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November 20, 2008

Kiriti Rambhatla, Six Telecoms Company Limited, (10)

I would personally not take sides in the debate of whether Taliban is an extremist group or an insurgent organization. However, from my understanding, 85% of the people that write articles about these have read about taliban or have collected information from third party sources.

Thus, people who actually visit Afghanistan ( and not under the influence of any media) would probably be the best people to comment on such issues. Again, how many people would like to visit Afghanistan to know the actual scene? It is much easier for someone to believe the information through various media sources.

The situation reminds me of how certain African nations are termed the poorest in the world. This would portray the image of an economy that is not self sufficient. Not until someone like me spots a Ferrari being driven on the roads of Dar es salaam ,an East African city.

Makes me wonder what is it like really in Afghanistan. Is it what i see in the media or is the story something else ? Probably a commom man in Afghanistan can give us the right answer to this question.

My 2 cents

November 22, 2008

Marie Claude

The Taliban: is it a terrorist organization or an insurgency movement?

terrorist

sources : Iran as sponsoring any group that wants to harm the westernies

the afghani population is taken as hostage of an externe conflict

November 23, 2008

Member deleted

It is always interesting to face such issues. like the good old days of withdrawal of colonial powers immediately preceding and immediately follwoing the Second World War. It had resulted in some hasty boundaries being drawn alongwith the introduction of the idea of the modern state in many of the erstwhile colonies.
That new idea alongwith certain debates over ethnicity and nationalism led one section to come up with the classical argument of "One man's freedom Fighter being another man's(or/and Woman's) terrorist. Between terrorism and insurgency, what are the markers of difference that can be usefully employed? A marker of such notions immediately enjoins a certain legitimacy to insurgency vis-a-vis terrorism, though it again begs the very notion of legitimacy and brings forth the issues of successful and failed states, alongwith the notion introduced by Prof. Cohen of 'flailing' states.
However states also enjoin a certain territorial as well as an ideational locality that pan-national movements (globalization has this other spin-off) do not have, without putting their support groups in other states as 'suspect citizens' in those states where they are based - by the same logic of allegiance and 'patriotism' or 'nationalism'.
One of the basic conditions of politics (in fact its raison d’être) is the eschewing of direct violence, at the worst and the eschewing of even indirect violence (within well determined parameters of Human Rights encapsulated with the the Right to Life with dignity and with the freedom of the individual to decide what that means).
Between successful states - in maintaining the absence of direct as well as indirect violence within its territories except as the notion of the Weberian State enjoins - to ensure the condition of that freedom to its populace, and faliling states and failed states - the notion of terrorism and insurgency may get blurred in the flailing and the failed states. But pan-national movements as armed ideological struggles - again beg for a clear denunciation of the parameters of a particular ideology and its political or a-political nature - and the reasons why it needs to take up arms.
Here we get into serious academia and serious debates and the calls for pragmatic discussions - two very political means and methods of conflict-resolution as well as its management. The notion of politics enjoins both direct and indirect violence and its eschewance, with very clear roles and lines of demarcation for individual freedom and state intervention. But yes, as an argument against terrorism goes - it is anti-political, in the educated sense. But then again between the various degrees of successful and flailing and failed states - and the global nature of pan-national as well as pan-ideological movements based upon religious overtones that can have expressly stated religious purposes - how and where would we put it? The modern and post-modern usage of classificatory schemes over politics and society and the state or the pre-modern experiences that never knew the idea of the modern and more so the post-modern state, while it seeks to justify itself using their parameters.
Let us first look at what it is that groups like the al-quaeda seek to oppose, in their pan-national movements - of which the al-quaeda is merely one expression that is more visible. That is the danger here. Where particular ideological movements like the neo-marxists etc. fail to recognize - of the emaning of politics and the meaning that lies in the question whether the al-quaeda is a terrorist organization or an insurgent group! Third world states and locations, like India and South Asia, often betrays a certain density of comprehension - including of its elites, when such questions are thrown up.

November 23, 2008

Benjamin Stappenbeck, Student, (3)

During the debate for the renewal of the mandate for the Bundeswehr to continue its engagement in Afghanistan, calls have been made to finally stop the fighting and integrate all the concerned parties to come up with a general conclusion. It is a desirable claim to bring peace to a society which has been caught in the maelstrom of violence for over two decades since the invasion of Soviet troops in 1979. Nevertheless the Taliban are not a political opposition party or freedom fighters, which is a rather cynical euphemism. They deploy means of violence and terrorize the native population. For the Taliban the famous reasoning by Mao Tse-Tung which applies for insurgencies no longer holds true. Mao Tse-Tung saw the goal of an effective insurgency to work like a fish in water. Like a fish in the water, the insurgents are dependent on the support of the population, to operate smoothly and be invisible to foreign troops.

The Taliban instead take advantage of an absence of a state monopoly of force that should provide security throughout the country. Thus Afghan people often have no choice but to support Taliban fighters: “They come in groups of five or twenty. They ask for food, but you can’t refuse. You can’t argue with men with guns.” (Rotberg, Robert, 2007: Building a new Afghanistan, Brookings Institute).

