Ukraine's political system prescribes new presidential elections in January 2010, when a new standoff between Ukraine and Russia concerning gas deliveries and payments is likely to occur. In fact, given Ukraine's current financial difficulties, Russia may regard it politically opportune as well as domestically and internationally justifiable to cut gas deliveries to Ukraine before January 2010.
Polling data shows that anti-Ukrainian sentiment is growing in
Russia's population as a result of the daily xenophobic brainwashing by the
Kremlin-directed propaganda machine. As a hard line against Kiev becomes
increasingly popular among ordinary Russians, the Moscow leadership may
conclude that cutting gas deliveries to Ukraine would kill two birds with one
stone: it would divert attention from its own omissions in reforming Russia's
post-Soviet state and economy, and it would cause serious trouble for Kiev's
Orange government, in domestic affairs and foreign relations.
As Ukraine's economic, social and political crisis sharpens, more and more
Ukrainians may question the wisdom of conducting a costly presidential election
when the Ukrainian state is almost bankrupt - if not on the brink of collapse.
After all, Ukraine does have a legitimate legislature as well as a more or less
operational government. In the increasingly difficult situation that Ukraine
awaits during the coming months, the election of a second ruler appears to be a
luxury. Moreover, by participation in these elections, Ukrainians would
legitimize the semi-presidential system that is obviously unsuitable for
Ukraine - as has been manifestly demonstrated by the agonizing intra-executive
conflicts, during the last years.
Not only is the current Ukrainian dual power system deficient, but
semi-presidential systems, at least in transition countries, are generally a
bad choice, if one believes the results of comparative research into this
political system. In 2008, the Irish government professor Robert Elgie and
American political researcher Sophia Moestrup published the collected volume
"Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe." This book
contains research papers by leading specialists on post-Soviet institutional
design and performance in Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The study confirms
previous scholarly work that has indicated concerns about the political system
that Ukraine inherited when it acquired independence in 1991. Elgie and
Moestrup show once more that the impact of semi-presidentialism on the
transition to, and consolidation of, democracy is negative or at least
unhelpful. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, this concerns both highly
presidentialized semi-presidentialism, like Ukraine had until 2005, and
balanced presidential-prime ministerial semi-presidentialism, like Ukraine has
had since 2006. The scholars conclude that, "if democracy is fragile, then
semi-presidentialism of any form is probably best avoided."
With presidential elections scheduled for January 17, 2010, Ukraine is about
to reproduce a political system that will be detrimental to its interests,
especially considering the possibly grave domestic repercussions of the world
financial crisis and Moscow's continuously growing imperial appetite. In the
unlikely best-case scenario that the latter issues do not become salient,
Ukraine will still be losing if it decides to go ahead with the 2010
presidential elections.
Recent rumours in Kiev are indicating that at least a part of the Ukrainian
political elite seems to be interested in serious institutional reform. From
late May to early June 2009, secret negotiations were conducted between
Tymoshenko's Bloc and Viktor Yanukovych's opposition Party of Regions about the
formation of a coalition to change the constitution, create a parliamentary
republic, and cancel next year's presidential elections. While these changes
would not have solved Ukraine's two major headaches - payment for gas
deliveries and Kremlin hostility - they would have calmed down political
bickering in Kiev and stabilized the Ukrainian government. However, Yanukovich
decided to leave the negotiation table. As of today, the presidential elections
will thus continue as prescribed under the current Constitution.
Dr. Andreas Umland teaches at the Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Upper Bavaria and is a member of the Atlantic Community. He edits the book series "Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society" and compiles the biweekly Russian Nationalism Bulletin.
Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Andrey Chubyk: European Energy Security Requires Transparency
- Janusz Bugajski: Pragmatic Russians Seek to Exert Influenc
- Fabian Martin Lieschke: How to Extend NATO's MAP to Ukraine and Georgia



July 25, 2009
Kazim
Can you give one example, in the last 30 years, when Russia cut off, or threatened to cut off, gas deliveries to anyone? (anyone who pays for gas). I mean Russia itself, not when a transit country refused to transit gas making Russia impotent.
One example, please.