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July 7, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Extraordinarily perceptive, particularly the thrird paragraph outlining Europe's dependency on an increasingly decoupled US.

"Europe, incapable of defending itself, could end up being a significantly less comfy place to live in."

Possibly, depending upon what Europe does about it. The US is decoupling from NATO with the ramp-up in Afghanistan, but I think many Americans are psychologically decoupling from NATO in another sense, partially in response to what can be seen as a European decoupling from NATO. Most of continental Europe radically disarmed after the end of the Cold War. As Herr Techau observes this made Europe MORE depent upon NATO. Or rather - more dependent upon the few member of NATO who did not as radically disarm. Effectively, the US, Canada, possibly the UK, and France among the older members of the alliance.

The Obama 'surge' in Afghanistan can be seen as a capitulation of a kind - by 'Americanizing' the war Obama seems to give up the idea that NATO can effectively respond to Afghanistan. I have one quibble with the phrasing: "leaving Europeans sidelined" is inaccurate. 'Europe' sidelined itself; the American 'surge' merely recognizes the fait accompli.

I deeply hope that Herr Techau is correct; that Europe can reform it's perceptions and committment in time to save the alliance, or to save itself failing that. I tend to doubt it. Not only do I doubt "Europe's" ability to see it's problems that clearly and solve them. I also tend to doubt US' willingness to cooperate to the degree envisioned. People in the US are tired of war, tired of defending territories thousands of miles from it's territory (like Europe), tired of 'Yankee go Home'. I am one Yankee who believes that going 'home' is a good idea.

Europeans said that very loudlly after 9/11 - even if they did not realize they were sending that message - that was what many heard.

July 8, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Greetings from New York, Jan, and thank you for this commentary.

In thinking about the new strategic concept, I am struck by the timing of President Obama's trip to Moscow and the need to 'reset' (to use Vice President Biden's choice of words in his metaphor) the strategic relationship with Russia.

If we consider the challenges to European security, the bilateral relationship between Washington and Moscow must be revisited with a focus on a few strategic priorities not a shopping list of goals. The reduction of nuclear arsenals in each country is a sound point of departure upon which to build a working relationship with profound implications for the peoples of the European continent.

I am inclined to agree with Robert Legvold's analysis in the current issue of Foreign Affairs. His article cites four dominant areas at the heart of a much-needed strategic dialogue: European security, the security particularly focused on the post-Soviet area as well as nuclear and energy security. Each of these areas is essential to a new strategic concept for NATO. As bilateral US-Russia relations evolve, Mr. Solana is in a position to articulate key European security concerns.

How Europe defines the threats it faces should be a decisive factor in the US-Russia dialogue, particularly given the leverage Russia maintains in its immediate neighborhood. The politics of oil and gas are likely to dominate trilateral US-EU-Russia discussions. Mr. Putin's ambition for 'a new international legal framework for energy security' should be explored.

Fundamentally, NATO leaders must rethink the politics of enlargement and focus on a Alliance relationship with Russia that does not antagonize Moscow or divert its attention consistently to areas of global strategic importance. Iran has facilitated Russia's increasing involvement in the Persian Gulf. Russia is helping Iran with the construction of the as yet unfinished Bushehr nuclear reactor.

The Obama Administration has a historic opportunity to persuade in its approach to Moscow on missile defense in central Europe, particularly in terms of weighing the options regarding the pivotal role Russia can play. Moscow is the candidate to be a primary source for Iran of nuclear fuel and reprocessing or as the potential provider of a international fuel-service center with which Iran could partner to achieve its nuclear aspirations in ways that could be negotiated with the P5+1.

A new strategic concept for NATO must be presented to Europe's publics in terms of the issues that most threaten continental security as the US and Russia rethink their relationship. Europe, with France now fully integrated into NATO, must decide how to maximize the use of its assets as national leaders push for contributions that are in their own interests.

Is decoupling really an option for US policy in the current environment given bilateral security concerns with Russia and their implications for Europe? Or the development of a much-needed strategy vis-a-vis Iran?

Key strategic NATO allies, particularly Turkey, must be brought increasingly into an evolving security equation that concentrates our geo-economic, political and strategic focus on the intersection of competing interests in several distinct regions.

As you know, if the EU should decide on further enlargements to the south and east, Europe's Union will house those multiple regions inside its own internal space. In that eventuality, what strategic concept will NATO require?

All the best, Colette

July 8, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

What is it that NATO offers Europe?

I can see what it offers the US: Political cover for colonial wars in the Near East, and a framework for encircling Russia and extending the American sphere of influence in Central Asia. But none of those are compatible with Europe's legitimate strategic interests, and none are compatible with efforts to support political liberty and economic security for the majority of the people in the countries immediately concerned.

As for the issues that the article raises to justify NATO, they are, to put it bluntly, hogwash. Deconstructing them one by one:

Regarding Russia: Russia cannot win a serious shooting war against the European Union. The EU has a larger army, better equipment and a stronger heavy industry that can be retooled for war. Moreover, such a war would be geopolitical and economic suicide for Russia - recall that Yeltsin's small-scale colonial war in Chechnya almost bled the Russian army white. Russia knows this, and the government in the Kremlin is not particularly suicidal.

Of course, this is not peculiar to Russia - any serious shooting war between major powers using modern weapons (even purely conventional ones) can only end in defeat for all belligerents. This is the most obvious lesson from the wars of the 20th century.

Regarding the American nuclear umbrella: Europe has a perfectly fine independent nuclear strike capability. France is able to get payloads in the multi-digit kiloton range to any major city in our immediate neighbourhood. Access to the American nuclear arsenal will do little to improve our security: If a potential aggressor is not discouraged by a hundred kiloton, it is unlikely that he will be discouraged by a hundred megaton either.

Regarding Iran: The threat from Iran is wildly exaggerated. Iran poses no serious threat to European security or legitimate interests. The fact that American policy towards Iran appears to be hostile encirclement (take a look at a map of the immediate environs of Iran - Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Georgia all have heavy American presence) is not helping matters either. Frankly, given the heavy-handed way the US conducts policy in that area I cannot blame Tehran for pushing back with all the means at its disposal.

Regarding pirates: Pirates pose no threat to Europe that requires NATO intervention. Any European warship is perfectly capable of handling any bunch of pirates that ever set sail.

Regarding Palestine: At the moment, American policy in Palestine is a part of the problem, not a part of the solution. European (and humanitarian) interests would be better served by a disassociation between Europe and the current American stance on Palestinian policy.

And even if one supports the current American policy in Palestine, one would still need to justify using the NATO framework for implementing it. There are many other multilateral institutions (G20, the UN General Assembly, OECD, the Council of Europe, the World Bank, to name just a few) that have a broader and deeper institutional experience with economic development, peace negotiations, (successful) diplomacy, adherence to international law and the host of other competencies needed to resolve the Palestinian conflict.

Or, to put it a little more sharply: (Western) European and American strategic interests in the Atlantic area were largely coterminous while the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc still existed. They no longer are.

No, this is not anti-Americanism, this is the 21st century.

July 9, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"Is decoupling really an option for US policy in the current environment given bilateral security concerns with Russia and their implications for Europe? Or the development of a much-needed strategy vis-a-vis Iran?"

Dea Collette, In a word - yes. Decoupling is indeed an option. For the US, it's a very viable option.

We have been assured by Germans for almost 40 years now that the USSR/Russia is no threat, that Russians are instead proper partners for the West. Suppose that the Germans and the Left are actually on to something with that argument? Russia has not been much of a threat to Europe these past 50 years, have they?

Accepting that argument leaves no argument for US remaining in NATO at all. When NATO was formed there are two compelling reasons for the alliance.

1) The most important goal was to neutralize Germany militarily by fixing it into a security structure which dwarfed it. Behind that structure the important work of integrating Germany into the rest of Europe could be pursued without worry that Bismarkian Germany could be revived.

2) To protect a prostrated and impoverished Europe from the USSR. This was the public goal, but for political and face-saving reasons. I believe #1 was more important.

Goal #1 was fully accomplished no later than 1970 & probably much earlier than that. We've long been told that goal #2 has also been accomplished, and I think it's actually true. Russia may not have been reduced to a non-threat, but Europe is no longer prostrate and impoverished, is it? Europe should be capable of protecting itself from any possible Rusian military threat in any terms one can envision, whether it be national wealth, manpower, or technology. This endless fretting about Russian energy policies is amusing; the Red Army was a much more real threat.

NATO has been an alliance in search of a mission these past 20 years since the fall ofthe Berlin Wall. It has not succeeded in finding one? In 1999 I thought NATO was on it's way out, but the idea of NATO was still alive. Now - the idea is dead, buried in the plains of Afghanistan.

NATO won't die with a bang but rather with a whimper. It is the Holy Roman Empire of the present age; the walking dead.

And so US decoupling from NATO is not only a viable strategy, but is actually happening in front of our disbelieving eyes. With every US base which is closed in Europe, decoupling proceeds apace.

Or am I wrong?

July 9, 2009

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVP, Diamond Contributor (1092)

@Jakob

What is that NATO offers Europe?

