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October 7, 2008 |  4 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

Djörn  Eversteijn

Topic Out of Afghanistan Means out of Business for NATO

Djörn Eversteijn: NATO’s reliance on its global partnerships may seem innocuous today. Contributions in Afghanistan from a diverse array of nations, such as Australia and South Korea, are seen as indispensable in security and reconstruction efforts. Until a full commitment by member states is exhibited, though, NATO’s long-term credibility is in danger.

The dissolution of the Soviet Empire removed the traditional raison d'être for what had become history's most successful military alliance and forced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to go "out of area or out of business." At the dawn of the 21st century, NATO responded accordingly by linking its future relevance to what is often referred to as the organization's most important mission: the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In order to adequately address the challenges of the 21st century, NATO expanded to its current 26 member states, while developing and strengthening cooperation with non-member countries on a bilateral basis. Determined by a process of consultation and negotiation, these so called ‘global partnerships' have made valuable contributions to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. Australian and South-Korean forces, for example, have conducted operations alongside Dutch, British and American troops in the dangerous and unstable southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding NATO's efforts, the situation in Afghanistan remains fragile. Continuous instability and insecurity hamper reconstruction efforts and leave the war-torn Afghan population frustrated with the foreign military presence. Nevertheless, substantial contributions to the mission in Afghanistan by formal NATO members remain largely absent.

The lack of long-term and substantial commitment is partly due to the existence of different positions among the alliance's members with regard to the objective of the mission. Although reconstruction and security are obviously interrelated - there can be no reconstruction without security and vice versa - some member states continue to perceive the mission in Afghanistan solely as a reconstruction effort. This perception has generated reluctance among several governments to dispatch troops to engage in combat operations.

Despite the importance of non-member states' contributions to NATO's all-important mission, the reliance on global partnerships may weaken the alliance in the long term. Although strengthening global partnerships may provide a valuable solution to member states' absence of long-term commitment to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, it may produce a dangerous precedent at the same time. The reliance on global partnerships may be perceived as a substitute for member states that are unwilling to commit themselves to the alliance's new raison d'être, thereby eroding the internal cohesion of the alliance and reducing the alliance's international credibility.

If progress is to be achieved in Afghanistan, the organization's member states should translate their political statements into actual contributions. Although global partnerships are indispensable for equipping the alliance for the 21st century, their contributions should be perceived as an addition rather than a substitute for contributions of the formal member states. If long-term commitment to the all-important mission in Afghanistan remains absent, history's most successful military organization will be unable to achieve progress and will lose its relevance in the 21st century. Out of Afghanistan means out of business.

Djörn Eversteijn holds a BA in European Studies and is currently a research trainee at the University of Amsterdam.

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Tags: | Afghanistan | NATO |
 
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Marek  Swierczynski

October 7, 2008

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"The lack of long-term and substantial commitment is partly due to the existence of different positions among the alliance's members with regard to the objective of the mission" - that's the point. The objective was not clear enough from the beginning and the events on the ground proved it can not be clear. I mean, if we wanted it to be clear, we should have accepted huge deployments of troops and a de facto all-out invasion of the country instead of limited operations here ane there. And we were not prepared to accept that even in time when "war on terror" wasn't such a devalued term. Why? Because it is not what NATO was designed for and nobody cared to re-define its mission in legally binding terms. Perhaps nobody was brave enough to put it on the agenda. The Washington Treaty, 60 years old next spring, is largely obsolete, if faced with today's security threats. Article 5, the pillar of the Alliance's common shield, was only quoted once and probably misquoted - as the offer of common defence was rejected by the most powerful ally. Afghanistan as it is now, is far beyond the common defence clause. Should it be abandoned then? Surely not, but the operation - wrongly marked as "the most important in NATO's history" - should be redefined and reshaped as soon as possible, with greater involvement of non-NATO forces and adjusting the goals to realities. A war that can not be won could be extremely harming for NATO internally and externally. After tidying up the Afghan mess, the Alliance should focus on re-designing itself to the XXIst century needs. The nobel anniversary next year is a good and may be the last occassion to do just that.
 
Bernhard  Lucke

October 7, 2008

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I agree to some degree with Marek Swierczynski: in fact Afghanistan should never have become a NATO mission. That was a grave mistake which puts the alliance's future at risk. One cannot discuss the differences on Afghanistan away by defining it as "the alliance's most important mission". It is bad enough that we are still there - but one could use the occasion for re-defining the alliance's main goals. Hopefully people in the member countries will be asked whether they agree on a new strategy - and for the case of Afghanistan, I bet the majority will insist on pulling out, at least on a timetable and clear goals which shall be achieved there.

By the way, NATO is the most successful alliance of the 20th century because it was never put on a military test. This was a wise policy - using military strength primarily to deterr the enemy and prevent a war. But I am not sure whether NATO will be the most successful alliance of the 21st century. It probably can't be successful because now as it is seemingly converting into an instrument of neo-colonial politics, aiming to control spheres of influence aggressively.

