The conflict between Israel and Palestine is a long and bitter one. Atlantic Community members intensely debated both traditional and non-traditional solutions, such as one-state, two-state, three-state and even four-state options. Several policy recommendations have been recurrently emphasized as critical for making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the two-state solution is still the most likely to succeed and Egypt has a crucial role to play in initiating regional peace and security.
1. The one-state solution is no solution.
Sociological considerations suggest that long term ethnic hatred renders the one-state solution unsustainable (Campe). From the Israeli perspective, it is seen as the "Arab-state solution," which denies Israel's right to self-determination and exasperates anxieties that Palestinian citizenship would result in a vulnerable Jewish minority (Petek).
2. The two-state solution is the most promising despite past failures.
The near success of the Oslo Accords suggests that the two-state solution has potential for success if the "failed points" are reviewed and reformed (Lucke). This option promises both Palestinian recognition of Israel and self-determination for Palestine. Successful implementation will depend on dismantling Israeli settlements and withdrawing all Israeli presence from the West Bank and Gaza (Awwad). Ideally, a reformed peace plan should also make provisions to demilitarize the Jerusalem area (Cannon). Admittedly, there are problems with the two-state solution: In a world of failed states and terrorism, pessimists argue that divisions among Palestinians will turn any Palestinian state into the new Afghanistan (Petek). Furthermore, a Palestinian state would be dependent on Israel for economic development. However, despite these obstacles, the two state solution holds the benefit of addressing both the Israeli desire to preserve the Jewish state and the Palestinian desire to create a sovereign Palestine.
3. Egypt holds the keys to regional peace.
Israel's anxieties would be better allayed if a joint security architecture were achieved among regional players such as Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and even Syria (Lucke). Other members point out that cooperation among regional actors is uncertain. Jordan is concerned that adding the West Bank to its territory might lead to changing demographics (Lucke). Indeed, the outcome of the latest Arab League Summit confirmed the disunity which characterizes Arab states and revealed an unwillingness to take the initiative on Palestine. However, Egypt, as a 'neutral' Arab state, must play an influential role in the region (Matthews). President Mubarak is seen as a key figure in setting up a united strategy through which to address the Palestine question.
4. Israel: Isolate Hamas through negotiating with Syria.
Member opinions are deeply divided on negotiations with Hamas. Some conclude that Hamas must be invited to the negotiating table if peace negotiations are to ever "get off the ground" (Matthews). Indeed, despite the fact that Hamas was democratically elected in 2006, it is questionable whether negotiating with an actor who is committed to the destruction of Israel will produce fruitful results (Kilper). Successful political dialogue between Israel and Syria, whether public or behind the scenes, could simultaneously move Syria out of the "Iran camp" and break ties between Syria and Hamas, thereby marginalizing Hamas and furthering peace efforts in the region.
5. Real peace begins at the grassroots.
It is crucial to change the rhetoric and vision of Israeli politics. Israeli politicians should stop perpetuating security-driven policy rhetoric and throw more weight behind the peace movement. While the security agenda delivers unity and maintains the status quo, it makes little contribution to ending the conflict (Galaski). Furthermore, increased interaction at the grassroots level, although not a comprehensive peace solution, is a crucial first step towards setting aside religious fundamentalism and ethnic divisions (Campe). An example of such a policy would be to create exchange programs between Israeli and Palestinian schools.
Atlantic Memos showcase the best ideas and arguments from debates in the Open Think Tank on www.atlantic-community.org. Please take the next step and help us spread the word. You can download a PDF copy of this Atlantic Memo to distribute to your local or national decision-makers. The recommendations expressed above come from your Atlantic Community.
Written by Christia Flourentzou
- 7
April 21, 2009
Kristian Brakel
they assume that all players and esp. the ISR and PAL are interested in a stable peace agreement and that the best solution to fullfil all demands is that of two states
However this does not really reflect reality. Reality is that while the PAL side is under intense pressure by it's constituency to deliver something (either a peace treaty or at least a more organized armed resistance), ISR is not.
The situation as it is now: full controll over territory and resources with a neglectible loss of human life on the ISR side suits the ISR administration and is in the interest of most of the parties in the coalition. Risking this status quo for an unpredictable outcome would have a very high political cost at this time, that no politician sees reason to take.
As the ISR public has no reason to believe otherwise - the results of the Oslo process, the partly "withdrawel" from Gaza and relatively calm situation shape this impression -, the idea that peace could be build in this case from the grasroot up is initially flawed. Countless cooperation projects over the years have prooven that under the conditions of occupation and a power-bias on the side of ISR such endeavours will only lead to more domination not to full cooperation.
The only possibility to turn the wheel around in this case comes therefore not from the grasroots (at least not from the ones in the region, the ones in the US and the EU are more important) but top-down pressure on ISR is needed both from the EU and the US.
Only if the international community raises the price for ISR continued refusal to engage in a real compromise on the lines of 67 a two state solution might become reality.