Russia's package of presents to the Serbian people include a loan worth one billion dollars including the financing of important highway and railroad projects, investments in the national oil and gas industry, within Serbia's participation in the South Stream gas project as well as several agreements in the domain of parliamentarian, police, disaster relief and cultural cooperation.
The fact that Medvedev is the first Russian president to hold a speech in the Serbian Parliament, with a clear message directed to Washington and Brussels, further underscores the significance of this visit. Seemingly in response to President Obama's reset policy towards Russia, Medvedev expressed his country's readiness to harmonize relations with the US and seek peaceful and constructive cooperation with NATO. At the same time, President Medvedev reiterated the need to modernize the existing European security structure with the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia as its founding pillar.
The establishment of a disaster relief center in South Serbia will give Russia an important regional logistical base for operations ranging from humanitarian relief to anti-terrorist interventions. It has not been revealed what type of equipment and weapons will be transferred to that base. Out of the countries that participate in the South Stream project, Serbia is the first to enter a joint venture agreement with Gazprom for the construction of underground gas storage. By making Serbia a pivotal energy player for the transportation and distribution of natural gas, the country would become another dependant and loyal friend who could help assert Russian influence within the EU, particularly with regard to the European security concept. In this context, it does not come as a surprise that Russia supports Serbia's EU membership.
For Serbia, the "no-strings-attached" Russian loan might appear more attractive than the conditionality of IMF, World Bank or EU loans. Yet, in the long-term, it impedes the implementation of sound fiscal and monetary policies and encourages corruption and nepotism. The estimated half a billion Euros in annual transit fees from South Stream are certainly most welcome in the Serbian cash-strapped state budget.
But Gazprom's unchallenged position in the Serbian gas and oil industry increases Serbia's vulnerability towards Russia and, as the Serbian newspaper Politika reported shortly after Medvedev's visit, already begins translating into higher gas prices for Serbian consumers. Serbia appreciates Russia's unwavering support with regard to Kosovo. Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, however, undermined Serbia's diplomatic battle for Kosovo. No surprise, Medvedev suggested that there is a difference between the conflicts on the Balkans and the Caucasus, which lies in sharp contrast to statements made by Russian state officials and scholars after the recognition of Kosovo.
Serbia also runs the risk of misinterpreting the message between the lines. Public statements that contain highly personalized and emotional language such as "natural partnership", "brothers" or "one people" can create overly optimistic expectations and unsubstantiated hopes. Thus, these words should only be used if they have actual grounding in reality.
Serbia should keep a right balance in its international relations. An open-door policy should include good relations with Russia, but not at the expense of Serbia's vital national interests such as the democratic reform process and the successful integration into the European and the Euro-Atlantic security structure.
Serbia's dance with the bear could actually be a signal to the EU to accelerate the country's accession process. Therefore, the EU needs to make unequivocally clear that Serbia, together with the other former Yugoslav republics, belongs to the European family and a common European identity. The approval of visa-free travels to the EU Schengen area and a one-million Euro credit line for infrastructure projects in the next five years are steps in the right direction. NATO should encourage closer cooperation between Serbia and other Partnership for Peace member countries. At the same time, the EU should facilitate cultural, scientific and especially student and youth exchange initiatives so that the 70 percent of Serbian citizens, who have never left the country, gain the opportunity to embrace the European idea and Western values. Ultimately, it is only the Serbian people who can ensure that "Serbia will tie its small boat to the great European ship" as suggested by the early 20th century Serbian Foreign Minister Milovan Milovanovic.
Sonja Davidovic is a graduate from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She is currently working as an Independent Consultant for Castalia - Strategic Advisors in Washington, DC.
Related Material from the Atlantic Community:
- Elizabeth Pond: Kosovo: Balkan Success Story and Future EU Member?
- Ben Slay & Michaela Pospisilova: Proximity to Europe Hurting Baltic States in Crisis
- Rudi Guraziu: Is the EU Suffering From 'Visa Liberalization Fatigue'?
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November 6, 2009
Member deleted
The strengthening of relations between Serbia and Russia can not be and should not be interpreted as a natural disadvantage for Serbia for its relations with the EU. Nor does Russia's developing closer relations with its neighbours a threat for the EU. The very idea of such an antagonistical imagination goes against the very grains of the EU and the various exercises that the EU is engaged in globally - of fostering regional co-operations to encourage a growth like that of the EU. Secondly, Russia-EU co-operation is vital for both their strategic security and stability in the region. The EU is quite keen to expand its zone of peace and that does not necessarily mean an acceleration in its expansion or the expansion of the zone of peace as meaning an expansion of the EU. The EU would be happy to see similar regional co-operations in place in various parts of the world - of what it itself symbolises: Institutional and Structural integration and inter-dependence that peace easier to envisage than conflict.
The idea of looking at EU-Russia relations through the cold war logic is self-defeating and not pragmatic - though one would agree with concerns that a lop-sided dependence does. That is precisely where the EU would be keen to offer its expertise as well as present itself as model for regional co-operations that do not mean a multi-polar world in the 'realist' sense.
Russia's endeavours to move towards achieving a societal growth that is compatible and competitive with EU standards (if not the Nordic standards) should not be discouraged or misunderstood even as Russia should not be mistaken to be the new saint. It merely is moving away from such conceptual traps and looking at the issues more pragmatically in a changing and evolving world.
It would be a fallacy to envision the expansion of the EU on such logic. The EU is not a competitive power in the realist sense and presents a promise of the feasibility of institutional-structural arrangements between states that can foster both peace and development. It would be a fallacy to look at the EU as a state in terms of a unit within certain discourses in International Relations that so bind or rather blind certain views.
It would be more prudent to look at the possible development of similar co-operation between the states of eastern europe or even encourage such developments that can look at institutional-structural arrangements for co-operation on the lines of the EU than looking at the EU as the new el-dorado. It is not.