Iran’s nuclear program has been the focus of international concern since 2003, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered that Iran had been breaching its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement for over 18 years. By August 2003 the French, German, and British foreign ministers, known as the E3, took collective action by seeking to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. The key European players were later united by the EU High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, as the EU3 in autumn 2004. Yet the European mediation encountered a serious setback one year later in August 2005, when Tehran restarted its uranium enrichment activities after almost two years of postponements. The EU3 then shifted gears from mediation to coalition building in order to lay the foundation for a sanctions-based strategy. In January 2006 the EU3 was joined by the United States, China, and Russia to become the EU3+3.

So far this most recent constellation has failed to stop Iran’s pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle capacity, namely the ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium. The sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747 have not altered Tehran’s course. While it is too early for a final verdict, important lessons can be drawn from the EU3+3 experience with Iran.

Originally the E3 and EU3 sought to resolve the conflict over Tehran’s suspicious civilian program by restoring confidence in its peaceful nature. This included urging it to suspend sensitive activities and come clean on past transgressions. But the strategy was doomed to failure because of its inconsistency with basic assumptions about successful mediation in international conflict. Threats and benefits do not, as a rule, generate stable conflict resolution unless supported by all of the major powers concerned, in this case the United States as well as Russia and China.

It is important to keep in mind that the crucial moment in the unfolding crisis will not occur when Iran explodes a nuclear device, but when the international community believes that Iran has the capacity to build one. Further diplomatic action, however, must also take into account the security concerns of neighboring states, especially Israel, which understandably define a crisis situation on the basis of a much lower threshold. Based on this premise, the following lessons should be drawn from recent EU3 experience with Iran:

1. The European initiative bought some time for negotiations but was ill prepared to facilitate a diplomatic settlement. The EU3 simply did not have the negotiating power or essential incentives at its disposal. Either the EU3 and Washington will confront Tehran together or they will perish separately when diplomacy fails. To make a credible last ditch diplomatic initiative and to address the risk of future transatlantic divergence on the issue, the EU3 and the United States need to define the essential elements of a “comprehensive settlement,” whose rejection by Iran would close ranks in the international community. Washington’s approval of security assurances for Iran must be a central component of a credible comprehensive settlement.
2. Since the zero enrichment option has been overtaken by Iran’s technical progress, the comprehensive package must include a balanced, verified, and phased approach to uranium enrichment on Iranian territory under strict international safeguards. If Tehran’s drive for advanced nuclear technology is partially motivated by prestige and domestic political concerns, a comprehensive settlement must address these motives.
3. In order to limit Iran’s ability to manipulate public opinion and the policies of the non-aligned movement, the Bush administration must overcome its internal differences and forge a consistent course on Iran. Diplomatic negotiations combined with US bilateral measures, such as thinly veiled threats of regime change or pre-positioning of military capacities in the Middle East, will not provide the Iranian regime with viable options. So far these approaches have effectively undermined Washington’s effort to build a great power consensus.
4. Finally, the concentration of power among Iran’s political and religious elite indicates that Iranian society may have to endure considerable hardship under economic sanctions before there is any political motion. Therefore, Iran will likely reach the critical nuclear weapons threshold before serious sanctions by the Security Council are able to change Iran’s priorities. As a result, prolonged restraint by Israel and the United States in particular is a diminishing resource for the EU3 effort. To succeed, the EU3+3 will have to work very hard in the near future to maintain the current level of restraint.

Sebastian Harnisch is professor of political science at the Ruprecht Karls University of Heidelberg.

This article is presented as an excerpt from a longer essay published in the Global Edition of Internationale Politik, Germany’s foremost foreign policy journal and a collaboration partner of the Atlantic Community.

The Lessons of the EU’s Iran Diplomacy, IP Global Edition Fall 2007


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