NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan carries forward the Alliance's political-military objectives in Afghanistan, liaising with the Afghan government, civil society and representatives of the international community.
Ambassador Sedwill has responded to your questions and policy recommendations on a wide range of topics, including the role of Pakistani security services, NATO's Training Mission, the role of narcotics, gender issues, parliamentary elections, co-operation with Russia, and the issue of civilian casualties.
Thank you to all of our members who sent in questions and contributed to the second round of the open dialogue with the Ambassador.
David Axe, World Politics Review, Washington, DC:
At the Kabul conference, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to jointly train Afghan military officers. However, the two countries didn't publicly address the more serious problem: the widely reported support the Taliban receives from the Pakistani intelligence service. Historically, insurgencies survive as long as they have external support. How, if at all, is NATO dealing with this critical issue?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
Everybody agrees that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without the cooperation of Pakistan. Pakistan has taken serious steps in fighting terror and this is to be welcomed. Tribute has to be paid to the Pakistani soldiers who are also paying a heavy price in combatting this plague that is infecting both countries. But let’s be clear: NATO’s mission in Afghanistan stops at the borders. Intervention in Pakistan – of any sort – is not provided for under the United Nations Security Council mandate and there is, therefore, no plan – or intent – for NATO to operate across the border. What we will do is continue to deepen our cooperation – along with our Afghan counterparts – notably strengthening border control, increasing intelligence sharing, and further developing military-to-military cooperation.
Nico Segers, Political Secretary, Young European Federalists, Mechelen, Belgium:
According to various statements from NGO workers and reports in the media, there is a tenacious degree of distrust between trainers and Afghani candidate law enforcers. A 2009 Pentagon report confirms these looming facts, including a slowing learning curve among the Afghani security forces.
What is NATO doing with regards to its Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) to prevent and mitigate the problems of ‘low morale’, rising incompetence, hidden corruption, and the persistent tendency to defect?
Will enhanced extra-legal, financial or practical benefits do the trick to calm anxieties and ‘bail out’ syndromes?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
We were aware of the many challenges of the development of the Afghan National Security Forces when standing up the Training Mission in November 2009. Since then, a great deal of progress has been made. Yet, it is true that literacy and attrition are two main stumbling blocks to ANSF development. Literacy, in particular, is a major challenge when it comes to training and education, one that cannot be mitigated overnight. Today, the average literacy rate for an entry level soldier or policeman in Afghanistan is about 14% across the entire ANSF. The current attrition ratio within the ANSF is of 1:2.5. This means that we will need to recruit, train and assign 133,000 soldiers and police to grow the next 50,000 troops that we need to meet the 2011 goal. Attrition, however, is not even across the board. It is higher in the southern units and within the Afghan National Civil Order Police, which are most exposed to risks. NTM-A, along with the Ministries of Interior and Defence, is engaged in a concerted recruiting effort to address these, notably through recent pay increases, the introduction of bonuses and literacy training.
Joerg Wolf, Atlantic Community Editorial Team, Berlin, Germany:
Our previous discussions on atlantic-community.org led to several policy recommendations. One conclusion was for instance that extending the reach of the central government is a major motivating factor of the insurgency. Some of our members suggested that it is important to focus on training good provincial and district-level public servants.
Would you agree that this would ultimately contribute to better governance? And were any decisions taken in this regard during the Kabul conference?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
Building Afghan capacity is key. The Afghan Independent Directorate for Local Governance has developed a comprehensive programme aimed at further developing sub-national governance institutions and functions. Known as the District Delivery Programme (DDP), it is designed to help stabilize recently secured districts by establishing or improving the presence of the Afghan local authorities. DDP will support district government efforts to respond to the needs of their constituents by building the government’s capacity to deliver basic health, education, agricultural and judicial services at sub-national level.
At NATO-ISAF’s level, the 28 Provincial Reconstructions Teams play a key role in supporting the development of these institutions.
Good governance is one of the key pillars of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. It is also an essential component of a counter-insurgency strategy. Functioning public institutions stand as one of the prerequisites for the transition to Afghan lead.
Mirela Isic, Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich, Germany:
Is NATO-ISAF going to strengthen its cooperation with Russia in fostering the governance-building process in Afghanistan beyond the land transit of non-military equipment?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
The land transit agreement is an essential contribution to our operations. Russia’s engagement in Afghanistan also includes counter-narcotics training for Afghan and Central Asian personnel. There is potential for further Russian engagement in Afghanistan. This ranges from further cooperation in ANP training, to the provision of helicopters and spare parts.
