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Before Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, most Western powers adhered to three fundamental strategies when dealing with the group:

• Meet with non-Hamas members of the Hamas-led National Unity Government, but not with members of Hamas. Each meeting would start and end with a firm demand that Hamas agree to the Quartet’s three basic principles:

1. Renunciation of terrorism and political violence
2. Respect for past agreements negotiated between the PA and Israel
3. Recognition of Israel

• Work to find effective and transparent means to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in such a way that it does not go through or benefit Hamas. Key to this effort was the quest to replace the EU’s Temporary International Mechanism (TIM), which has been extended to the point that there is little temporary about it.
• Press upon Fatah the need to undergo critical reform to effectively compete with Hamas. It is largely true that Fatah lost the January 2006 election more than Hamas won it, yet Fatah strongmen have strenuously resisted efforts to reform the party. Today’s Fatah is still riddled with corruption and is now also tied to terrorism through the affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

Now that Hamas has conquered Gaza and President Abbas has dissolved the Hamas-led government, these strategies must be revisited. Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the critical questions today are a mere variation of those we faced before:

• How to press Fatah to reform, when its heavyweights may believe that reform is no longer necessary, since Fatah is the only viable alternative to Hamas?
• How can the international community prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza (and, to a much lesser extent, the West Bank) and provide aid while keeping it from Hamas?
• Should the international community engage Hamas, recognizing that the group will continue to be a major player in the Palestinian arena? Or should Western governments shun the movement as long as it attempts to establish an Islamist Palestinian state through terrorism and political violence?

The West made a critical mistake when it welcomed Hamas to participate in democratic elections without demanding that it adhere to democratic principles. The electoral laws in most Western European countries would have barred Hamas, an extremist party, from running for political office. There are two things that can be done right now to prevent Hamas from smuggling material across the Egyptian border or transferring unlimited funds through its social service network.

First, Egypt must effectively police its border – above and below ground – with Gaza. Cairo has sidelined Hamas diplomatically and announced its opposition to the emergence of “Islamic Warlords” in Gaza. It needs to follow up on this rhetoric with a serious border patrol initiative, focused primarily on the eight mile long border with Gaza but not ignoring the much longer border with Israel between the Sinai and Negev deserts. Smugglers use this longer border to move weapons into the West Bank.

Second, while the US and EU have both designated all of Hamas – including its political and charitable wings – as a terrorist entity, neither has listed the many Hamas-controlled entities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through which the movement traditionally receives funds raised in the Gulf, the US and Europe. Designating these Hamas-controlled charities, think tanks and societies as terrorist groups would prompt international banks to block such transactions. Recognizing this, President Abbas already ordered all private associations to apply for new permits in an effort to “dry up” Hamas funding. As long as its political and social wings are allowed to operate unhindered, Hamas will be able to fully fund all of its activities, including the militia and terrorist cells now carrying out attacks against Israelis and Palestinians alike.


Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at The Washington Institute. Previously, he served as deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department and is the author of Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad .


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