RSS

February 6, 2009

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

Apart from the fact that there is a huge percentage of undecided voters (especially among women and the elderly) so that it is dangerous to read too much into the polls, in my view a critical element is missing in Mr. Emery's analysis: The surge of Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu. It looks as if it is more Yisrael Beitenu that is attracting former and potential voters of Likud and thus weakening it than it is Labor and Kadima that "had cut Likud's lead".

February 6, 2009

Andrew Christian Emery, University of Birmingham, Silver Contributor (26)

I think that Mr Petek's point is probably fair. I think this arises from the fact that my article was written almost two weeks ago. A rise in the polls that could accurately be described as a 'surge' for Yisrael Beitenu, until very recently an obscure party supported by hard line Russian immigrants, has only been perceptible very recently. Until the latest polls, a few days ago, I don't recall seeing much serious contemplation of him being 'kingmaker' (as characterised in the press today/yesterday) or in any other way instrumental in the next election.

Perhaps, however, we could apply the same caution regarding opinion polls that you offer me..

However, the point that Kadima gained popularity in the polls during the assault is valid. Netanyahu is, as I state, still almost certain to be the next PM. The basic notion that the Gaza conflict has, at least in part, cut short Likud's lead (preventing a potential landslide) still appears sound. It also appears reasonable to suggest that there was a limit to which any military action could dent Netanyahu's credentials on national security in favour of Kadima. I also believe that Barak has probably done enough to save Labour from the very real threat of annihilation and reserve a decent cabinet position.

In short, though this piece is two weeks old, and could thus not pick up on Lieberman's surge, many of its underlining principles still seem reasonable.

Your point about ‘undeciders’ is also well taken- would your assessment be that any late swings will benefit Kadima the most?

As a personal aside, I watch the surge in Yisrael Beitenu with significant dismay

February 6, 2009

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

Dear Mr. Emery,

I was not aware of the fact that your article was written two weeks ago and so I welcome your acknowledgment of the Yisrael Beitenu factor now.

While I cannot disprove your assessment nor really prove mine as we all only can speculate, my assessment is that the recent war between Hamas and Israel rather has not had a significant effect on the Israeli election outcome, because I think that the Israeli population that so unanimously supported the recent military operation was disappointed with Livni for her public diplomacy ineffectiveness failing to get the US to veto the UNSC resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and with Barak for stopping the military operation short of the achievement of absolute deterrence (see the continuing firing of rockets into Israel).

I would argue that the fact that Likud was projected so many seats before operation “Cast Lead” was due to Kadima voters being dissatisfied with their party’s drift from the pragmatic center to the ideological left. They indicated in the polls exactly what they wanted the Kadima leadership to notice and not their actual preferences, which have still been located in the pragmatic center. The Kadima leadership was supposed to shift rightwards back to the center as a result.

Now that election is nearing dissatisfied Kadima voters – who I think make up the largest part of the undecided voters and want to vote for a pragmatic center party – start to ask themselves if they really want to vote for an ideological right-wing Likud, which is against there sincere preferences, or if they should vote nonetheless for Kadima and risk that it will stay the ideological left party it has become and not be the pragmatic center party again, which is even more against there sincere preferences. Therefore, I think that whether the undecided voters will vote for Kadima depends on the credibility with which Kadima can claim to be a pragmatic center party again (this is exactly why I think that the Kadima campaign strategy of attacking Netanyahu is counter-productive as it fosters the voters’ belief that Kadima has become an ideological left-wing party).

In sum, I think that the Israeli electorate is still in its majority located in the pragmatic center. The problem, however, is that it has difficulty recognizing a pragmatic center party and that is exactly what makes this Israeli election so complex, on the one hand, and fascinating, on the other.

For an excellent article on this topic see Ari Shavit, "The center that disappointed":

www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1059757.html />

February 6, 2009

Andrew Christian Emery, University of Birmingham, Silver Contributor (26)

Dear Mr Petek (if it is Dr. I apologise!),

Whilst we can argue about what the "the achievement of absolute deterrence" is and the extent that it was a realistic strategy (or compatible with wider diplomatic aims), I think it is wrong to entirely discount the impact of the conflict on the election. Not least because you actually seem to allude to the fact that Barak and Livini's conduct in the war have 'disapointed' the electorate. That seems to suggest an immediate and explict impact.

