"We are all Americans," declared Jacques Chirac after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Europe's transatlanticists rejoiced as Nicolas Sarkozy came to power because France's new president was regarded as a friend of the United States and its president. However, the fissure with George W. Bush over the Iraq war was soon to follow. Furthermore, it appeared as if Sarkozy had taken his political style from Bush himself. Hence, France's EU Council presidency was stamped with historical irony: Europe would be led for six months by a man whose handling of foreign policy resembled the predominantly unilateral approach of Bush, which is, of course, downright hated by Europeans.
Germany is not least of all opposed to Sarkozy's political style. As its longstanding partner, Berlin sharply senses the new unilateralism of Paris. The French President has repeatedly demonstrated to the German Chancellor that, according to his vision, France is the leader of Europe, and that he will work according to his own agenda in his own best interests: if necessary, Sarkozy will question the stability package and the political independence of the European Central Bank. Without agreement from the other EU member states and from the United States, he consented, at the political approach of Moscow, to create a new Eurasian security architecture and hold an OSZE summit in the first half of 2009. His vision for a Mediterranean Union and a European economic government would procure a dominant role for France in Europe - to the disadvantage of the smaller EU member states.
Sarkozy confronted the EU with a ‘fait accompli' by filling the position of director of the International Monetary Fund with former French finance minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Indeed, Paris spoke with Luxembourg and the United States about this nomination, but not with its closest ally, Germany. Germany was also surprised and disgruntled when Sarkozy's foreign minister Bernhard Kouchner initiated Tony Blair as the Middle East delegate with ten EU states, effectively declaring the stipulated international plan for peace in the Middle East invalid.
France's Lebanon conference, without the participation of Europe, led to irritation within the EU and the UN. Furthermore, by acting without UN mandates for military intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic, Paris has demonstrated its role as Africa's sheriff.
The result of this political style is perhaps worse for EU governmental structures than Bush's style was for the US: as it stands, the Lisbon treaty is still not in effect. Sarkozy's approach to missile defense at the EU-Russia Summit in Nice did not solve the relationship problems between Moscow and Brussels, especially his unfounded statement that missile defenses in the Czech Republic or Poland would not better Europe's security. Paris also gave up one of Europe's few sanctioning options against Russia: the adjournment of negotiations over a partnership agreement. As a result, Russian troops are still occupying South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Is it any wonder, then, that Sarkozy's promised attempt to revitalize the European security and defense policy is no longer heard of? On the contrary: with its nationalistic unilateralism France undermines the creation of a unified foreign and security policy of the EU. The hopeful notes of "Sarkozy l'Américain" have gone flat. Where is "Sarkozy l'Européen?"
Thomas Speckmann is consultant to the Office of the Governor of the Federal State of North-Rhine Westphalia and assistant lecturer at the seminar on political science and sociology of the University of Bonn.
This translation from German was prepared by David Neil Lebhar of the Atlantic Community Editorial Team.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Memo 10: Time to Start Transatlantic Relations Afresh
- Stanley R. Sloan: How and Why did NATO Survive the Bush Doctrine?
- Nanne Zwagerman: Obama the Atlanticist?
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December 30, 2008
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Yet, "Sarkozy l'Américain" is rarely a justice to the USA when combined with what Speckmann puts here as Sarkozy's nationalist unilateralism that makes "Sarkozy Le français" a more apt description, given the different contexts that any President of the USA is located in, than from, say, any Head of State of a European state, within the European Union as well as any President of the European Union, in its rotational basis of selection.
It makes more sense to look at Sarkozy's style of functioning as "Sarkozy Le français", than anything else. The friendly rivalry between the various NATO members sometimes get expressed as other varieties: between 'exit' and 'voice' people and as one finds in expressions such as "Sarkozy l'Américain"! These other varieties do mask what one can term as 'simmering' sentiments of 'difference' that is used, to define an 'other-ness' from what one sometimes puts as the Anglo-saxon world, seen largely as Britain & USA-Canada. Yet, the idea of a common European identtity that seeks to be inclusive - by its very demands [this is something that one needs to mention here given such notions of ascription : even a Braudellian re-narration of French nationalism and nation-building (as one of the strong examples of nation-states in the world) exercises interpreted as an 'European' exercise of today, should it be attempted, is bound to fail by the very logic that calls forth for Speckmann's observations, even if one dis-counts what the traditional Franco-German rivalry within Europa by itself submits, in its exclusion - the other nation-states of 'old europe'] necessarily needs to be able to define European-ness, where the notion of consensual governance enjoys a certain privilege. Charges of weakening this privilege of consensual governance within Europa is one thing and tags like "Sarkozy l'Américain" or when will he turn into a "Sarkozy l'Européen" are another abnd do not make much of a sense. Especially when "Sarkozy l'Américain" was hardly ever "Sarkozy l'Européen" , to begin with, given the stark differences that exixts between the USA and the Europa.
Within similar discussions here, when one first faced this notion of "Sarkozy l'Américain" - the notion of "Sarkozy l'Américain" was put forth as a dismayed discovery. But one hopes that the notion of "Sarkozy l'Américain" is discontinued, for his preference for a security network with the CIS states, definitely does not amke him a George W. Bush to begin with. Moreover, should one not delve into the 'voice' and 'exit' people demarcation, as a point of 'difference' and distinction, then the notion of "Sarkozy Le français" would suffice equally - even if one delved into it. The 'immigrant' status of France's First Family strengthens Europa, while charges of French nationalism strengthens Sarkozy's position within France while it takes care of the fears some may have held - given the 'immigrant' status of France's First Family.
As for the notion of a pan-european security network - that includes the CIS states - it is a healthy view that encpasulates the earlier notions and principles that brought forth the European Union into existence: Of the expansion of an inter-dependent network that may foster and enlarge the 'zone-of-peace' while it banishes war. It is too early to say what the Eurasian Security Umbrella may look like and/or if it may become feasible.
But yes, given the old Franco-German rivalry here, Speckmann's bringing forth the 'voice' and 'exit' people demarcation and the notion of Sarkozy as a Bush in garb barely does justice to either Bush or Sarkozy, even if one appreciates Speckmann's distaste for the policies of George W Bush.
But yes, the privilege of consensual governance that Europa enjoys and encourages, based upon the principles of proportioniality, is something that is a wonderful concept for Europa, and the world at large and does banish the notions of less-than-equal relations - in any such enterprise that Europa symbolises in the present times.