Iran and the United States have finally stepped forward and begun talking, although each is still deeply suspicious of the other. But how is one to reconcile US interests in the Gulf region with the security concerns of Iran? The answer lies in a realistic quid pro quo.
On the one hand, Washington depends on Saudi oil resources, which must be kept accessible and inexpensive. Iraq no longer acts as a strategic counterweight in the region; prior to 2003, King Fahd and Saddam Hussein balanced against the Islamic Republic. When an adviser to the new King Abdullah announced in last November’s Washington Post that Riyadh would actively support her Sunni brethren in Iraq against Iran, the real reason was to hinder a premature US withdrawal from the region since the kingdom is too weak to take on the role of the region’s hegemon. Neither country can now be relied upon by the United States as a safeguard against Iran. On the other hand, Iran has pursued a nuclear program regardless of whether pragmatists or revolutionaries have ruled over Khomeini’s invention. Similarly to the former Soviet military doctrine, Iran will make any endeavor to prevent a war on its territory. The memory of the war with Iraq (1980-88) is deeply enshrined in people’s minds. The combination of US troops in the region, unforgotten regime change rhetoric and Israel’s nuclear capabilities has created a fear of foreign invasion that is being effectively exploited by Ahmadinejad’s government.
A quid pro quo deal could take the shape of a security guarantee for Iran, signed first and foremost by the United States and the remaining Security Council members. One major problem might be the difficulty in convincing Iran of the legitimacy of international institutions, based on Iran’s past experience with the UN and other intergovernmental agencies. The US would also have to acknowledge Tehran as a middle power, just as they managed with China at the end of the 1960s. In turn, Iran would have to reassure the powers that any and all nuclear weapons plans have been nullified.
Critics might contend that an Iran-US agreement is out of sight, but the level of distrust in the region does not allow for a gradual approach to solve problems like the island question of the Strait of Hormuz. Others might argue that such an agreement would grant Iran more time to further develop counter-deterrents. What is needed, therefore, is a neutral meeting ground for the two tense parties. Germany should take the initiative during her EU presidency and suggest an international conference on Gulf Security for 2008 in Berlin—130 years after Bismarck’s successful conference on the Balkans.
Dr. Maximilian Terhalle is an expert on the Middle East with extensive regional experience. He works with the German Army on security policy related to the Gulf and transatlantic relations. He studied International Relations, Arabic and Middle East Politics in London, Cairo, Berlin and Bonn. This article reflects entirely his private opinion.
Related Material from the Atlantic Community:
- Christoph Bertram on Gently Nudging Iran to Play Ball
- John K. Cooley Calls For A Comprehensive US-Iranian Dialogue
- 0