I also find it almost impossible to discount the impact of the war on Israeli-Arabs (20% of the population). If this group doesn't vote for the left, it will take a severe kicking regardless of any other movement amongst the ‘Israeli’ electorate.

But even if we do understate the effect, we cannot entirely discount the notion that the war was prosecuted by some individuals who had at least one eye on the election. To quote Uriya Shavit, of the Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University "It is improbable that Israeli politicians did not have elections in mind in light of the offensive. I am absolutely sure they did,"

Furthermore, and whilst it is impossible to definitively prove, I find it a stretch to assume that Yisrael Beitenu would have enjoyed such a 'surge' regardless of the conflict. I do, however, acknowledge that there has been some previous hardline dissatisfaction with Likud, for example following Moshe Feiglin's ousting from a Knesset seat.

Your argument, as I understand it, is that the boost Kadima has experienced during the conflict, and to a slightly lesser extent after, is due to pragmatic centerists returning to the party after previously expressing their dissatisfaction in the polls by supporting Likud.

If voters return to kadima because they are persuaded it has moved away from the left- can we completely discount any relation to the recent conflict with this thought process?

I wonder, also, what explained the boost Labour received?

As far as I can see, it seems that it is indeed very different to predict current political feelings in Israel. It does seem, however, that the recent war in Gaza is important context to framing these current feelings.

I think the article you cite is interesting- and perhaps the pragmatic electorate does still constitute the majority in Israel. It's hard to see how the next election will result in a government that represents the views of 'pragmatic center'. I think that there are wider factors explaining the shift in Israeli politics to the right. My article simply tried to argue that the attempt to regain some of this lost ground, at least in part, framed Kadima's decision to go into Gaza on the scale they did.

Facinating stuff....

February 6, 2009

Member deleted

The volatility in polls witnesses a short sighted portfolio of demands and opinions.

Kadima won the election once promising to establish “peace with the Arabs” once. This aim appears to be wishful thinking against the background of the realities on the ground, thus the Gaza onslaught and the accelerated growth of settlements in the West Bank. Syria declared the Arab Initiative as dead and Saudi Arabia declared the chance for peace could expire recently.

Haaretz announced Israel’s choice as “together with 22 Arab states against Iran, or with the settlers against the whole world” but I don’t think the choice of the Israelis is not that manifold and complex. To bring it to a nutshell Israelis want Shalit back home and no more rockets in southern Israel with any means matters.

An easy equation if Israel talks to Hamas and opens the crossings… so my projection is, if a cease fire is in reach and Shalit returns from custody the next two days Kadima will gain and Bibi soars.

Let us not forget the most powerful lobby in Israel namely Iran and Hamas.

February 7, 2009

Ilyas M. Mohsin, PPP, Platinum Contributor (296)

while nobody can overlook the issue of rockets fired into Israel by the
dispossessed palestinains, it is strange that nobody appears to have any human concern for thr atrocities committed in Gaza just beacause of electoral planning in Israel and that the Gazans are poorly armed.
Samir' observation, "Kadima won the election once promising to establish “peace with the Arabs” once. This aim appears to be wishful thinking against the background of the realities on the ground, thus the Gaza onslaught and the accelerated growth of settlements in the West Bank." forms the bottomline. whether it is Livini, Olmert, Barak or Yahoo, it is just a question of misappropriating Palestinian lands with, general, approval of our friends in the US due to their domestic compulsions. Injustice may last for a while but the Bastlle has to collapse, as history bears out. Many good Israelis would also agree.

February 7, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Ilyas,

I didn't point out the connection between the electoral planning and the onslought on Gaza because it doesn't surprise me after all.

My personal objection is, how to vote for peace under the light of political leaders. Livini, Olmert, Barak, Yahoo and Liebermann is a developement from bad to worse. Livini, Olmert and Barak failed to implement peace or at least a realistic path towards it and Yahoo/Libermann possition themselfes somewhere between "not dismanteling settlements", "topple Hamas" and "throwing all Arabs out".
I do not doubt that the peace movement is strong enough in order to implement the arab peace initiative on the basis, but is there any leader willing to support peace at this election actually? Do the Israelis have a choice to vote for peace (Ok Meretz)?

My impression is the quintet inferal offers strategies how to avoid peace?

February 7, 2009

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

Dear Mr. Emery,

I indeed must thank you for drawing my attention to fact that I only considered Kadima and Likud in my comment and neglected the effect of operation “Cast Lead” on Labor (as I only talked about Barak and not the Labor party itself) and Yisrael Beitenu.

But first let me clarify the assessments I have made in my previous comment. I completely agree with you that “it is wrong to entirely discount the impact of the conflict on the election“. It is not my view that operation ”Cast Lead“ did not have an effect on the election, but rather that it did not have a significant effect on it (this is why I focused on the balance of power between Kadima and Likud). You also get me wrong by claiming that I “suggest an immediate and explict impact”. You are right that in my opinion mostly Livni and to some extent Barak (by the end of the operation) have disappointed the electorate and thus the military operation did have an effect on the election. However, I think this effect cancelled out the previous positive effect in the beginning of the operation on Livni's and Barak's iamge, thus leading all in all to an insignificant effect. Concerning the effect on Kadima it is my interpretation that Kadima’s boost is not an effect of the military operation leading people to believe Kadima has shifted back to the center. I was rather trying to say that it is an effect of the dissatisfied Kadima voters’ dilemma: They indicated in the polls previously, my interpretation goes, that they would vote for Likud in order to send a signal to the Kadima leadership (thus Likud’s boost) and now ask themselves whether to materialize this threat (as Likud is only their second preference) or whether to give Kadima a second chance (taking the risk that their first preference Kadima does not exist in reality). Now seeing Likud’s boost, a lot of dissatisfied Kadima voters may decide to give Kadima a second chance knowing that there is a strong rightwards pressure by Likud, thus minimizing the risk of Kadima staying a left-wing party and enhancing the probability of it moving back to the pragmatic center. So I think Kadima’s recent boost is not a result of Kadima itself creating a center image by operation “Cast Lead", though it certainly had an effect in the same direction. Obviously, if all dissatisfied Kadima voters will act that way and move back from Likud to Kadima there will be no strong rightwards pressure by Likud. Therefore, I think an equilibrium will be reached with, I would say, around two thirds of the dissatisfied Kadima voters staying with Kadima and around one-third voting for Likud. It will be interesting to see how and if a sort of equilibrium will be reached now that the results of polls are prohibited from being made public making it difficult for dissatisfied Kadima voters to judge whether Likud will end up being strong.

However, I do share your differentiated opinion on Yisrael Beitenu’s rise, which can probably be explained as you said by a mix of the recent military operation and the dissatisfied hard-line fraction of the potential Likud voters.

I similarly agree with your assessment of Labor’s boost, though as with Yisrael Beitenu I think that additionally to the effect of operation “Cast Lead” Barak alone having been elected as head of the Labor party (as opposed to Peretz) has had a long-term positive effect on Labor. In my view Barak is the only one in the Labor party stopping the Israeli electorate from perceiving Labor as being Meretz 2 (based on this it will also be interesting to see how Meretz will perform in the election).

Since you have closely followed the election process and are as fascinated by it as I am it would be really interesting to hear from you what you predict the election outcome would be?

My prediction would be that Kadima will eventually surpass Likud, while both together will end up threatening the 60-seat threshold of absolute majority (probably Kadima will get around 30 seats and Likud around 25): Livni will be Prime Minister, Mofaz Defense Minister and Netanyahu Foreign Minister. Besides basing this prediction on the aforementioned calculation of dissatisfied Kadima voters, I think that Mofaz is generally seen by the majority of the Israeli electorate as the best Defense Minister and Netanyahu as the best Foreign Minister – not least because of his English proficiency. Probably Kadima will add Labor to the coalition to function as a counter-weight to Likud, whereas Yisrael Beitenu will probably be left outside the government. Of course, this is just a mere guess based on my perception of the Israeli electorate’s preferences and calculations.

