The recently published detailed proposal from Russian President Dmitri Medvedev for a new European security architecture enlivened the debate about the EU-Russia relationship. Yet under the term security, Russians understand something far different from the EU’s concept of soft power, especially when dealing with the common neighborhood in Eastern Europe. The EU’s vision of security implies long-term modernization leading to stability and the resolution of frozen conflicts. Russia’s, on the other hand, concentrates on hard security. These diverging perceptions of security challenges in the common neighborhood are responsible for Moscow’s suspicions toward the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, formed in May 2009 with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
It will be difficult if not impossible to receive a positive reaction from Moscow both in terms of the Eastern Partnership and in areas such as the definition of new security challenges or the resolution of frozen conflicts. This will remain true as long as the overarching relations, in particular in the area of security, are unsettled. This paper calls for an integrated EU approach using a combination of existing and developing instruments in order improve the gridlocked constellation of cooperation platforms with Russia in the common neighborhood.
Firstly, within the framework of the EaP, the EU should engage Russia together with the partner countries in conflict resolution—ideally starting firstly with the conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh—and secondly, with the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises in Eastern Europe. These areas comprise openly-expressed shared interests and would bring them together to make a first step toward increased cooperation in practical projects that increase trust in the common neighborhood.
Secondly, so that convergence of the EaP countries with the EU is not perceived as targeted divergence from Russia, parallel progress in agreeing on a follow-up Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia is urgently needed. In order to achieve more effective cooperation in the framework of the PCA and the Four Common Spaces (Common Economic Space, Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, Space on External Security and that on Research, Education, Culture), the EU should make evidence-based investments by evaluating which areas among the four above mentioned promise the most advancements and returns on investment . The EU should foster these areas in particular rather than focus on too many items at once with heavily diverging outcomes and prospects for future success.
Thirdly, the EU should respond positively to Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal and engage in dialogue with Moscow in order to produce a mutually acceptable and more detailed version. In doing so, both old and new members must overcome a history of fragmented bilateral strategies particularly regarding relations with Russia and respond with one voice.
Finally, the incorporation of Russia into the European security architecture must occur independently from NATO but parallel to it at the same time. Independently because a new council is needed in which Russia can help shaping from the very beginning, and parallel to NATO secondly, because most EU member states still see NATO and its US participation as the preferred institution for providing security in Europe. A new Euro-Atlantic Security Council within the OSCE would provide such a forum and institutionally integrate the Russian Federation equally into decision-making processes on jointly defined issues that are not dealt with within NATO.
With the help of the brand new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, created in the frame of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is now in a position, given the necessary political will to take the initiative on all of these action items and display its unity in foreign policy.
Cortnie Shupe is currently a Project Manager in the "Young Professional Programm" at the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Before Ms. Shupe came to the foundation, she worked as a consultant and Research Associate at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin and focused on governance issues of partnerships in development and humanitarian aid.
Related Material from Atlantic Community:
- Joshua Posaner: Political Pipelines as Diplomatic Fault Lines
- Heinrich Bonnenberg: Europe is More than the EU
- Aleksandra Palagnyuk: The Russia-Georgia War and Its Impact on EU Foreign Policy
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February 10, 2010
Greg Randolph Lawson, Wikistrat, Platinum Contributor (507)
The interests of Europe and Russia only somewhat converge and on perceived "existential
issues, they actually diverge rather dramatically. Russia needs to make money off of its natural resources. This will always mean energy competition as Europe seeks diversification of supplies and move away from over reliance on Russia. While, at the same time, Russia does need more foreign investment, much of which could come from Europe, it will never allow that to become a paramount concern.
Russia wants strategic depth. It always has since the Mongol invasions before there was a unified Russian state. Given its experiences at the hands of Napoleon and Hitler, it also still wants a western buffer zone that includes places like Ukraine and Georgia. Afterall, it continues to have a not altogether illegitimate fear of westward expansion, not only physically, but philosophically.
That fear of "westernization" is an existential fear that is deep and informs part of the Russian worldview. Yes, there are modernizers and those in Russia that want to embrace much of what Europe has to offer, however, cultural divides matter and cannot be easily papered over.
As for the Medvedev proposal for a "new European security architecture", what sober analysts think it is anything other than a shrewd gambit to split Europe and the US?
One can't blame Russia for their perspective. Their history is filled with so much tragedy, it would be hard not to be empathetic. However, retaining a realistic assesment of intentions still is needed.
While Europe (and America) need not be wantonly provocative towards Russia, they also should not become overly accomodative in the pursuit of illusory partnerships.