When putting aside politically driven prejudicies, as seen in the preface to your comments, one should analyse point by point the military added-value that NATO brings to those European countries that can not afford a wide-ranging own security structure.
Regarding Russia: as the EU has no army yet (or I am seriously impaired in vision and hearing) and Russia has clear advantage in both conventional as well as MD weaponry against any European country and all of them combined, NATO offers the only reliable platform of deterrence and (less so, due to reduction of the US forces on the continent) reaction to an aggression on its mandate territory.
Regarding US nukes: in case of nuclear confrontation it's not only the sheer megaton-capability of some countries that matters but also the ability for those nuclear less-priviledged countries to get a deterrence they need. The B-61 in European depos under the NATO nuclear agreement is the only way to provide for this in a proliferation-weary world.
Regarding Iran: in case Iran gets long range missile and nuclear capability it is NATO that will have to provide Europe with a missile shield - and better for us all that there is a US installation nearby to use it. Whether it'll be agreed upon with Moscow or not.
Regarding piracy: NATO has not yet transformed for the needs of assymetric warfare and hence Somali pirates can play a cat and mouse with marine forces - but claiming that any European warship can do the job must be a joke. There are dozens of European warships - also in NATO operation - in the piracy areas and I have not seen many reports of pirate Zodiaks being sunk!!!
Regarding Palestine: European policy in the Middle East are also part of the problem and NATO is a stabilizing factor to both the US and Europe in the theatre. If those were to rival each other, as the Author seems to be suggesting, we could see 9/11 repeating sooner that we think.
The Soviet Bloc may not be existent now, but it does not mean Europe is a safe haven. Only months ago we felt close to repeating the worst Balkan scenarios in Moldova - and that pot is still boiling! A year ago we faced an outright military aggression by a significant world power just outside Europe's security area - and can we say it's over now? Are we better off with the US and NATO or without???
This is not blind Atlanticism. This is XXI Century.

July 9, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Dear Colleagues and Friends,

If we take the original premise of the NATO, 'to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down,' yes, some things have changed. Yet, the more things change, the more they stay the same. I do believe that there is still a need and a rationale to keep an American military presence in Europe, albeit with a shift to those geographical parts of the continent where conflicts still simmer and potentially boil over. Marek cited Moldova of late and there are other potential crisis spots in the Balkans geographical space where NATO assets could play a role.

The necessity to 'keep the Russians out' of Europe is what genuinely has changed. Russia is key to security on a unified continent. As Parag Khanna argues, Russia is likely to be more and more a substantial part of the European east, in geographical terms, than a central Asian power in the making. In terms of rising powers, Russia cannot compete economically with China or India. What sets Russia apart are its energy assets, which it tries to leverage to intimidate neighbors and to forge strategic alliances. Access to oil and gas resources are vital. The need to stop nuclear proliferation is pressing. Russia is positioned to be a net contributor to security defined in those terms. Alternatively, under an authoritarian regime, it can be a genuine problem for European security or, as importantly, a brake on potential solutions that require multilateral cooperation in broader transregional security cooperation.

NATO must define its relations with Russia so that Alliance assets can be deployed out-of-area, particularly in Afghanistan. It is important to assess, with the reintegration of France into NATO's integrated military command structure and the need to keep Turkey pro-actively engaged, what this will mean for overall European commitments as the new strategic concept is elaborated. I do agree that European countries must achieve their own internal consensus about maximizing individual country and collective group assets. The time has come for Europe to punch above its weight collectively in NATO.

It is interesting to note that right after 9/11, NATO members wanted to be of assistance in Afghanistan. The US decided otherwise. That, I believe, was an opportunity lost. The decision to reallocate resources to Iraq, and thereby take the military focus off of Afghanistan, was once again a US decision supported by the UK. The Alliance is still recovering from the diversion of assets since 2003. National armies are very slow to modernize and adapt their weapons systems once strategic reviews are initiated. I believe that the Bundeswehr is a case in point. It is not clear to me, frankly, the extent to which NATO serves a particular role in force modernization for the newer member states in central and eastern Europe.

I agree that to 'keep the Germans down' is not relevant presently. The Federal Republic is no longer the central problem of European security. The question now being raised about Germany is how it is part of the solution as a net contributor to European security, which NATO is still meant to guarantee. This security guarantee must extend today across the entire continent not simply the Western and Scandinavian spaces. Donald cited the views of the German Left, which is one segment albeit a significant one, in the German population. My point is that in an analysis of security for that particular country, given its place at the heart of the continent, it is essential to consider the entire spectrum of views.

Germany still confronts a mentality divide, east versus west, over a decade after national unification. As an export oriented country, Germany has to most to gain, and conversely, the most to lose, should instability spread from east to west. In the present environment, this is more likely to happen economically than militarily. The Balkans remain a troubled crossroads, however, whose recent history demonstrates why integration over time is necessary as a counter to the nationalist impulses in the political mainstream, particularly in Serbia. In the interim, NATO assets are still an anchor to provide the required stability to the center, east and south of the continent.

Why should American taxpayers bear this burden, if I understand Donald's analyses well, in the face of a persistent chorus of 'Yankee go home?' In the present context, I would argue that Europe is still vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, transnational threats, particularly crime networks, and the instablity that often does result from massive waves of migration from other surrounding regions, which do cause extreme reactions of an emotional nature even in the most rational persons in the most traditionally stable of allies. NATO must continue to adapt the use of its assets to meet the new threats Europe's states now face from inside the continental space as well as the neighboring regions. This is in the American interest. If any part of Europe destabilizes in the east or south, the broader strategic implications will require a US engagement to prevent a power vacuum that is as likely as not to be filled by competing and/or hostile elements.

I was struck by an article in the most current issue of Foreign Affairs analyzing the Pentagon's 'wasting assets,' which discusses the difficulties Washington faces in power projection. The NATO commitment is physically moving eastward. Even with the base closings and overall reduction in troop levels, a commitment in the central theatre would still provide the ability to transfer adapted assets more quickly and efficiently in the case of crisis.

The crises of the future are as likely to be inside states as between them, motivated in part by ethnic tensions that have been instrumentalized and in part by resource wars, increasingly over water as much as oil or gas. Energy security leaves states vulnerable in ways that are as important to act upon as the threat of the Red Army at the height of the Cold War. Ethnic tensions can be, and often are, exploited on grounds of resource allocation and redistribution to a privileged group with state complicity.

NATO was not created to address these kinds of challenges, which is one of the reasons why many believe it is not and cannot remain relevant in this new era. In fact, the entire American military establishment is under review, including the assets NATO uses, given the demands potential wars of the future are likely to impose.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

July 9, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Marek, your post is such an excellent exposition of the conventional wisdom that deserves a point-by-point deconstruction.

However, before I get down to the detailed deconstruction, I'd like to ask Colette what NATO can contribute to resolving the difficulties mentioned in your post? Inasmuch as they even are issues at all (the energy security issue, for instance, is nonsense - at least in the way it is presented here), all of them seem to be more suitable for the Council of Europe, European Union, World Bank and OECD than for NATO. I fail to see any viable military solution to any of them.

And military solutions are what NATO does. If what is needed is diplomacy, economic development, election monitoring, trade sanctions/favours/agreements, or any other of the many non-military ways to resolve issues, then we have perfectly fine international institutions that can do that better than NATO ever will. By force of institutional experience, if nothing else. Building up a parallel capacity within the NATO bureaucracy not only wastes resources, it also causes NATO to lose focus from what it does best (territorial defence). And it risks (yet more) turf wars between NATO and other international institutions when there is an overlap between their mission statements.

But back to business:

"When putting aside politically driven prejudicies, as seen in the preface to your comments,"

When you accuse other people of political prejudice, it helps to be specific. Vague insinuations tend to be unconvincing.

With that in mind, please identify this "prejudice" explicitly. Do you deny that Iraq is a colonial war? Do you deny that American policy in Central Asia has as a central objective to extend the American sphere of influence at the expense of the Russian sphere? Do you deny that this amounts to a policy of containment and encirclement of Russia? Or do you deny that NATO offered political cover for these policies?

"Regarding Russia: as the EU has no army yet (or I am seriously impaired in vision and hearing) and Russia has clear advantage in both conventional as well as MD weaponry against any European country and all of them combined,"

To recapitulate: The European Union combined has as many troops as Russia, and far superior equipment. We also have two or three times the Russian population, and more than three times the Russian heavy industry, so in the event of a full mobilisation, Russia would lose. All of these statistics are perfectly public, so I fail to see how anybody could think otherwise.

The only thing Europe lacks in this respect is a unified command structure, so your claim essentially boils down to the contention that if the US leaves, Europe will be unable to organise a unified command and control structure of our own. That is not self-evident, so if that is your claim you need to make a case for it. Your current post does not do this - it simply assumes that conclusion, as if it were a law of nature.

"Regarding US nukes: in case of nuclear confrontation it's not only the sheer megaton-capability of some countries that matters but also the ability for those nuclear less-priviledged countries to get a deterrence they need."

Translation: "The Americans are prepared to defend their allies. The French are not."

That is garbage.

"Regarding Iran: in case Iran gets long range missile and nuclear capability it is NATO that will have to provide Europe with a missile shield"

You are simply assuming - without even attempting to make a case for it - that Iran will want to threaten Europe with nuclear missiles. Why would they want to do that?

Further, what makes Iran so different from Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, the US, China, France and Britain that Iran cannot be persuaded by the same measures (deterrence, mutually assured destruction and respecting their legitimate security interests and sphere of influence) that have worked to prevent any of the other nuclear powers from pushing the button?

Oh and - as any freshman physics student should be able to tell you - a "missile shield" is science fiction.