Niamatullah Sayer Sharifi, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, Erfurt, Germany:
President Karzai and the Afghan Government insist on reducing civilian casualties, making this a key point during the London and Kabul conferences. But, on July 25, 2010 an attack killed 52 civilians, including women and children. Given this reality, what is the actual impact of these conferences on the military policies of the international community in Afghanistan?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
President Karzai and the Afghan Government are not the only ones to want to reduce the number of civilian casualties. We all do. One civilian death is always one too many. Since 2008, ISAF Commanders have issued a series of Tactical Directives aimed at improving the conduct of military operations, minimizing the risk of civilian casualties, and improving the assessment and reporting of any incidents involving civilians. This goes from the restriction of the use of airstrikes, the review of Escalation of Force regulations and the creation of the ISAF tracking cell to the systematization of a joint investigation.
All these efforts have already yielded positive result. According to the latest UN Secretary General’s report on Afghanistan (21 September, 2010), the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF and Afghan Forces dropped by 30% over the Jan-Jun 2010 vs Jan-Jun 2009 period, now only representing 11.8% of the total number of civilians killed, despite the fact that we have roughly twice, if not three times as many forces in the field. Efforts are being pursued, with a new Tactical Directive issued in July further enforcing our practices.
As regards the civilian casualty allegations in Regey, let me just mention that, as always in such circumstances, a thorough investigation into the case was carried out by ISAF and the Afghan authorities. No evidence was found to substantiate these allegations.
Philip Berry, University of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland:
The Afghan opium trade represents the most potent danger to Afghanistan’s democratic stability and economic development. Evidence also suggests there is a clear nexus between the narcotic industry and anti-government forces. Therefore, the narcotics industry is inextricably linked to NATO and its allies’ quest to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Do you think that NATO’s current counter-narcotics policies are adequate to tackle the Afghan drug trade? And what measures are currently in place to target and destabilize the narcotics industry?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
Counter-narcotics is a law enforcement responsibility of the Afghan Government. NATO and the broader International Community fully support the National Drug Control Strategy, which has four priorities: targeting the traffickers; providing alternative rural livelihoods; reducing demand; and developing state institutions.
NATO-ISAF’s main contribution to the counter-narcotics effort is made by tackling the insurgency. There is a clear nexus between narcotics and financing the insurgency. Additional support includes: information sharing; developing command and control procedures for effective liaison, coordination and de-confliction; supporting the Government’s counter-narcotics information campaign; and training ANSF. But we do not do eradication.
Horia Mosadiq, Amnesty International, Herat, Afghanistan:
What is the gender policy of NATO during its peace and military operations in Afghanistan?
Is there any NATO-ISAF policy for the protection of the candidates ahead of the parliamentary election, particularly female ones? If yes, how? If not, why?
SCR Mark Sedwill:
In compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, ISAF troop contributing nations are taking a concerted approach to promote the role of women within the mission. ISAF runs an extensive gender awareness programme. Afghan women have and continue to demonstrate their commitment to rebuilding their country, with women represented in Parliament, the Ministries, and involved in educational, health and non-governmental sectors, among others. This was again evident during the Parliamentary elections, where the number of female applicants stood at nearly 16% of the total – compared to 12% in the 2005 Wolesi Jirga election – and more than 1.4 million women casted their votes.
Turning to the protection of candidates, ISAF forces did not directly provide election candidates with protection. The Afghan National Security Forces provided security for political campaign activities by candidates. These were coordinated directly between candidates and the security forces at the provincial level.
Nazif M. Shahrani, (PhD) Chairman, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, Bloomington, United States:
In my view what happened in Kabul was another political theater, this time directed by Karzai in Kabul in a hurry. The people of Afghanistan are getting tired of these meaningless shows of support for a kleptocratic regime supported once again by the international community. Such theatrics could only add to the cynicism of Afghans on the street as well as villages.
SCR Mark Sedwill:
President Karzai is the elected President of Afghanistan. His line ministers are all vetted by the Afghan Parliament. He and his government stand as our primary partners. They will not always say what we want, when we want. What matters is the delivery on their committments to better governance.
In the video clip below, Ambassador Sedwill shares the key
outcomes of the International Conference on Afghanistan - and the way ahead:
This was the second and last part our exclusive Q&A with Ambassador Sedwill. Read the dialogue's first part here.
Additional Information:
- Ambassador Mark Sedwill’s full biography
- Duties of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan
- International Conference on Afghanistan Communiqué
- NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s speech
- Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s statement
- US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's speech
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