliferation policies will achieve little, if anything, if they maintain the status quo. Internal changes are critical to achieving success on the issue. Thus, grassroots efforts that address the issue through regime change or regime weakening should be bolstered.

On the third point, Iran views European as well as U.S. motives concerning Israel and Iran with great suspicion and paranoia, much of which isn’t unwarranted. Iran is more or less that last Black or White Pawn trying desperately to defend its King by itself, while its opponent still has its Bishops, Rooks, and Knights in addition to its Pawns and Queen. This is even more the case since Syria is under fire. The Iranian leadership knows that there is no real contest with the West militarily and that its real hope is to have time pass and have talks or talks in anticipation of talks long enough to acquire nuclear capabilities before drastic and paralyzing sanctions are levied against it or more ominously, military strikes against the country become reality. As Ms. Swilon above argues, a united European Union effort may be of little use. In this respect, new change agents must come into play and the author’s suggestions of more vigorous action from Russia and China in addition to France and Germany makes sense since these nations have seemed to be more detached from the rhetorical battles that have become commonplace certainly in United States-Iran interactions.

March 20, 2012

Josh Beaver

I came across your article on the Perspectivist website and found it to be very insightful. With recent news that the State Department was exempting 11 countries from the sanctions on trade with Iran, I feel like the US and the West are moving in the right direction realizing that diplomacy will be the only way to settle this moving forward.