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On its face, the question seems absurd. The French President has called for Paris' return into the integrated command structure of the Atlantic Alliance, and Sarkozy shares with his counterparts across the Atlantic a common assessment of the threats emerging from the so-called "arc of crisis", including the challenge posed by Islamist terrorism to Western security. Sarkozy seems determined to challenge the two most commonly-held stereotypes of France in Washington: that Paris is content to be a "free-rider" allowing the United States to bear most of the burdens for ensuring the peace and prosperity of the Atlantic Community, and that France seeks to be a "spoiler", constantly looking for ways to assert its independence vis-à-vis Washington by "cozying up" to America's opponents and rivals.

But while many here in Washington have welcomed the rhetorical shift, the ramifications of a closer Franco-American partnership in the service of renovating the trans-Atlantic relationship don't appear to have been thought through. It was easier to dismiss French (and by extension, continental European) concerns when Americans thought that France did not share American goals and aspirations.

What happens, however, when you have a French president who proclaims his solidarity with the United States and puts forward new international initiatives not in order to oppose the United States but to, in his opinion, enhance the security of the Western world?

Take Sarkozy's stance on NATO. What does it mean, for instance, when Sarkozy advocates a full return of France to NATO but his defense "White Paper" maintains that Paris should retain both "full freedom of assessment" and "permanent freedom of decision"? This doesn't sound like a formula for automatic acquiescence to the US position. It so happens that at present there is a convergence in perspectives between Washington and Paris on the challenge posed by Iran's efforts to pursue its nuclear program as well as the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missiles-but there is no guarantee that this will continue or that the Franco-American symmetry on this issue will extend to other matters.

Indeed, I detect a certain degree of concern here with Sarkozy's willingness to pursue his own course of action, whether in terms of how the Euro-Atlantic community should deal with a resurgent Russia or his efforts on behalf of promoting peace and prosperity in the greater Mediterranean region. Indeed, the reaction from the State Department when asked to comment on the "Union of the Mediterranean" summit this past Monday is quite telling: "We don't have an observer there. We don't have a place at the table. But I think generally, it's an effort that we can, at the least, be supportive of." Not exactly a ringing endorsement.

Some have argued that Sarkozy's preference for using economic engagement to try and affect the behavior of states, rather than relying on sanctions to change regimes marks a major point of divergence with both Republicans and Democrats here, especially when it comes to the Middle East. His willingness to welcome Libyan leader Muamar Qaddafi and Syrian president Bashar Asad raised eyebrows here-especially when it seemed that Paris prefers to move ahead with concrete projects dealing with energy and the environment instead of pressing harder for domestic political reforms.

But I am concerned about a more fundamental problem-the willingness of Washington to share power in a more equal fashion with its European partners. Sarkozy is often invoked by both US presidential candidates as an example of the multilateralism they hope to restore to American foreign policy-a key partner for US efforts. But the real test is whether a McCain or Obama administration would be as prepared to sign off or support a major Sarkozy initiative that was not "made in the USA" or where the United States did not have a "seat at the table"-as in the case of the Mediterranean effort.

In the past several years, we have assumed tensions in the trans-Atlantic relationship occurred because of divergence. What happens, however, if we are unable to define the terms of cooperation?

How Nicolas Sarkozy engages with his new American counterpart may become a key litmus test.

Nikolas Gvosdev, the outgoing editor of The National Interest, is joining the faculty of the US Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

• Transatlantic Press Round-up: France Adopts a Multilateral Defense Policy
• Gaelle Fisher: Sarkozy l' Américain?
• Pierre Drai: Drawing-up a Balance Sheet for Europe