By the way, the dynamics of the al-Qaida terror system were modelled in 2001 by Frederic Vester, who analysed feedbacks shortly before his death and arrived at the conclusion that the core for controlling terror is reducing the number of volunteers for the bombing attacks. He also concluded that military actions, invasions, torture etc. will lead to more terror. This study was submitted to the Pentagon, unfortunately without effect, and as predicted the terror increased every year. By the way this chain of events was also predicted by the well-known political journalist Peter Scholl-Latour. It this context, "fragile" it is a nice word for the situation in Afghanistan. Perhaps "war" fits better. For more information on Vester's models, see http://www.frederic-vester.de/eng/. Unfortunately the terror-model was only published in an interview with the Gazette journal in 2001 (http://www.gazette.de/index.html)

One may blame some NATO members for being reluctant to fight in Afghanistan. But from the other point of view, one may blame some other alliance members for engaging in a risky, bloody, and terror-breeding adventure which lacks clear goals, and which hijacks the "most successful" alliance for a colonial game about control of fossil resources in this world. As it seems, we have the majority of Afghans against us now. What's then the point of staying there? Is it really to teach Afghan girls reading and writing, or merely to keep Karzai's mercenary guard busy, or to protect some secret torture cellars? Of course, it is the gas pipeline, and strategic control.

I don't want to repeat my strategic comments on Afghanistan, please visit the other discussions of the atlantic community at http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/NAT... and http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/It_... (I did not find out to place tags here)
 
Anna  Wojnilko

October 10, 2008

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Bernhard,

With all due respect, I must say when reading your comments I get the impression you are trying to play devil’s advocate here. Do you seriously believe that the war in Afghanistan is merely “a colonial game about control of fossil resources in this world”? This is not just about a gas pipeline. At least not only.

I’m afraid you are right in saying that if the people of NATO member states were to decide, they would insist on pulling out of Afghanistan. This, however, is not because pulling out is the right thing to do. It because the public does not seem to realize what is actually at stake in this war. Luckily, NATO leaders know better than that.


Tags: | Afghanistan | NATO |
 
Amarjyoti  Acharya

October 12, 2008

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There are two things that come out here as very interesting. "Not only a gas pipeline" and 'strategic control'. Energy security dominated the situation after the Iraq war. With costs to the US state and its populace that could always have been either avoided or minimised. Afghanistan is very different and the Eurasian energy is more or less with the CIS rather than either with China or NATO (largely visible via US pronouncements on most issues and as is usual with US practices- rather dense and ham-handed).
However, the confessions of "not only a gas pipeline" queers the pitch for NATO in Afghanistan, while it makes it more profitable for the CIS states since they are talking in a language that speaks of business and strategic partnership with the central asian energy-rich states. The nuances of a strategic partnership and 'strategic control' are very different and are not confused by the populace as well as elites of those regions.
Cold war mentality is less a factor and (seen from the vantage point of the region and its psychographc profile) a certain christian outlook (NATO via the United States) comes across as more the reason behind the reluctance of "engagement as equals" - by NATO of eurasian states. Ironically, the church plays a double game and while hardly any NATO state in Europe would like to be defined as 'christian' or even other religious terms, this religious orientation goggles much of the view about NATO states in that region, and other regions of the world.
The people of not only Afghanistan/eurasian states but the other energy-rich regions (the gulf)are rather proud people with very proud memories of their histories and culture, even if broken today. They seek to rejuvenate themselves and stand proud and self-dependent as before, with energy-sources as their only bargaining points. The dangers of a mis-read christian orientation (the US again comes across as guilty of encouraging that view via its indulgence of certain churches) of NATO prevents NATO from being seen as a friendly force seeking to contribute towards that very aim of the 're-construction' of Afghanistan. NATO would be far more successful if it can (US included, please) dis-engage itself from this religious bias, and come across as an alliance that seeks "engagement as equals" - in Afghanistan and elsewhere. NATO, in its representation of the European Union in one aspect alongwith the US, needs that de-coupling of 'image' to enable it to be a welcome force in Afghanistan as well as elsewhere.
One could argue about the relevance here, and I would still point out to my view as stated here - the need for de-coupling of a particular religion with any particular state within NATO - even when most of those very states (eurasia-Gulf) avowedly display their religious affiliations. That is the reality of the situation and difficult as it is, it serves very little interest to get drawn into a medieval quagmire that various churches hope and feed upon, and infact seek to encourage - as their piggy-back riding for infiltration and making a comeback.
It should not be forgotten that a part of the 'proud memories' of people from certain regions involves having to have had bear the brunt of the medieval crusades, alongwith colonialism that again, many tend to mis-read as some christian evangelical exercise. The attempts by various churches to fill in the vaccum-of-presence left by the colonial masters, in many regions of the world, have merely contributed to a serious mis-judgement and a mis-reading of the ground realities. The de-coupling of the state with any particular religion, in and within NATO, is imperative - should it wish to avoid a strategic mistake that may threaten to propel the world in a medieval quagmire. Alternatively, NATO should clearly state its orientation - like those states (Gulf region/eurasia) vis-a-vis any particular religion to again enable a lessening of the contempt and disdain of it (seen as anti-west or anti-modern but more accurately it is this perceived hypocrisy) in many regions of the world. There are many contending powers in the world that are very clear about their orientations as well as the willingness to enter into 'engagement as equals' - other things remaining the same. Those powers shall emerge as the key players in the 'construction' of a new world order that guarantees stability and dignity, with not only their energy-securities guaranteed a certain stability, but also an increase in their 'acceptability' or what later becomes the 'legitimacy'.
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