"Regarding piracy: NATO has not yet transformed for the needs of assymetric warfare and hence Somali pirates can play a cat and mouse with marine forces"

If by "play cat and mouse" you mean "the fact that Somalia is in a state of civil war (that the Americans and British are heavily involved in perpetuating, by the way) means that there is no effective local law enforcement. This in turn means that many Somalis take to organised crime (including, but not limited to, piracy) and vigilantism (a few of the "pirate" attacks have been against ships smuggling arms to African war zones, illegally dumping toxic waste in Somali waters or stealing Somali fish - it's not many, but they deserve to be mentioned). When so many civilians are involved in organised crime, no foreign power can hope to curtail it," then that is a valid description of the state of affairs.

But I utterly fail to see how "asymmetric warfare" could possibly help with that. Surely you are not suggesting that NATO forces should fall ashore in fishing villages that are sending out pirates (or vigilantes) and murder or abduct the pirates in question? That would be in violation of three or four different international laws. And the NATO charter states quite explicitly (Article 7) that NATO obligations can never supersede member states' obligation to observance of international law. (NATO, incidentally, does not actually have jurisdiction in the Indian Ocean - see Article 6, second bullet of the treaty.)

"- but claiming that any European warship can do the job must be a joke. There are dozens of European warships - also in NATO operation - in the piracy areas and I have not seen many reports of pirate Zodiaks being sunk!!!"

It is not my fault that you do not read the news. A minute of googling turns up the following:

http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0418/piracy.html

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQE7AZFsqNTa-QJH...

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/11/13/British-navy-ship-captures-p...

"Regarding Palestine: European policy in the Middle East are also part of the problem"

Indisputably. But how is NATO going to help Europe pursue a policy that is less in line with the current European and American policy?

"and NATO is a stabilizing factor to both the US and Europe in the theatre."

Given current policy, "stabilizing" the Euro-American strategic stance in the theatre is a part of the problem, not a part of the solution.

Also fails to address the fact that there are several other organisations available that provide a more natural framework for engaging the issue.

"If those were to rival each other, as the Author seems to be suggesting, we could see 9/11 repeating sooner that we think."

Utterly unsupported assertion. 9/11 had nothing to do with Palestine, except inasmuch as everything involving the Near East can trace some tenuous connection (rhetorical, if nothing else) to Palestine.

Further, there is little reason (and even less evidence) to suggest that shady criminal outfits like the people who carried out the New York attacks should become more motivated to kill people if were to Europe force Israel to remove its illegal colonies on the West Bank and end its slow-motion genocide in Gaza.

But since you bring up "terrorism," permit me to share an interesting statistic with you: Every day, approximately 80-100 people are killed on European roads (depending a little on what you count as "Europe"). That is a London bombing every day, a Madrid bombing every three days or a 9/11 every month or so. On European roads alone.

Terrorism, in other words, is not a serious issue for European (or, for that matter, American) security. If you want to save lives, take the money currently being spent on the Terror "War" and use it to build railways instead (rail has negligible fatalities). That would be a better use of the time and money - and, incidentally, would not involve creating a police state at home, or propping up nasty regimes abroad.

"Only months ago we felt close to repeating the worst Balkan scenarios in Moldova - and that pot is still boiling!"

I assume that you are talking about the "grape revolution" flashmobs that formed in the wake of the elections, and the ensuing riots. In that case, I must remind you that your "feelings" do not constitute analysis. Equating post-election riots that barely reach the level of The Battle in Seattle to the deliberate programmes of ethnic cleansing and outright genocide that went on in Yugoslavia in the '90s is an insult to the victims of the latter - living and dead.

"A year ago we faced an outright military aggression by a significant world power just outside Europe's security area"

In which fictional alternative universe is Georgia a "significant world power?"

July 9, 2009

Anthony Mansell, Johns Hopkins University, (4)

A very informative article giving new insights to points I have been discussing for many months now, From looking at the 1993 New Strategic Concept it is incredible to see the extent to which the security landscape has changed. However, what is more striking is the extent to which Europe is still hamstrung by the same problems it had at the end of the Cold War. The capability-expectations gap that Hill coined almost seems more relevant now than then, in particular the increasingly disjointed and ambiguous role in Afghanistan for European forces.

Again, a thought provoking and informed article clearly articulating the issues that will continue to undermine transatlantic unity in security until it becomes mere rhetoric, unless strong reassessments are made throughout the NATO member states.

(Apologies for the repeat, forgot to sign in)

July 9, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Collette:

"It is interesting to note that right after 9/11, NATO members wanted to be of assistance in Afghanistan. The US decided otherwise. That, I believe, was an opportunity lost."

Unfortunately I have to disagree with this assessment. There may have been a fleeting moment of time when the more reluctant NATO members wished to be part of the initial response, but the ability was never there. Let's not forget that German defense spnding had been cut to about 1% of GDP at that time, and much of Continental Europe was not far behind (in cuts & lack of capability). I recall that time very well, and remember that the press was full of cautions and exhortations tht the US was sure to kill 'millions'. The sense of the the public debate was clear, I think; the US could do nothing to improve the situation and therefore should sit on it's hands and do - nothing at all.

So I'm inclined to believe that the expressed willingness to cooperate was at best a pious wish and at worse a strategic effort to ensure that anything the US did would fail. We needed 'to be taught a lesson'. I remember it very well.

"The Alliance is still recovering from the diversion of assets since 2003. National armies are very slow to modernize and adapt their weapons systems once strategic reviews are initiated."

Wrong time, I think. The 'diversion of assets' begn soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. During the cold War Germany had spent about 5% of GDP on defense, but that had fallen to about 1% by 2001. Last I heard German defense spending has 'recovered' to about 1.3% of GDP as of 2008? Not much of a recovery; there is no apparent urgency. After all the US taxpayer & armed forces will be there in case of real need. Won't it? In Europe 'strategic review' seems to be a synonym for 'endless delay and palaver'. No?

"The question now being raised about Germany is how it is part of the solution as a net contributor to European security".

Is Germany a 'net contributor' to European security? At 1.3% of GDP I doubt it. Germany has ALWAYS been a net consumer of security within NATO, and the consumption only accellerated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany is a trading rival, but we continue to subsidize their security. Time for that to stop.

" I would argue that Europe is still vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, transnational threats, particularly crime networks"

Europe has ALWAYS been subject to such things and always will be. Mexico suffers far worse than Europe does and the implications of that are far more relevant to the US, yet nobody advocates we sort out Mexican problems. If the US decoupled from NATO sufficiently perhaps we would have the resources to help Mexico solve it's problems - to our very direct benefit.

Europe is rich and capable enough to handle it's own problems. Time for the US to tell them that they are adults, and time they solved their own problems. We can retire and spoil the grandkids....

July 9, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

According to Wikipedia, 2006 US military spending was US$ 528.7 bn. At nominal exchange rates, the combined figure for the five largest EU countries (in terms of military expenditures) was US$ 195.5 bn. By way of comparison, China, Russia and India (the three other fully developed great powers in the world) had a *combined* military spending of US$ 108.4 bn.

In other words, the EU maintains around twice the military expenditures of the three other Eurasian great powers, and about six times the spending of Russia (US$ 34.7 bn), the only non-US country that is remotely capable of prosecuting a serious shooting war against Europe. Now, one may argue that purchasing power parity might be a better measure than nominal exchange rates. But that is never going to give you a factor of two, nevermind a factor of six.

So aggregate European levels of military expenditure are not outrageously low, unless somebody wishes to suggest that the USA will be attacking us in the near future.

Also bear in mind that the 528.7 bn figure for the US includes a world-wide base empire spanning more than a thousand installations in about two hundred different countries. Europe has no cause for, need to or strategic interest in emulating that particular exercise in imperial overstretch. This alone reduces our need for military spending by a considerable, if hard to quantify, margin. Similarly, a strategic doctrine of territorial defence does not call for fleet carriers, intercontinental bombers or the dedicated logistics network needed to supply colonial task forces operating in unfriendly territory.

July 10, 2009

Hans Reuther-Fix

Is there a new world order?
As a start, the two methods of governance NATO was assigned to keep separate,
Communism, Centralized Economy, and American Free Market Economy respectively
have shown to be on two opposite sides of the spectrum and are basically not workable.
The European Union on the other hand, as it expands, is more and more maturing to a sea of small sovereign states, easy to exploit and to (mis-)use as political footballs.
Unfortunately, the European Union is still mentally impotent to get out from under
the massive cloud of the complexity of world wars and its consequences, which reach all the way down to Palestine. NATO is a forceful reminder of that, just that.
The display of nuclear arsenals in both camps serves just as a reminder, that nuclear warfare , even with smaller units, is only helpful in creating radioactive zombies and
basically useless.
Japan, the Ukraine and many others should serve as a reminder.
So, presently, Greater Europe is a playground for covert activities of which ignorant people
are the players. These games are so intense, that the ratio of initiators to players is
almost par.
The proposal must simply be, to allow the Eurozone to rearm to its full potential and
capability to replace NATO and to make Europe a respected member of a greater international society to include developing countries and a new sutainable monetary system, which does not hold subordinated countries hostage.
This distribution of military complexes will further underscore the necessity of
regional control currencies as a guarantor for sustainable value oriented growth.

HRF

July 10, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Hello Jakob,

Thank you for your question. I agree that the other organizations you cite are suitable to address non-military aspects of security. The European Union is developing a profile in ESDP operations in different areas, which is likely to develop in the years ahead with more attention to issues of transitional justice. The Union's focus in these operations, as I understand, is in conflict prevention, which is important.

As for NATO, I believe that the areas in which the Alliance has been engaged since the end of the Cold War show how warfare has changed and how NATO personnel must adapt in terms of fighting as well as other areas of post-confict reconstruction. These challenges were evident in Bosnia and Kosovo/a before EU missions stepped into those areas.

NATO's initial purpose was territorial defense when the continent faced an overwhelming conventional threat from the former Soviet Union. That original purpose must evolve if the Alliance is to remain relevant given changes outside the European Union's internal space.

NATO should not be, I believe, about the encirclement of Russia today. That would be a mistake in US policy as Kennan explained in the 1990s. NATO must develop its relations with Russia in the new strategic concept in ways that offer its assets the chance to be useful out-of-area in peacekeeping operations.

Respectfully, I think that the European Union is not ready to develop a unified command structure, which would have to be led by France and Great Britain. I have seen no evidence of a willingness to move beyond the St. Malo agreement. Nor am I convinced that a US decoupling would necessarily lead to any major change on this front.

I do believe that the French are willing and able to defend their allies. Do the allies, across the Continent, including Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, want this assurance without that of the United States?

I agree with your assessment about missile shield defense. This is at best perhaps a bargaining chip, if the timing is right. I see no value in pursuing this option as NATO policy. Nor do I believe that Iran has an interest in launching missiles against Europe. Iranian leaders could be persuaded by deterrence, I believe, if this was necessary although the US government clearly does not want to contemplate the eventuality of an Iran with nuclear weapons.

I do not think that NATO can play a decisive role in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict. That would divert its resources from the areas of operation in which it is presently engaged.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

July 10, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Hello Donald,

We have different recollections of the period just after 9/11 and diverse perceptions of the willingness and ability of Europe's states to contribute in Afghanistan. In a collective effort, clearly France and the United Kingdom would have led the more reluctant countries in terms of capabilities.

Germany had, and still has, its particular national context and history to contend with, which I think is quite a distinct set of issues than contributing to a strategic effort to ensure that anything the US did would fail. The press coverage can and often does lead to misunderstandings across the pond, which is why leaders must communicate well to their publics about the vital security needs and national interests on each side of the Atlantic.

I believe that the new strategic concept for NATO must set clear and specific target goals for European and US contributions to the collective defense. Publics must be prepared in advance for this eventuality, which is necessary in the context of what I have termed the 'assets-expectations differential' in a commentary published online by AICGS last year, http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/mazzucelli071108.aspx

Purely in terms of the US position in the world, I do not equate a trade-off between decoupling from Europe to assist Mexico in the US backyard as more to America's direct benefit. I believe that US policy in Europe was much more forward-looking and constructive than American policies in the Southern hemisphere over the past century. In this new millennium, I believe it is important that the US policies toward a united Europe remain as forward-looking and strategically oriented given American interests in areas neighboring the Continent.

In the midst of the current global crisis, Europe faces issues of solidarity as financial difficulties in the center and east of the Continent are potentially exported to the west. This is a problem the Union must tackle although it is in the collective interest of the US and Europe that the solutions found contribute to global stability.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

July 10, 2009

Nikolina-Romana Milunovic, Zeppelin University, Silver Contributor (52)

@ Donald
While Colette has already alluded to the difficult German historical burden seemingly forgotten when asserting that Germany only consumes and doesn’t contribute to international security, I would like to point out the enormous uprising of civil society when Germany first debated about sending military to Afghanistan and seemingly never-ending arguments about a German right to do so in regard to second world war memories. Military deployment of German troops will always be confronted with controversial national and international public debates, which is a rather positive phenomenon, but also negates any loose decisions about military support.

@ Jakob:
• When talking about “military aggression by a significant world power” in 2008, one could hint at Russia, rather than Georgia.

Russia’s military aggression toward Georgia is considered as the trigger for Georgian-Russian conflicts, as it was well portrayed Russian journalist Yulia Latynina, further stating:

“Throughout most of this year, the Kremlin has tried to convince the world that Georgia started the war. Clearly, the more innocent the Kremlin considers itself to be, the more likely it will feel justified in starting a second war with Georgia to settle scores.”

• Regarding Iran you argued that “the threat from Iran is wildly exaggerated. Iran poses no serious threat to European security or legitimate interests.”
I would disagree here reminding you of statements by Ahmadinejad saying: “the solution to the Middle East crisis is to destroy Israel”.
Moreover, Iran’s leadership has repeatedly proven to be unwilling to agree to international offers in order to stop uranium enrichment, which would answer your question about the difference between Iran and other countries.

While also being certain of the prevailing reason for NATO’s existence, I would like to point to a New York Times article by Thomas Friedman, who proposes a way to maintain and expand the zone of peace and security by investing in renewable energies leading to decreasing oil prices, which ultimately forces current dictatorships to encourage their people to innovate and trade. This could be the answer for a North Atlantic peace and security zone without unpopular military deployment.

July 10, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"Germany had, and still has, its particular national context and history to contend with, which I think is quite a distinct set of issues than contributing to a strategic effort to ensure that anything the US did would fail."

Colette, this is true but you seem to believe that it is somehow unique. The fact is that Every country has it;s own unique "national context and history" to contend with. Decidedly not excluding the US. Specifically the George Washington speech about 'avoiding foreign entanglements' upon leaving office. Remember?

Entering NATO and remaining in Europe post-1948 did extreme violence to core American values - yet nobody seems to want to understand that. The Germans have had more than a decade to come to terms with their historical context, with little apparent progress.

I have heard Germans write about how much angst deploying 30 combat troops caused in their country - implicitly arguing that deploying 30 is an enormous contribution from them, implicitly a far greater sacrifice than the US contributing 30,000.

Well, I'm sorry for the angst and everything - but that argument is complete and utter humbug. Ballocks as the Brits say.

Germany does not wish to contribute anything approaching a proper share to NATO efforts. I can understand that. It's a democratic decision, and in the recent German tradition. But the US can also make democratic decisions, and we have our own traditions. Two of the most important traditions are "No foreign entanglements", and then the foreiners cry 'Yankee go home' - sooner or later Yankee fgoes home. We don't stay where we're not wanted.

In this case central europe has shown we're not wanted by very large demonstrations, lack of cooperation, and pretty much utter denial that US interests are a legitimate concern of the NATO alliance (but German, French, etc interests ARE). That all spells the message Yankee go home to me, if not to you. Watching those demonstrations made me realize that millions of people deeply believe that people like me are national socialists. I've come to terms with that, but am determined to be a NS with a difference; MY variety of NS disinvades rather than repressing. As a good NS - I think my NS country should (and will) go home.

The primary reason I voted for Obama is that he's not an Atlanticist. That is he's the first president elected since the 50's who was not brought up with the idea that the atlantic alliance is the hinge of history. The man grew up in Hawaii & Indonesia, and part of his heritage is African. He has a global POV. Thus far I approve of his foreign policy.

July 10, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Good morning Donald,

Thank you for your comments. I agree that each country has its own unique context and history. This is why I choose to understand different countries and their relations in terms of history and culture as well as interests.

Once the US made the decision to use the bomb in Japan, the country entered into a fundamentally different era in the history of its foreign entanglements. President Truman had the common sense to realize the weight of the decision he made in terms of our Founding Fathers' vision of the country and its role in the world.

The creation of NATO, involvement in Europe, competition with the Soviets, tragedies in Korea and Vietnam, followed. President Eisenhower foresaw the rise of the military-industrial complex, which, I agree, has violated core American values over time.

I think there are many who do understand this reality. Decoupling from Europe will not fix what you identify as the problem, however. Like it or not, the US is implicated in Europe's affairs, economically, socially, politically, not just militarily. I do sense that NATO may become irrelevant if certain changes are not implemented in the next few years. The US is no longer primarily a military presence in Europe and, in fact, has not been for some time.

The question in my mind is what institution may replace NATO as the forum for US-Europe dialogue. By this I mean a dialogue with those countries outside the Union as well.

I agree that President Obama is a global president. He understands the country has vital interests on several continents. America's relations with Europe must be seen in a relative context as his Administration makes policy choices.

This does not mean that the US disengages unless it is in this country's interest to do so. If you listen again to President Obama's speech in Strasbourg when he visited Europe this spring, it is not my impression that he defines America's interests in Europe in the terms of disengagement.

Our leaders in Germany and the United States are in the process of redefining exactly what transatlantic engagement means. This will take time and a sense of purpose, or a vision of what America and Germany can accomplish together, not simply a recognition of those issues on which we cannot agree in the absence of the Cold War's bipolar divide.

Yes, the temptation to go home has been there for some time in US circles. Yes, protests continue over unpopular policy choices. We have seen what happens when the desire to give into temptations prevails without careful evaluation of the consequences over time.

US consumers have the incessant temptation to continue spending on the plastic. In the present environment, the temptation remains. On balance, there are those who would agree: it is time to cease and desist. Forget about expecting the world to finance consumer shopping sprees at the mall.

There is no doubt in my mind. We have spoiled the grandchildren too much...

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

July 10, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

"Like it or not, the US is implicated in Europe’s affairs, economically, socially, politically, not just militarily."

It's not me who initially disliked it. Many (most?) Europeans also seem to dislike it. Look cloerly enough of the diplomatic events fo the past 15 years and you will see compelling evidence of that. Not all of the evidence is related to 9/11. Most of all the rather widespread belief in Europe that US interests are evil and must be utterly ignored or frustrated while European interests are good and must be completely satisfied.

"I do sense that NATO may become irrelevant if certain changes are not implemented in the next few years."

NATO HAS become at least 90% irrelevant. The efforts are to recusitate NATO, not to rebuild it. Witness the prolonged discussions preceding very minor committment of resources by ther likes of Germany and France. To his crdit Obama has not wasted nearly as much time on such discussions as Bush did. I think that is because Obama recognizes that little is to be gained by doing this.

"The US is no longer primarily a military presence in Europe and, in fact, has not been for some time."

True, and this is evidence of 'decoupling'. As is Obama's surge of US troops into Afghanistan. He asked for European support in Afghanistan. Merkel said 'nein', Sarko 'non. So Obama went ahead and did what he had to sans Europe, sans 'NATO'. You may not recognize the significance of this, but many Europeans do.

"it is not my impression that he defines America's interests in Europe in the terms of disengagement."

I would not disagree with this. I'd say that like FDR, Obama defines America's interests in terms of direct American interests. America as a nation-stae, as a Great Power (but not necessarily the Superpower). And decidedly not America as 'Leader of the Free World'. The latter designation is clearly defunct. The primary reason I voted for Obama over McCain is that I think he understands that while McCain did not.

The point I'm making is that Obama and the US should 'emgage' if it is in the national interest, and 'disengage' if it is in the national interest. We should no longer be thinking of unilaterally bolstering NATO if the allies don't value the body enough to contribute in proper scale. I'd say the evidence is they do not. QED, the US *also* decouples.

July 10, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Hello Donald,

Where I think younger Europeans, in particular, do not agree with US policy on the Continent is in terms of the extensive reliance on the military presence. As you discuss, postmodern Europe has developed in terms of its policies and interests.

In fundamental ways, the US security guarantee has been taken for granted as the EU member states became preoccupied with internal matters, particularly opaque discussions in Brussels about the Union's institutional questions, which do not always resonate in national capitals.

In terms of NATO and the US commitment, this situation is not likely to continue. France's reintegration tends to confirm the likelihood of change. How the European countries will agree on contributions to the collective defense within the Alliance are likely to be influenced by heated discussions. Turkey must be factored into the equation and, as the interest in EU membership diminishes over time in that country, it will be important to assess the implications for European defense cooperation.

I do not believe that the present administration is going to lose too much time on issues in NATO that do not lead to some tangible result. I prefer to see the outline of the new strategic concept in terms of how the Continents would work together before assessing the extent of NATO's irrelevance or demise.

Nor do I see the value of a lense that colors the entire relationship between Europe and the US on the basis of Afghanistan policy. This has the tendency to create a mood, which can distort our understanding of the range of interests the Continents do share given the challenges in the world today. NATO is one facet of the overall relationship not the filter through which our entire policy conversation should be distilled. Europeans also recognize this reality as Americans increasingly do.

I agree with your assessment of President Obama's approach to the US as a power in the world. Unlike President Roosevelt, I believe that he faces the need to push for a fundamental reform in the UN Security Council. The lack of presence by rising powers in that body signals the likelihood of exit from the UN system by some of the future players on the regional and/or global stage - India, Brazil, in particular.

Candidly, I agree that the US should not be thinking in terms of unilaterally bolstering resources in NATO or any other institution until there is an agreement on respective national and/or Union contributions as well as the new 'rules of the game' that follow as a consequence of a review of commitments and a redistribution of existing assets.

All the best and greetings from New York, Colette

July 10, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Greetings from London, Colette.

"Where I think younger Europeans, in particular, do not agree with US policy on the Continent is in terms of the extensive reliance on the military presence."

Agreed. I was on Oxford Street the day that 750,000 people demonstrated in Hyde Park, with similar demonstrations widely spread across Europe, and I thought then: "These people do not like the US very much. Many dislike the US and Americans, and their countries are therefore extremely unlikely to be able to fulfill their NATO obligations satisfactorially (from an American perspective)".

"In fundamental ways, the US security guarantee has been taken for granted"

Again we agree, though you may not agree with me about the time frame. I think the US security guarantee has been taken for granted in most of Europe since at least the early 80's, probably much earlier than that. I think DeGaulle's 1964 withdrawal from NATO was the earliest major symptom, and Wily Brandt's Ostpolitik another symptom.

"In terms of NATO and the US commitment, this situation is not likely to continue. "

Here we part company. You are an optimist, I am a pessimist. I think Europeans are unlikely to see our POV, no matter how obvious or correct it seems to Americans. Most will prefer their own perspectives. Rightly so, I think, if we wish our perspective we must allow them theirs.

But it seems to me that they have either completely internallized the US security guarantee, regarding it as a kind of law of nature. They fail to appreciate that our traditions are quite otherwise, that for the first 150 years of our national existence we either did not involve ourselves with Europe or we swiftly returned home after WWI. Nor do they seem to understand that the US intended to do likewise after WWII. Certainly that is what Roosevelt intended. US involvement in Europe is in fact not a law of nature; in a very real sense it is a desecration of a fundamental national principal.

"I do not believe that the present administration is going to lose too much time on issues in NATO that do not lead to some tangible result."

Agreed. Problem is, what in recent palaverings about NATO (since the fall of the Berlin Wall) HAVE led to some tangible result? Not much I can think of. You seem to believe this will change. Why? Perhaps it's somehow unthinkable that the trend will remain the same? I find it VERY thinkable.

"Nor do I see the value of a lense that colors the entire relationship between Europe and the US on the basis of Afghanistan policy."

It's not solely Afghanistan policy, although that is a point in the data set. I'm thinking also of Kosovo, where many Germans seemed to think that manning war crime tribunals was the only contribution they cared to make. Before that the masive reduction in military expenditures after the fall of the Berlkin Wall.

Everyone cut, that is true. But the US cut about 40% relative to the size of the economy - Germany cut 80% or more.

Germans frequently point out that they don't need all the things the US does, but for many things that is true only inasmuch as Germany doesn't need to do those things - because the US DOES do them!

So what I see is a steady trend of hollowing out their contributions while implicitly relying on the US security guarantee - for virtually everything. With a growing wave of non-cooperation adding to the difficulty and expense of providing those security services.

Unacceptable. If things don't reverse, and rather radically, NATO remains dead.

July 11, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Colette,

Thank you for your thoughtful analysis. It is well worth the read, even though there is a small number of points where I disagree.

First and foremost, I fail to see why it is an objective to keep NATO relevant? Surely NATO is a tool, not a purpose? NATO was supposed to provide a framework for defending against the Soviet Union and (later) the Warsaw Pact. Neither of those threats exist at this point in time, and there is no serious risk that they, or any comparable threats, will reappear within the foreseeable future. Mission accomplished. Game over. Congratulations, we won.

We're not keeping Germany occupied anymore. We're not demanding that Austria keep to the Versailles reparations payment schedule. We're not demanding the return of Skåne to Denmark, or claiming that Schleswig must remain "auf ewig ungeteilt." All those are relics of past conflicts that are no longer relevant, except as historical curiosities. What is so special about NATO that it must be kept alive despite having outlived its purpose?

I am not convinced that the activities NATO has been engaged in since the dissolution of the USSR have actually promoted peace and security in the North Atlantic area. With the exception of Bosnia (which was actually a UN operation, not a NATO one, even if most of the troops were drawn from NATO countries), I cannot name a single conflict in which NATO has contributed in a meaningful and positive way.

And if you say "Kosova" then I would suggest reviewing the chronology of events - it was the NATO campaign of terror bombing against Serbia (itself a war crime, by the way) that gave Milošević the excuse he was looking for to begin mass ethnic cleansings. The provocations that had been going on between the Yugoslav Army and the KLA in Kosova until that point had been relatively even-handed, so there was no obvious reason for Europe to intervene on KLA's side. In fact, KLA is a pretty shady outfit itself - if it had been operating out of Iraq, the West Bank or the occupied Golan area in Syria, it would almost certainly have been designated a terrorist organisation. Meanwhile, the outcome has been to render Kosova into a failed state. I fail to be convinced that this is a shining example of humanitarian intervention.

Second, while we agree that NATO *should* not be about the encirclement of Russia, that is what NATO's Russia policy has actually been. NATO is supporting a number of countries in Central Asia whose governments are unfriendly to Russia (and not because those countries are shining beacons of democracy and liberty either... Uzbekistan is probably the worst offender east of Belarus on those counts, and Saak'ashvili in Georgia is basically a glorified oligarch whose democratic credentials are questionable at best). And now NATO wants to install something in the "missile shield" bases in Eastern Europe that is patently not what it says on the label, because what it says on the label is physically impossible.

If Russia were making a comparable effort to prop up anti-American regimes in the Caribbean, installing missile systems of unknown purpose in Mexico and making overtures to Canada about basing rights for fighter-bombers and naval task forces, then the US might justifiably complain that Russia was engaged in a policy of unfriendly encirclement. Given how objectionable the US found Soviet bases on Cuba, it is fairly certain that the American objections to such a strategy would be rather more forceful than the Russian objections to NATO enlargement have been so far.

Third, I disagree with your assessment the EU is not ready to develop a unified command structure, but it will be Franco-German, not Franco-British. British leadership of anything that has to do with the EU is, in my considered opinion, a pipe dream. Britain has, by her own deliberate decisions, placed herself on the periphery of Europe, and is considered by many in Paris, Berlin and Bruxelles to be a mental annex to New York. The fact that thirty years of Thatcherism has rendered the country into a barely solvent off-shore hedge fund does not help either.

It is possible that Poland would reject Franco-German leadership. But Poland does not have much say in the European Union. The Twins have squandered Poland's political capital with their squabbling and grandstanding over the last decade, and Poland was never more than a mid-sized member in the first place. There is also considerable resentment over the fact that Poland provided political cover for the American aggression against Iraq. In general, Rumsfeld's "New Europe" lacks both the economic power, the political clout and the diplomatic and bureaucratic skill to seriously shape European policy. And as long as they continue to take advice from American neoconservatives, Friedmanite "shock therapists" and similar snake oil peddlers, this is unlikely to change.

With kind wishes,
Jakob Stenfalk

July 11, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

@Donald: When you bemoan Europe's insufficient "contribution" to "security" issues, you keep forgetting that the European militaries outspend the only realistic antagonist we have by a factor of roughly six, and has about as many men under arms (and a much larger population and industrial base to mobilise in the even of a serious shooting war). If Europe's ability to defend ourselves without the American security guarantee is defective, it is not for a lack of money. It is true that the US outspends Europe by a factor of two or three. But the US is maintaining an empire on which the sun never sets; Europe neither needs nor wants (with the possible exception of some lingering British nostalgics who have not yet realised that Britain is not a serious global power) to do so. And Europe will neither need nor want (I most devoutly hope) to do so, even when the American empire disappears in the next decade or three.

Further, NATO is a purely defensive treaty structure. There is nothing in the NATO charter that stipulates anything about deploying forces abroad. So any troops at all deployed outside Europe's borders to help Americans fight their wars (yes, "their" wars - Europe has no compelling interests to defend in Afghanistan or Iraq) is a favour to the Americans that goes above and beyond our "proper share to NATO efforts." Talking about Europe's role in NATO in terms of how many troops and how much hardware we should be able to deploy to this or that foreign war sounds to many European ears like a presumption that America has the right to expect European countries to spill our blood, treasure and political capital (not to mention other people's blood) in American colonial wars. I believe that this impression - along with the real and serious divergence in our objective strategic interests - is the basis for a large part of the "Yankee go home" sentiment that you find in some quarters (also, do not underestimate the damage that Bush/Cheney has done to American soft power - Bush's ignorant stupidity and Cheney's naked corporatism and belligerent militarism does not sit well with most Europeans).

As an aside, your notion that Americans won't stay where they are not wanted is something that you should, perhaps, take up with the good citizens of Guatemala, Columbia, Panama, Chile, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Palestine and the other couple of hundred places where American forces, or the forces of American client states, have set up shop. I find it hard to believe that all of those countries are eternally grateful for the "security" offered.

@Nikolina: Your memory of the Georgian crisis is severely defective. The time line of the crisis is as follows: Saak'ashvili ordered an armoured assault column to move into South Ossetia - a region that had roughly the same status as Kosova currently has in Yugoslavia - i.e. de facto but not de jure independence. This Georgian attack force then moved on to kill several Russian peacekeeping soldiers (which are operating under a UN mandate), kill an unknown but fairly substantial number of civilian Russian citizens (at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, former Soviet citizens in the breakaway republics were offered Russian citizenship, and many Ossetians accepted this). Then the Georgian invasion force began to shell the Ossetian capital Tskhinvali with rocket artillery (when the Germans did that to London in 1942 it was considered a war crime...). Russia then sent an armoured column into Ossetia, destroyed the Georgian army and restored the status quo ante. Russian ground forces never moved very far outside Ossetia in any serious numbers, and while the Russian air force did bomb a number of targets in Georgia proper, they did not terror bomb any cities (unlike the Americans during their war against Serbia in 2001...), and the targets were mainly rail bridges and airports - which are perfectly legitimate military targets under international law.

Please tell me how that constitutes Russian aggression? What do you think Russia *should* have done in that situation? Sit idly by while a loose cannon like Saak'ashvili was terror bombing Ossetian cities and killing UN peacekeepers and Russian citizens? What do you think the US would have done if Serbia had invaded Kosova and started shelling Camp Bondsteel (which is not even a UN outfit, is a perfectly legitimate military target and thus has no special legal status under international law)?

If your answer to the last question does not involve the American air force terror bombing Beograd, then I have a couple of Northern Rock shares I'd like to sell you.

Finally, while I am not personally a big fan of the gentlemen Putin and Medvedev, citing a member of a neoliberal belief tank that counts Garry Kasparov as a member is about as credible as dragging out Ahmed Chalabi for a political analysis of the Middle East, or Milton Friedman for a discussion of economics.

Your view of Iranian politics is similarly factually challenged. Ahmadinejad has never said anything remotely resembling what you quote him as saying.

The statement that you are alluding to is "The Imam said that this regime occupying Jerusalem (een rezhim-e ishghalgar-e qods) must [vanish from] from the page of time (bayad az safheh-ye ruzgar mahv shavad)." (via - the whole article is worth reading).

In the same link, Juan Cole (who actually understands Farsi, unlike the propaganda shills that peddled the version of the quote you use) explains further:

"Ahmadinejad was not making a threat, he was quoting a saying of Khomeini and urging that pro-Palestinian activists in Iran not give up hope-- that the occupation of Jerusalem was no more a continued inevitability than had been the hegemony of the Shah's government.

Whatever this quotation from a decades-old speech of Khomeini may have meant, Ahmadinejad did not say that "Israel must be wiped off the map" with the implication that phrase has of Nazi-style extermination of a people. He said that the occupation regime over Jerusalem must be erased from the page of time.

Again, Ariel Sharon erased the occupation regime over Gaza from the page of time."

Nor does the fact that Iran exercises its rights to control the full uranium fuel cycle prove that it is different from other nuclear powers. All nuclear powers do this (it is a prerequisite for being a nuclear power), and in fact all countries have a right to control the full fuel cycle. The latter is stated quite explicitly in the non-proliferation treaty. If insistence on control of the full nuclear fuel cycle indicates that a regime is dangerously unstable and/or belligerent, then all countries with nuclear programmes - peaceful or otherwise - are unstable, dangerous and belligerent. Including such countries as Sweden, Estonia and Germany.

(As an aside, thus far, there is not even any evidence that Iran is in violation of the NPT, although they obviously would be the moment they started manufacturing an actual nuclear device.)

Finally, Europe has no legitimate strategic interest in protecting Israel, until and unless Israel is in full compliance with international law. That means that Israel must dismantle all of the illegal occupation of the West Bank, restore Palestinian sovereignty over Palestine's airspace and territorial waters in accordance with the appropriate treaties on aerospace and maritime borders and cease its illegal blockade of Gaza. Until and unless this happens, Israel has no more claim to European support than Augusto Pinochet, Slobodan Milošević or South Africa's apartheid regime.

On your final point, Thomas Friedman is a neoliberal snake oil peddler whose economic theology does not apply outside the fantasy world of neoclassical economics. Needless to say, he does not command my respect.

In summary, your response is nothing but a farrago of long-debunked neoconservative and neoliberal talking points. I do not know where you get your news and views from, but you should probably revoke most of your subscriptions.

July 12, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Greetings from New York, Jakob,

Thank you for your comments. My sense of the NATO evolution is as follows. As trade between Russia and the EU increases in coming years, their relations are likely to evolve.

Russia has interests economically as well as renewed incentives to cooperate, especially in this period of global crisis.

If NATO persists in a strategy of encircling Russia, this will prove counterproductive in the short-term. The US should develop a policy toward Russia that is mindful of continental security concerns, including the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals to include those of France and the United Kingdom in time.

The non-proliferation regime must be strengthened by the actions of nuclear powers worldwide to reduce their strategic arsenals.

I believe that the German role as a bridge between the US and Russia should not be underestimated. Chancellor Merkel has proposed a transatlantic free trade area, which should be developed.

Europe is a continent of 800 million persons that should be able to identify interests in common with the United States beyond the use of NATO to create an "enemy image" vis-a-vis Russia.

This being said, Russia's actions in central Asia may prove problematic for Europe and the world. Here the EU faces the challenge to create a neighborhood policy that addresses its regional security concerns.

The question of European defense cooperation between France and Germany is one that must develop over time. Absent some type of focused external threat beyond Russia, which, candidly, is hard to imagine at this point, it is not clear what the motivation would be domestically for that cooperation to intensify.

A fundamental change in approach to defense cooperation and planning would be required, which an external threat would compel in terms of energizing the need to unify resources in this policy area.

The EU member states' different interests necessitate continuous multilateral and bilateral negotiations to agree on common policies. This makes cooperation more complicated. It also causes the EU to struggle to speak with a single voice in the world.

That struggle also ensures the survival of the member states. If a country must constantly negotiate with its neighbors, the energy it must use in that endeavor diverts attentions away from more aggressive pursuits.

Russia and Turkey will grow closer to the EU economically over time. The implications of this evolution in terms of security broadly defined is a whole other matter, particularly with regard to membership in the Union. These enlargements would impact on the continental security equation structurally requiring a complete rethinking of the transatlantic relationship.

All the best, Colette

July 12, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Hi, Colette

Again, you have a sound analysis, although I would question both what security concerns Europe has East of the Black Sea (at least until and unless Turkey is fully integrated into the Union) and why Russia's actions there are objectionable on strategic grounds. If you had objected on humanitarian grounds I could see a point, considering Russian conduct in Chechnya - on the other hand, Euro-American conduct in Central Asia has not been reassuring either on that count.

As I see it, Europe's primary foreign policy challenge is to integrate the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean fully and firmly into a European framework of ecologically sustainable development, political liberty and human rights. Eventually, if and when they meet the admission criteria, these countries should be adopted as full and equal members of the Union. To neglect this challenge will breed a region of continued instability along our Southern and South-Eastern borders. Imagine if the US had to contend with a Mexico that was in a continual state of low-grade civil war and/or run by more or less dictatorial juntas - it would not be a pretty sight.

This is, however, a political challenge rather than a military one. Given our - ah - less than reassuring history in North Africa, anything that smacks of neocolonial ambition would only serve to antagonise the very people we need to befriend.

And I think you underestimate the internal coherence of the EU (that is something the English-speaking press does a lot). For better or worse, it looks to me like the EU will develop into a semi-federal entity within the next couple of decades. People of my generation (I was three years old when the Berlin Wall came down) have only a dim memory of passport checks at intra-EU borders, reached the age of majority only after the introduction of the common currency, and have never known a world in which you couldn't reach Berlin, Paris, Bruxelles or Strasbourg by train in about as much time as it takes to fly there (and the train speed can only go up once the European passenger HSR grid gets rolled out). It looks like one country to me, and with the European Court in Strasbourg becoming the court of last resort for constitutional grievances and Bruxelles enforcing a scheme of common EU civil rights (with few exceptions, all EU citizens have to be treated as if they were full citizens of all EU states), it's starting to act like one country as well.

On that count, it is not helpful to transatlantic relations that several prominent European anti-federalist astroturfers are being funded and guided by American neoconservative belief tanks and are found to have ties to the American mil-ind complex (yes, Declan Ganley, I'm looking at you).

July 12, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

@Jakob

"Donald: When you bemoan Europe's insufficient "contribution" to "security" issues, you keep forgetting that the European militaries outspend the only realistic antagonist we have by a factor of roughly six, and has about as many men under arms (and a much larger population and industrial base to mobilise in the even of a serious shooting war). "

Budgets don't win wars, experienced and well-trained soldiers & logistics do. I heard Germany confess it was 'exhausted' by the effort of maintaining 11,000 troops in peacekeeping missions abroad, with the most demanding mission being the one in Kabul. Which is the least-demanding mission faced by any nation in Afghanistan - or so I understand. Germany (and most of continental Europe) lack experienced officers & enlisted men and (obviously) lack logistical support systems. Or you would not be complaining about efforts a small fraction of those supported by the US, UK, or even Canada being 'exhausting'.

Germany seems to support it's allies half-heartedly, but actually I exaggurate. It's much less than that. Moreover, the european armies seem under-equipped compared with American and Canadian forces.

"If Europe's ability to defend ourselves without the American security guarantee is defective, it is not for a lack of money."

I think it's both; lack of resources AND lack of committment. You don't intend to fight and thus do not prepare to fight. Whatever you are spending, you are not getting value for money. Based upon the European performance in Afghanistan I don't believe the UK, US, Canada, or Eastern Europe can count upon most of their allies to provide effective force. France has some good forces, but Germany? Belgium? Italy? Spain? Perhaps they exist, but if so - where have you been hiding them?

I don't want US troops in harms way having to rely upon the German forces we've been seeing in Afghanistan, their arms tied by the Bundestag and pacifist public opinion at home. The Russians have their problems but they are far better equipped than the Taliban & far more experienced than continental europe (except some of the French).

"Further, NATO is a purely defensive treaty structure. There is nothing in the NATO charter that stipulates anything about deploying forces abroad."

Yes, I've certainly heard this pointed out before. But you are blinkered, sir; suppose the US, Canada, and the UK were to interpret the treaty in the same precise manner; no obligation on their part to maintain forces outside of their national borders - no obligation to fight to defend Poland or Germany? What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander; if Germany does not fight for the US when we are attacked why do you suppose the US should feel any obligation for fight to defend Germany when it is attacked?


"help Americans fight their wars (yes, "their" wars"

Ah, there we have it! When the US is attacked it's a 'US' war, a 'colonial' war - when Germany is attacked it will suddenly be that we're all in this together, eh?

"I believe that this impression - along with the real and serious divergence in our objective strategic interests - is the basis for a large part of the "Yankee go home" sentiment that you find in some quarters (also, do not underestimate the damage that Bush/Cheney has done to American soft power - Bush's ignorant stupidity and Cheney's naked corporatism and belligerent militarism does not sit well with most Europeans)."

I aree that this is the European analysis, and even would agree that it is not completely without merit - from your perspective. But what you obviously fail to grasp is that the European response has done (and is doing) at least equal damage from the American perspective. I understand your POV very well having had my nose rubbed in the shit many times since the mid-90s, whereas you do not understand my POV seemingly at all.

That is one reason NATO is doomed to irrelevancy.

July 12, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Donald, who's going to attack Germany? The Russians?

And go read the NATO treaty.

No, you know what, I'll quote the relevant parts to you:

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

It does not say anything here about supporting missions to overthrow regimes that either party to the treaty does not like. It does not say anything about "spreading freedom and democracy" (if the US had a real commitment to do that, I would be more receptive - but then the US would stop propping up the regimes in Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia...).

The US has not been subjected to an attack that threatened their "territorial integrity, political independence or security" since Pearl Harbour. And if you say "9/11" or "terrorism" then please go buy a clue. You could have a 9/11 every month and it would not rival car accidents as a leading cause of civilian death in NATO countries. Terrorism is not a serious threat. Certainly not one that can serve as a valid pretext for running around and toppling governments willy-nilly.

July 12, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Jakob, the US was 'attacked' in North America, by a group supported by the Taliban. Germany voted to invoke Article 5, but has not followed through.

"Donald, who's going to attack Germany? The Russians?"

You make my case for me. The Russians are no threat, therefore NATO no longer has a purpose. Europe is unwilling to 'pay' for the security guarantee by expending resources for it's own defense or to support the US in the new security climate - so the US should withdraw the security guarantee and it's forces from the defense of Europe. That is what I mean by 'Yankee Go Home'.

July 12, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

When was the US attacked by the Taliban? As I recall it, the US was attacked by a Saudi-based outfit called Al Qaeda. Which was armed with box cutters. All you need to do that is ten crazy people and a couple of airline tickets. You can buy the box cutters in the duty-free on the other side of the security gate (no kidding). Even if you manage to kill every last Taliban under arms in Afghanistan (which you won't), it still would not prevent ten crazy Saudis from arming themselves with box cutters, hijacking a plane and flying it into some landmark or another.

Fortunately that is not a serious problem for Western(TM) society. Both in terms of loss of life and material damage, terrorism barely even rises to the level of a rounding error. There quite literally is nothing to fear from terrorism, save fear itself. If Americans want to pretend that terrorism is a serious security issue, then that is their prerogative. They should not, however, expect the majority of Europeans to support such a pointless waste of blood and treasure.

Or we could let Interpol handle terrorism, Wall Street hedge funds and other international organised crime, and instead focus on the real and serious security issues - such as preventing catastrophic climate change and curtailing nuclear proliferation. NATO may or may not be a suitable tool for dealing with those issues, but at least they are real issues that deserve our attention.

July 12, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Once more, slowly. Jakob, I didn't say Taliban attacked the US directly. I said that Taliban sheltered Al-Qaeda, a group which attacked the US. They were not 'Saudi-based', they were Afghanistan-based and Saudi-financed.

Taliban sheltered them and would not arrest the leadership.

And thenk you very muich for reducing this to a 'rounding error'. I've heard this from Germans before - and thought them very odd people indeed. Many Germans argued then (after 9/11) and argue now - that the US should simply ignore an act of war on it's territory and people because nobody was responsible. No reason to go to war with Taliban because Taliban didn't directly do it, and we couldn't go to war with Al-Qaeda without goijng to war with Taliban - because Taliban didn't do it directly. No, Taliban condoned it and encouraged it.

As did Germany in a sense. Where did Atta and Bihnshalib come from, remember? Jolly old Hamburg....

July 12, 2009

Hans Reuther-Fix

Hi Colette, Donald and Jakob,

It is with pleasure to follow your debate and contensions..
It is also interesting to observe as you so eloquently avoid and ignore the
cause, obviously then the effect , for the creation of NATO.
NATO was and still is not only a military compex for defense purposes,
but also a means to compliment the expansion of our American Free Market
and Money Authority, across the globe. This Western-US Economic Base will at all times supersede any military intentions and the US Dollar will then reign
supreme, as the USA will establish itself as the consumer nation par exellance.
When an American economist " proclaimed" on a foreign TV Network
referencing the deficit accounts with the Peoples Republic of China:
"..... we are exchanging goods and services for paper and bonds...",
our real morality submerged, which helps to explain todays economic problems. When Saddam Hussein then intended to switch the denomination
of Iraqs oil contracts away from the US$, de facto trying to destabalize the US currency, a military intervention was required. Dubai's Exchange was to be
anchored basically in Beirut.
In addition to that, globalization was also meant to give, for example, international oil companies a free reign over natural resources around the globe, on a as needed basis.
Russia, one of the richest countries in natural, mineral resources put a stop to it and others followed.
It was about 1891, when the Russian Czars would not allow our currency
system as applied now in the West to be introduced to Russia, whcih allows an interesting comparison:
...when the USSR collapsed, most satellite states owed enormous amount of
Russian currency to Moscow, while at the present stage of affairs
the US owes everybody else through bonds etc.
What does NATO have to do with that, you might asked:
You may want to ask General Tommy Frank, Supreme Commander
US and Allied Forces Iraq, the to some extent crucial information he received from German Intellingence at the beginning of the war.
Yet NATOs assignment was also to keep Germany and with that, the axis,
militarily " handicapped".
Your debates show that your mind, may be unwillingly, finds
soothing refuge for this to remain permanent and helps to ease your
deliberations without the feeling of being historically not accurate.

NATO, even through your discussions, becomes more an more an obstacle,
as it demands to follow any present or further accepted dictum,
NATO was designed to be, and understandibly so, under US Command and
Control.
You may understand also that world affairs are revolving counter to the comfort of your discussions.
You must realize that money management, especially when applied without moral base, will even make NATO inconsequential.




HRF

July 12, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Donald, if 9/11 was an act of war, then so was the Unabombing. You are free to treat them as such, of course, but you should be aware that by doing so you are contributing, not detracting from, the threat of terrorism.

As the British learned to their considerable regret in Northern Ireland, sending in the marines to root out terrorists plays right into the terrorists' hands. Every single time you burn a poppy field or bomb a wedding party or torture a prisoner, you're creating new terrorists. This is basic, basic guerrillia tactics that are found in every direct action doctrine from the past two centuries: Provoke the enemy into a disproportionate or poorly targeted response, and you get grist for your propaganda mill.

Treating terrorism as a law-enforcement issue is not to do nothing. It is to do what works. The Germans understand this fact, because they actually have real experience in countering terrorist operations.

July 13, 2009

Colette Grace Mazzucelli, Hofstra University / New York University, Platinum Contributor (333)

Greetings Hans,

Thank you for these points, which, it is true, were not considered in my comments.

I believe that your argument is significant for a large number of the institutions created as a result of World War II, which are less and less relevant in our world today given the challenges. moral, economic, political, legal, and social, which millions of people face in their daily lives.

Inertia can maintain institutions as much as it can lead to their eventual demise. It seems that great and rising powers are more likely to slip consciously into patterns of bilateralism on the most important topics defined by their interests instead of constructing a relevant system of global governance in which many actors have a genuine stake. It would seem that the severity of the present crisis could work against this trend.

Do you believe that the world will emerge from this present crisis with stronger economic and financial institutions? Or is money management likely to continue, supported by the institutions currently in place, without a moral base? All the best.

Sincerely, Colette

July 13, 2009

Hans Reuther-Fix

Greetings Colette,

Thank you for your reply.
It is very difficult to respond to your question and here is why:

When you look at the subject matter of previous NOBEL Prizes in Economics,
you will find that the psychological aspects in the decision making process
within the economic environment are in the foreground.
So, human creed and certain authoritative beliefs can become guiding principles and can override cooperation and coexistence.
The deregulation of capital flow and the addition of engineered liquidity
in the 1990s reflected in a massive polarization of capital.
Prior to October 2008, the financial world seem to be aware that "something
big" was going to happen. So private capital moved to the side line and
government stepped in to avoid a systemic collapse.
With the additional creation of even bigger instituitions, such as Bank Holding Companies, we probably will continue another term to go from "bubble to
bubble",--------
For quite some time we are in favor of regional control currencies, perhaps within the context of emerging markets, such as BRISC or better in reverse
CIRBS. But first we have to settle our present dilemma.

HRF

July 21, 2009

Oliver Hauss, -, Platinum Contributor (342)

@Donald Stadler:

Germany condoned and encouraged Al Qaeda "in a sense" because Atta et al. lived in Hamburg? That is some curious logic. Spinning it further, the US condoned and encouraged Al Qaeda by training its pilots. So you claim that "in a sense" the conspiracy theories are true and 9/11 was an inside job?

It also seems you're a bit at odds with General Franks on the ability of the Europeans to help in Afghanistan. Oh, I know what you want to say, he wanted to pat the Europeans on the back symbolically. Great argument, that patting caused a political scandal in Germany, because parliament was not quite aware of that help he expressed his gratefulness for...

The true problem in your and Techau's argumentation, however, seems to me that in the middle of the greatest economic crisis in decades, security for you is still something restricted to guns and bullets. But wars need resources and resources come through economy. And if the financial crisis has shown one thing, then that you have to be very careful to tilt the table on one end for fear of precipitating disaster at the other. While you can use guns or even energy etc to bully someone around, that only works up to a degree. Kill an economy and you risk seeing your own flushed down the drain. If you're making a fortune selling XYZ to someone, it's usually not a good idea to ensure that someone is not able to pay for it anymore. Starting a war aimed chiefly at bankrupting oneself doesn't really seem like a good idea.

July 22, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

@Oliver Hausss,

"It also seems you're a bit at odds with General Franks on the ability of the Europeans to help in Afghanistan."

Less a matter of ability than that of willingness. Also ability, but in the short term only. Capabilities can be developed if the political and financial will are there to develop them.

That has been lacking also. It's no longer the short term. Considering the time which has passed since 9/11 we are deep into the medum term and verging on the long term. Still few signs of willingness to help materially.

"in the middle of the greatest economic crisis in decades, security for you is still something restricted to guns and bullets."

No. But the assymetrical nature of the NATO alliance forces the US to invest more on the guns and bullets and less on the strength of the US economy than it ought to. In a very real sense the German 'investment' in pacifism forces the US to become more militaristic than is in our best interest. Withdrawing committment from Europe would conserve resources to rebuild the US economy.

Who is talking of killing an economy? I am taking of withdrawal. The US presence in Europe makes Russia into an enemy, and US withdrawal would eventually result in neutrality and very likely cooperation, later on.

It is not necessary for the US to continue this policy, which unecessarily drains the US to the direct benefit of a trading rival who wages direct trade war on the US. That is, the EU.

The US subsidizes their defense, so in return they exclude most US farm produce. In direct contravention of WTO.

July 24, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Donald, why do you keep pretending to believe things that a mere moment's sane and sober analysis will tell you are flatly untrue?

Specifically:

- That it is possible (nevermind desirable) to use military force to prevent terrorist attacks.

- That terrorism is covered by the NATO charter (despite NATO never playing any serious role in Lockerbie, the IRA, RAF, ETA, München, Oklahoma or the first WTC bombing).

- That Europe isn't spending enough on our military, when in fact we are spending six times as much as the only other mature great power in our sphere of interest.

- That the problem with the American economy is caused by over-commitment to defending European interests (as opposed to thirty years of Ronnie Raygun and his disciples deliberately wrecking your industrial plant in order to enrich their friends on Wall Street).

- That an unwillingness to accept an environmental and consumer safety race to the bottom constitutes illegitimate barriers to trade.

You have specifically acknowledged earlier in this very thread that at least bullet three is plainly wrong. Which makes your repetition of it little short of a premediated lie.

Please stop arguing in bad faith.

July 25, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Jakob, do you have the slightest idea of how smug you appear? This from an American, the former undoubted champions of smug. But no longer.

Germans have taken over the title. But I can be paitient and give the problem a little time. You will learn..... ;)

July 25, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

I am not German.

And smug? That is not the word I would use. Dismissive? Certainly. Overly confident? Perhaps. But smug? Not unless you're a fan of Ronnie Raygun. Then I'll admit to a certain amount of schadenfreude that your economic theology went up in smoke last year.

But, attitudes aside, do you care to actually argue any of these points?

- Is there any evidence - from any time since the invention of the breech-loaded rifle - that military intervention has prevented terrorist attacks?
(Hint: If you don't have a conviction from a court of law, a scholarly article from a respectable historian - Cato, PNAC and Heritage fellows need not apply - or something of similar gravitas, don't bother.)

- Is there any reason at all to distinguish between the laundry list of terrorist attacks I provided above (which did not elicit any NATO response) and 9/11?

- Do you have any quarrel with the spending numbers I provided above?

- Can you present a serious - or even semi-plausible - economic analysis in which American commitment to European military bases played a role in the current financial meltdown that is comparable to the repeal of Glass-Steagall?
(Memos from Chicago-schoolers, Austrians and other far-right lunatics need not apply.)

- What precisely are the American agricultural products that are being unfairly excluded from European markets?
(Hormone beef and GMO crops will be dismissed outright and without further discussion - as mentioned above, they are a consumer safety and environmental policy decision, respectively, over which the WTO has no standing.)

July 25, 2009

Donald Stadler, Self-employed, Diamond Contributor (1052)

Smug. Without a doubt.

July 25, 2009

Jakob Stenfalk, N/A, Silver Contributor (54)

Ah. I'm afraid I'm not familiar with your dialect. In the version of English I learned in school, demanding evidence when faced with a fact-free propaganda screed did not qualify as "smug." Oh, well. You learn something new every day.

And I take it that you still don't have any actual facts that you'd care to share with the rest of us?

July 30, 2011

davu

Thank you it was very interesting to read.