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For a moment, developments inside Iran have overshadowed questions of foreign policy. When trying to grasp how foreign policy is influenced by the domestic unrest, we must remember that two different levels of conflict exist: in addition to outrage and frustration on the streets and rooftops, behind the curtains of power another - but probably more decisive - power-struggle takes place.

While many ordinary protesters would shed no tears if the system of the Islamic Republic to fall, the case is different for the struggle behind the scenes. Loyalty to the idea of velayat-e faghih (the guidance of the clergy in political affairs) is, of course, an inevitable requirement for taking part in the political game, but this time, key players opposing the leadership include some well-connected founding fathers of the system. The intra-regime power struggle can even be described as having started from a quarrel over how to save the achievements of the Islamic Revolution; although it has in some regard taken on a life of its own and many more issues are involved. But for the sake of a short article, let's stick to just this one question:

One faction, the "reformers," has argued for years, that the trust of the population in the system has to be won back - or at least the pressure has to be relieved. For them, societal liberalization coupled with economic growth is the path to be taken in order to save the Islamic Republic. While still overwhelmingly critical of the US, supportive of Hizbullah and Hamas and staunchly defensive of the nuclear program, this side tends to view relations with the West as an opportunity, at least in the economic sector.

The other faction, the "principalists," sees this as leading towards disaster. For them, giving in to the masses opens the door towards ever more concessions until little is left of the Islamic nature of the system. In the field of foreign policy, engagement with the West from this perspective opens the door to a creeping "cultural invasion." On the other hand, severely reducing all relations with the West would have the additional benefit of hurting the English-speaking middle classes involved in these relations, whom they despise. A realignment of economic and cultural ties, away from the West (which is now perhaps more popular than before the revolution among large parts of the population) towards the emerging markets of the third world might in the long run even lead to their own constituency replacing the "westoxicated" elites of northern Tehran.

Presuming the elections were rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad - a highly controversial figure even among fellow principalists - many observers speak of the possibility of a coup d'etat in favor of the most hard-line elements. However, more important decisions than the person of the president may arise in the near future. Rumors consistently emerge regarding the "crippling health" of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While the current rumors are little more than speculation, as a biological fact, Khamenei will die one day. His successor will have much more far-reaching competencies than the president. Khamenei's hardline son Mojtaba or the extremist Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi would surely be a worse outcome for the West. The committee responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader is currently headed by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, an arch-enemy of Ahmadinejad and a so-called "pragmatist." Were he to fall, the consequences for Iranian policy might be more grave than Ahmadinejad‘a second term in office.

In the end, there seems little the West can do in order to positively influence this power struggle - even less than it could do to support the protesters on the streets. But for the time being, what can be expected in the field of foreign policy? The faction that for now has the upper-hand is unlikely to be keen on an all-out grand bargain. The demonstrations and protests will likely even have reinforced this tendency. Sanctions, while at least annoying, are not a threat per se: cutting the economic ties with the West is a proclaimed goal of this faction, although they might wish to determine the timeframe themselves. Military options, as long as an all-out regime change is not on the table, are likely even less of a threat: in the life-time of Khamenei (who theologically forbade the development of WMD ex cathedra), no nuclear weapon could be easily produced or tested anyway. Getting a few installations bombed by the US or Israel, on the other hand, would likely increase the standing of the Islamic Republic in the region and - much more important - the regime in the population.

All in all, western options to influence Iran seem to be pretty limited for the time being. That is not to say, that no common ground or potential for deals on limited issues exist. But the most controversial points are unlikely to be solved in the medium run. Attempts to coerce Iran have always had the potential to worsen the situation, at least in tipping the balance of the interior power-struggles in favor of the more hard-line elements. While relations between the West and Iran have been bad for three decades there is still ample room for deterioration. Whichever path the West chooses, it must remember there is no silver bullet, no remote control for the "troublesome Persians." Every option needs a consistent approach over years and probably decades, and even then it will still be Iranians who ultimately decide their country's course.

Florian Broschk is a Lecturer of Islamic Studies at the University of Bonn, Germany. He has also served in Aghanistan as a Reserve Officer in the IASF and studied Islamic Studies, Political Science and International Law in Bonn and Tehran.

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