The Taliban and their strict interpretation of the sharia law have never represented a major consensus in Afghanistan. On the contrary the current constitution of Afghanistan stresses the equality of man and woman ( art. 22 section 2 ) and even stipulates quotas for women to be represented in the legislative chambers (art. 83; 84). It is important to notice that the Afghan constitution is not the product of an imposed “Westernization” of the country. Instead the constitution has been developed and approved by a “loya jirga” which declared the constitution to enter into force in January 2004.

Surely the Taliban in Afghanistan evoke pictures and rely on a language which simultaneously builds on the frustration and the religious pride of Muslims. Still, for the reasons stated above, I am not convinced that the Taliban movement in Afghanistan enjoys the extraordinary popular support it is said to have. Statistical support for this thesis can be drawn from a nation-wide survey conducted by the BBC, ABC News and the German ARD in 2007. According to this survey, the vast majority of people perceive the Taliban to be the greatest threat to their security, not foreign troops.

The Taliban are a terrorist organization solely interested in gaining power and spreading their sphere of influence. Reckless means of violence serve them as the main tool to achieve this goal.
Any kind of acceptance of Taliban leaders to some kind of negotiations should always bear this in mind

November 24, 2008

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (167)

The very question whether the Taliban are Terrorists or Insurgents is somehow misleading: terror is a tactic that was generally employed by insurgencies (and the Afghan Insurgents are for sure insurgents).
The designation 'terrorist' is in my opinion not useful in itself - while it indicates that the concerned group is using violence, it mainly demonstrates the dislike of the one who uses the designation. It is no substitute for a sound understanding of the situation and a realistic view of one's own interests, possibilities and limitations.
The Afghan Mujahiddin in the 80s used violence - often against civilians - and of course terrorizing people into compliance was part of their tactics. Still, not only from my point of view, backing them was in the best interest of the west and for sure, their enemies were far from moral superior. The question was not, whether the Mujahiddin as a whole (consisting of a multiude of different groups, commanders and sub-commanders) were terrorists or insurgents (or freedom-fighters) but whether backing them was in the interest of the west and - equally important - whether backing of a certain type would more likely advance or hamper their cause.

Our policies towards the Afghan Insurgents (also consisting of a multiude of different groups, commanders and sub-commanders) should be shaped by the same underlying questions: Is fighting against them in our interest? And if yes - will the methods we employ likely weaken or strengthen them?

Of course it would be desirable if the public at home embraced the Afghan mission more enthusiasticly - consistently branding the Afghan Insurgents as Terrorists might help. But our main problem in Afghanistan seems not the crumbling support at home, but our lack of understanding of the ongoing conflict (we are from alone in this, history suggests that counterinsurgents are always prone to gravely missconceive the nature of their enemies). This seems to apply not only to the media and the public but also to our military, academic and poltical elites. Branding the 'Taliban' as terrorists will likely only reinforce our existing perceptions and contribute to a vicious cycle of self-deception: when the Taliban are Terrorists, then they are 'evil', then there are only two sides, then we can count on our allies and have a fixed number of opponents.
But the afghan insurgency is a highly dynamic environment with fluent alliances and changing loyalties. As it seems, the presence of the foreign forces is a major factor in motivating fighters and commanders against the government, but it is for sure not the only one (as made clear by commanders changing from an alliance with the government towards the Insurgents and vice versa). We have to work towards understanding the dynamics of the Insurgency; branding the 'Taliban' may be of minor importance.

December 2, 2008

John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (319)

The question (terrorist or insurgent) is vitally important to understanding how to defeat or co-opt the Taliban.

In the past, however, this question became a proxy for the question of, are the Taliban "legitimate" resisters of foreign occupation, and by extended proxy, shouldn't right-minded people acknowledge this legitimacy and oppose the war, no matter how oppressive or brutal the Taliban are?

The answer is, the Taliban are to al-Qaeda as a safe harbor is to pirates at sea. If that safe harbor enjoys the protection of a sovereign nation, it is permitted, under most interpretations of the Just War doctrine, to attack the host nation in order to prevent it from giving safe harbor to the pirates. Of course, the host nation must be given a suitable chance to cooperate against the pirates. In regards to the Taliban, this was done prior to the 2003 invasion of Afghanistan. See http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ about 1/3 of the way down.

Some will point out that laws of war regarding piracy only apply to piracy at sea; that may be so, but I strongly suspect that the laws of war have similar provisions for pirate-like acts on land. Even if they don't have specific provisions, the laws regarding piracy were derived from general principles, which form the basis for war against the Taliban under the Just War doctrine.

Others may point out that other nations, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and even Germany were also used by al-Qaeda to launch their attack; why aren't we at war with these countries as well? In response, the Just War doctrine lays out principles under which war may be permitted; violation of those principles does not automatically cause a state of war to exist. Here the question of cooperation what makes all the difference. Did these countries take reasonable measures within to prevent al Qaeda from using their sovereign territory as safe harbor, once the danger became well known? Obviously, Germany did; for the others, there is a great deal of debate, nevertheless, in the judgment of NATO, options other than war made more sense for these other countries.

To many this may seem off-topic and indeed, ancient history. But it is helpful from time to time to review these matters. Also, for a long time the question (insurgent or not) was a sort of political code or shorthand for the question, was the war justified.

December 2, 2008

John Hadjisky, Blogger, Platinum Contributor (319)

Oops..."the 2003 invasion of Afghanistan" should read "the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan"