Ahmed Rashid, acclaimed author and Central Asia expert, warns that NATO is currently losing the war in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons: the Taliban have become a regional phenomenon; there has been an explosion in Taliban recruitment from multiple countries; the tactics of the Taliban have become more extreme; civilian agencies have become paralyzed; and drugs run rampant due to lack of agricultural investment.
Western strategy is ineffective, and transatlantic allies must change course. Mr. Rashid emphasizes that the solution to the crisis in Afghanistan needs to incorporate local actors. Along with India and the countries of Central Asia, Iran must play a critical role in any solution. Therefore, the United States cannot continue to exclude and ignore Iran: both countries need to talk, despite America's qualms to do so.
Watch our exclusive interview below with Ahmed Rashid emphasizing his critical remarks made during his keynote speech and the panel discussion at the Heinrich Böll Foundation's conference "Values and Interests in Foreign Policy." (4:23min)
Germany must deploy more troops to Afghanistan. However, these troops will be ineffective if they are not allowed to operate more forcefully. Sending more troops to Afghanistan who are restricted by present national caveats would be a waste.
Germany doesn't need to fight in southern Afghanistan, but must do much more in the North: stopping drug convoys, fighting the Taliban, strengthening local authorities, preventing crime, and mediating between local powers.
While an extended mandate could incite antagonistic public sentiment within Germany, Mr. Rashid advises the German government to do more to educate its citizenry about the importance of military involvement and what is at stake in Afghanistan.
Watch excerpts below from Ahmed Rashid’s keynote speech regarding Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan. (5:00min)
Ahmed Rashid is a journalist based in Lahore and author of several books, including New York Times bestseller, "Taliban" and his latest book, "Descent Into Chaos."
David Neil Lebhar holds a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from Davidson College and is currently an editorial intern at atlantic-community.org.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Djörn Eversteijn: NATO and the Forgotten War
- Bernhard Lucke: It is Time to Withdraw from Afghanistan
- Reidar Visser: Obama and Biden: No Fundamental Change on Iraq Policy




October 10, 2008
John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (319)
But Mr. Rashid fails to address the critical question -- what do we (the West, NATO, Germany, US) have than the Iranians want? What do we have that they want, enough to give up either a nuclear bomb, or stop making trouble in Afghanistan, or both? Mr. Rashid does not answer this directly. Is he suggesting that merely making Iran a member in the various fora and institutions he mentions, is enough incentive for Iran? This is what he seems to be saying.
If so, he leaves out several important points.
First, US-Iranian dialog was going nowhere, until it became clear that the surge in Iraq was succeeding. We need similar progress in Afghanistan before engaging in dialog with the Iranians on that front. If Germany, the US, and indeed the rest of NATO could agree to implement a surge in Afghanistan (including vitally necessary reforms to the ISAF command structure and the end of most national caveats), in return for a US guarantee of future dialog with Iran on the topic of Iraq, that might make sense.
But I think Mr. Rashid is proposing simultaneous initiatives, which seem to me more likely to fail or be misinterpreted by Iran as a sign of weakness. Dialog can be a sign of strength, but it is hard to see how under the current circumstances, absent a successful Afghanistan surge. Still, if simultaneous dialog is the price to be paid to get Germany out of the barracks and engaged in Afghan the way Mr. Rashid clearly understands is needed, it might be worth it.
Second, when Iran and the US engaged somewhat on Iraq, Iran at the same time increased its misbehavior in other places, particularly Lebanon and Afghanistan. This shows that Iran still believes it gets equal, if not more, benefit from having the West as an enemy, than as a friend. It is negotiating re Iraq as a temporary tactic in support of a utopian (if not apocalyptic) "national greatness" strategy that is unaltered. Iran doesn't want to be invited to join the community of nations; it wants the community of nations to join Iran.
So we are back to the original question: What do we have to give, that will make Iran value us more as friends than as enemies? I don't know the answer; it seems to me we have plenty to give, but none of it of interest to the Iranians until they make a strategic decision to alter their current strategy. Mr. Rashid seems to think dialog alone is enough. But what do we say, that we haven't already said many times before?