February 8, 2009

Ilyas M. Mohsin, PPP, Platinum Contributor (296)

I'm for a just peace between Israel and palestine on the basis of a 2-state solution minus the real estate grabbing against the poor Palestinians. They are being killed by thousands just because they have no weapons like their adversaries who are occupying Palestine since 1967, thanks to the land-lust of the former backed by the likes of George W. Let us stop the bloodshed on either side though only Palestinians seem to be dying / getting maimed/ going hungry for the time being duly abetted by the neighboring regimes. This appears to be so to facilitate the political-gambling in Israel. Sad and inhuman.

February 8, 2009

Member deleted

Dear Ilyas, Dear Andrew,

there will be no stop to the bloodshed as long as the settlements are not dismanteled, Golan is not handed to the Syrians and Israel stops to percept the use of water rushing from Lebanon to Israel as a "casus belli".

And given the case Netanjahu wins the election he will lead his country towards more military conflicts, accelerate the settlement construction by their "natural growth" and maybe lead Israeli soldiers into a major bloodshed in Gaza.

We must not forget that the US intervened Israel trying to bomb Hamas targets located in Palestinian refugee camps within Syria. Dick Chaney underlined that the Israeli governement did't inform the US about their plans in Gaza at all.

Let us not forget the fact that US control over Israeli politics soars as a function of right wing dominance in the Knesset.

I agree to Mr. Peteks projection, in Germany we would call it a Grand Koalition. This coalition will be able to bring prograss to the Syrian track, but if the Palestinians loose their support by the Syrian governement they would fall into the hands of Iran.

Al long Iran has a stong arm among Palestinian politicians the huddles masses in the West Bank and Gaza will choose armed resistance that will be followed by major Israeli operations.

In the end we will have to percept the "two-state solution" as dead?

I think the US Administration anticipated this developement by choosing Mr. Mitchell, who is well known for the "Good Friday" agreement, but sending the man for the "two-state" solution - who solved the crisis in Balkan - in order to solve the Pakestan/Afghanistan/India conflict.

February 8, 2009

Andrew Christian Emery, University of Birmingham, Silver Contributor (26)

Dear Mr Petek,

I think we agree in many key regards. I think you offer a nuanced analysis- but one that perhaps limited by the extreme conjecture required to sustain it. The extent to which Kadima voters polled for Likud is incredibly difficult to determine- identifying their 'tactical' objectives for doing so even harder. The extent to which these tactical voters now believe they have made their point and will now return to Kadima for fear of Israeli politics shifting too far right..again a very problematic dynamic. Actually calculating these groups into thirds and so on is something that I cannot personally comment on. It's not that I discount the basic premise of your argument- I just find it impossible to use it to make any predictions.

My analysis is perhaps simpler- but I admit also far from definitive. I think Livni and Barak hoped this war would improve their electoral prospects. It has but perhaps for different, or supplementary, reasons than they believed. What has actually happened is that the conflict in Gaza provoked, or further encouraged, a movement to the right in the Israeli political environment. This has resulted in one clearly apparent benefit- splitting the right wing vote between Likud and Yisrael Beitenu.

A less clear benefit, at this stage, is the extent to which the rise of Lieberman can provoke a backlash amongst the center and left who will mobilise in greater numbers in support for Kadima- in order to prevent a Likud/Lieberman bloc. Certainly this prospect would mobilise Arab-Israelis.

On the other hand, and as unlikely as it may seem, there has been some talk of a potential Livni-Lieberman alliance. See http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1061368.html

Again, I am much more of a fascinated observer than a specialist in Israeli politics. There are so many variables, and such a large undecided vote, that nobody has been willing to form an accurate prediction. There is so much uncertainty- for example the police probe surrounding Lieberman, which could potentially lead to him being kicked out of any coalition in 5-6 months (to quote Motti Gilat).

My personal prediction, for what it's worth, is not that far from yours. However, I think that Netanyahu will still be the next PM, Livni foreign minister and there will be a 'no Lieberman' coalition with Labor, Likud and Kadima. Guess work really...

I think that maybe the only way for Livni to be next PM would be for her to form a coalition with Lieberman and Barak. I see this as less likely.

A very possible result would be totally chaos- in which no effective coalition could be formed.

Dear Sammir,

Forgive me if I stick to the specifics of the Israeli elections and not engage with the wider dynamics of the 'two state solution' and the much wider geo-political and historical issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. That, to me, requires an entirely different, and much more ambitious (and often acrimonious) debate. Suffice to say, I very much hope the prospect of a two state solution is not ‘dead’.

February 9, 2009

Catherine Keight

Very insightful and honest article.

February 9, 2009

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

Dear Mr. Emery,

Thank you for your prediction. It will indeed be interesting to see whether Likud or Kadima will eventually end up getting the most seats.

Since your article discusses the effects of operation “Cast Lead“ on the Israeli election, I think it is also interesting to see how the aftermath of that very operation, that is, the current accelerated negotiation about a truce between Israel and Hamas and about the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit will affect the election. In my view negotiating a truce will harm Kadima and strengthen Likud as it implies that operation “Cast Lead” did not “change the equation” and thus gives Kadima a weak image as opposed to Likud’s traditional strong image, whereas an agreement on the release of Gilad Shalit could indeed boost Kadima if the electorate sees the price to be paid as bearable.

Concerning the causes for the surge of Yisrael Beitenu we discussed I found today an insightful article of Ali Zahalka named “We got what we deserved”, in which he argues that the radicalism of the Israeli-Arab parties and leadership have led to a boost for Yisrael Beitenu and therefore encourages his Israeli-Arab fellows not to vote for those radical Israeli-Arab parties but for moderate ones:

www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3668921,00.html />

February 9, 2009

Member deleted

I think we must not percept the domestic Israeli - Arab rift as a short them momentum as Al-Jazeera elaborated:

http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/israelvotes/2009/02/200929135652...

February 10, 2009

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

While I agree that Israeli Jews have been suspect of the Israeli Arabs’ loyalty to the state of Israel for a long time – as opposed to the loyalty of other minorities like the Druze –, I think that Mr. Zahalka is right when he sees that suspicion gaining momentum in this Israeli election. And he rightly sees as cause for this two major incidents when Israel was at war with its enemies, both belonging to the radical axis – Hezbollah and Hamas. The first was Bishara, an Israeli-Arab Member of Knesset, who was accused of passing secret information to Hezbollah during the war and immediately afterwards fled the country:

“If we, citizens of the State of Israel, which has a Jewish majority, connect to the worst enemies of the State, why are we surprised that this is what we get?”

“The Arab-Israeli leadership won’t connect, heaven forbid, to the moderate Arab elements such as Egypt, Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Authority, or Jordan. These are of no interest to it. We saw Azmi Bishara, who left, and we saw where he went to.”

The second incident was the Israeli-Arab reaction to operation “Cast Lead”, which was unanimously supported by Israeli Jews (Meretz included):

“The Arab-Israeli leadership is increasing pushing us into anti-Israel radicalism. This extremism climaxed with the “Death to the Jews” chants during Operation Cast Lead. Here is what I have to say to those leaders: Look at what you’ve done.“

“We did not cry out in the face of rocket attacks on southern residents that went on for years. We did not cry out in the face of the suffering of our brethren, Gaza residents, who have been brutally repressed by Hamas. Yet we cried out, of all things, in the face of an onslaught against the most radical element in the Arab world.”

February 10, 2009

Member deleted

But putting it to a nutshell I would support the thesis that Israel is developing into a aparthy state, don't they?

- Increasing rift between Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli population.
- lack of integration of minorities.
- accelerating settlement construction in the West Bank thus making the Palestinians
defacto Israeli citizens.
- Increasing popularity among far right groups
- The fact that one out of four cars in Israel has a buttom writing "All Arabs Out!!"

Livni stated Israeli- Arabs should move to the West Bank, Liebermann stated he would take their citizenship, Netanjahu supports Libermann. There is only a weak Labour left that offers to digg a tunnel between the two Palestinian pre 67 territory.

March 24, 2009

Christia Flourentzou, Cyprus Embassy Berlin, Silver Contributor (67)

I have been following the discussion with great interest and I think that some of the comments make insightful contributions. I am not an expert on Israeli politics and I found your analysis very interesting in terms of predictions on the election outcome, potential coalitions and voting trends.

Now that the election is done, it would be interesting to continue the debate to see how the election outcome -and the coalition government to be formed by April 3- will impact peace prospects in the region.